a discourse on method-第5章
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was possible; results attributable to the circumstance that I commenced with the simplest and most general truths; and that thus each truth discovered was a rule available in the discovery of subsequent ones Nor in this perhaps shall I appear too vain; if it be considered that; as the truth on any particular point is one whoever apprehends the truth; knows all that on that point can be known。 The child; for example; who has been instructed in the elements of arithmetic; and has made a particular addition; according to rule; may be assured that he has found; with respect to the sum of the numbers before him; and that in this instance is within the reach of human genius。 Now; in conclusion; the method which teaches adherence to the true order; and an exact enumeration of all the conditions of the thing 。sought includes all that gives certitude to the rules of arithmetic。
But the chief ground of my satisfaction with thus method; was the assurance I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters; if not with absolute perfection; at least with the greatest attainable by me: besides; I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually habituated to clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects; and I hoped also; from not having restricted this method to any particular matter; to apply it to the difficulties of the other sciences; with not less success than to those of algebra。 I should not; however; on this account have ventured at once on the examination of all the difficulties of the sciences which presented themselves to me; for this would have been contrary to the order prescribed in the method; but observing that the knowledge of such is dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy; in which I found nothing certain; I thought it necessary first of all to endeavor to establish its principles。 。And because I observed; besides; that an inquiry of this kind was of all others of the greatest moment; and one in which precipitancy and anticipation in judgment were most to be dreaded; I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a more mature age (being at that time but twenty…three); and had first of all employed much of my time in preparation for the work; as well by eradicating from my mind all the erroneous opinions I had up to that moment accepted; as by amassing variety of experience to afford materials for my reasonings; and by continually exercising myself in my chosen method with a view to increased skill in its application。
PART III
And finally; as it is not enough; before commencing to rebuild the house in which we live; that it be pulled down; and materials and builders provided; or that we engage in the work ourselves; according to a plan which we have beforehand carefully drawn out; but as it is likewise necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may live commodiously during the operations; so that I might not remain irresolute in my actions; while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgement; and that I might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible felicity; I formed a provisory code of morals; composed of three or four maxims; with which I am desirous to make you acquainted。
The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country; adhering firmly to the faith in which; by the grace of God; I had been educated from my childhood and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions; and the farthest removed from extremes; which should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most judicious of those among whom I might be living。 For as I had from that time begun to hold my own opinions for nought because I wished to subject them all to examination; I was convinced that I could not do better than follow in the meantime the opinions of the most judicious; and although there are some perhaps among the Persians and Chinese as judicious as among ourselves; expediency seemed to dictate that I should regulate my practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom I should have to live; and it appeared to me that; in order to ascertain the real opinions of such; I ought rather to take cognizance of what they practised than of what they said; not only because; in the corruption of our manners; there are few disposed to speak exactly as they believe; but also because very many are not aware of what it is that they really believe; for; as the act of mind by which a thing is believed is different from that by which we know that we believe it; the one act is often found without the other。 Also; amid many opinions held in equal repute; I chose always the most moderate; as much for the reason that these are always the most convenient for practice; and probably the best (for all excess is generally vicious); as that; in the event of my falling into error; I might be at less distance from the truth than if; having chosen one of the extremes; it should turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted。 And I placed in the class of extremes especially all promises by which somewhat of our freedom is abridged; not that I disapproved of the laws which; to provide against the instability of men of feeble resolution; when what is sought to be accomplished is some good; permit engagements by vows and contracts binding the parties to persevere in it; or even; for the security of commerce; sanction similar engagements where the purpose sought to be realized is indifferent: but because I did not find anything on earth which was wholly superior to change; and because; for myself in particular; I hoped gradually to perfect my judgments; and not to suffer them to deteriorate; I would have deemed it a grave sin against good sense; if; for the reason that I approved of something at a particular time; I therefore bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent time; when perhaps it had ceased to be so; or I had ceased to esteem it such。
My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able; and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions; when once adopted; than if they had been highly certain; imitating in this the example of travelers who; when they have lost their way in a forest; ought not to wander from side to side; far less remain in one place; but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible; without changing their direction for slight reasons; although perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection; for in this way; if they do not exactly reach the point they desire; they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest。 In the same way; since in action it frequently happens that no delay is permissible; it is very certain that; when it is not in our power to determine what is true; we ought to act according to what is most probable; and even although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion than in another; we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other; and afterwards consider it; in so far as it relates to practice; as no longer dubious; but manifestly true and certain; since the reason by which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these qualities。 This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds as; destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice; allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best; which they abandon the next; as the opposite。
My third maxim was to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than fortune; and change my desires rather than the order of the world; and in general; accustom myself to the persuasion that; except our own thoughts; there is nothing absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our best in things external to us; all wherein we fail of success is to be held; as regards us; absolutely impossible: and this single principle seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future anything which I could not obtain; and thus render me contented; for since our will naturally seeks th