a discourse on method-第4章

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　which　has　not　been　maintained　by　some　on　of　the　philosophers；　and　afterwards　in　the　course　of　my　travels　I　remarked　that　all　those　whose　opinions　are　decidedly　repugnant　to　ours　are　not　in　that　account　barbarians　and　savages；　but　on　the　contrary　that　many　of　these　nations　make　an　equally　good；　if　not　better；　use　of　their　reason　than　we　do。　　I　took　into　account　also　the　very　different　character　which　a　person　brought　up　from　infancy　in　France　or　Germany　exhibits；　from　that　which；　with　the　same　mind　originally；　this　individual　would　have　possessed　had　he　lived　always　among　the　Chinese　or　with　savages；　and　the　circumstance　that　in　dress　itself　the　fashion　which　pleased　us　ten　years　ago；　and　which　may　again；　perhaps；　be　received　into　favor　before　ten　years　have　gone；　appears　to　us　at　this　moment　extravagant　and　ridiculous。　　I　was　thus　led　to　infer　that　the　ground　of　our　opinions　is　far　more　custom　and　example　than　any　certain　knowledge。　　And；　finally；　although　such　be　the　ground　of　our　opinions；　I　remarked　that　a　plurality　of　suffrages　is　no　guarantee　of　truth　where　it　is　at　all　of　difficult　discovery；　as　in　such　cases　it　is　much　more　likely　that　it　will　be　found　by　one　than　by　many。　　I　could；　however；　select　from　the　crowd　no　one　whose　opinions　seemed　worthy　of　preference；　and　thus　I　found　myself　constrained；　as　it　were；　to　use　my　own　reason　in　the　conduct　of　my　life。

But　like　one　walking　alone　and　in　the　dark；　I　resolved　to　proceed　so　slowly　and　with　such　circumspection；　that　if　I　did　not　advance　far；　I　would　at　least　guard　against　falling。　　I　did　not　even　choose　to　dismiss　summarily　any　of　the　opinions　that　had　crept　into　my　belief　without　having　been　introduced　by　reason；　but　first　of　all　took　sufficient　time　carefully　to　satisfy　myself　of　the　general　nature　of　the　task　I　was　setting　myself；　and　ascertain　the　true　method　by　which　to　arrive　at　the　knowledge　of　whatever　lay　within　the　compass　of　my　powers。

Among　the　branches　of　philosophy；　I　had；　at　an　earlier　period；　given　some　attention　to　logic；　and　among　those　of　the　mathematics　to　geometrical　analysis　and　algebra；　　three　arts　or　sciences　which　ought；　as　I　conceived；　to　contribute　something　to　my　design。　　But；　on　examination；　I　found　that；　as　for　logic；　its　syllogisms　and　the　majority　of　its　other　precepts　are　of　avail…　rather　in　the　communication　of　what　we　already　know；　or　even　as　the　art　of　Lully；　in　speaking　without　judgment　of　things　of　which　we　are　ignorant；　than　in　the　investigation　of　the　unknown；　and　although　this　science　contains　indeed　a　number　of　correct　and　very　excellent　precepts；　there　are；　nevertheless；　so　many　others；　and　these　either　injurious　or　superfluous；　mingled　with　the　former；　that　it　is　almost　quite　as　difficult　to　effect　a　severance　of　the　true　from　the　false　as　it　is　to　extract　a　Diana　or　a　Minerva　from　a　rough　block　of　marble。　Then　as　to　the　analysis　of　the　ancients　and　the　algebra　of　the　moderns；　besides　that　they　embrace　only　matters　highly　abstract；　and；　to　appearance；　of　no　use；　the　former　is　so　exclusively　restricted　to　the　consideration　of　figures；　that　it　can　exercise　the　understanding　only　on　condition　of　greatly　fatiguing　the　imagination；　and；　in　the　latter；　there　is　so　complete　a　subjection　to　certain　rules　and　formulas；　that　there　results　an　art　full　of　confusion　and　obscurity　calculated　to　embarrass；　instead　of　a　science　fitted　to　cultivate　the　mind。　　By　these　considerations　I　was　induced　to　seek　some　other　method　which　would　comprise　the　advantages　of　the　three　and　be　exempt　from　their　defects。　　And　as　a　multitude　of　laws　often　only　hampers　justice；　so　that　a　state　is　best　governed　when；　with　few　laws；　these　are　rigidly　administered；　in　like　manner；　instead　of　the　great　number　of　precepts　of　which　logic　is　composed；　I　believed　that　the　four　following　would　prove　perfectly　sufficient　for　me；　provided　I　took　the　firm　and　unwavering　resolution　never　in　a　single　instance　to　fail　in　observing　them。

The　first　was　never　to　accept　anything　for　true　which　I　did　not　clearly　know　to　be　such；　that　is　to　say；　carefully　to　avoid　precipitancy　and　prejudice；　and　to　comprise　nothing　more　in　my　judgement　than　what　was　presented　to　my　mind　so　clearly　and　distinctly　as　to　exclude　all　ground　of　doubt。

The　second；　to　divide　each　of　the　difficulties　under　examination　into　as　many　parts　as　possible；　and　as　might　be　necessary　for　its　adequate　solution。

The　third；　to　conduct　my　thoughts　in　such　order　that；　by　commencing　with　objects　the　simplest　and　easiest　to　know；　I　might　ascend　by　little　and　little；　and；　as　it　were；　step　by　step；　to　the　knowledge　of　the　more　complex；　assigning　in　thought　a　certain　order　even　to　those　objects　which　in　their　own　nature　do　not　stand　in　a　relation　of　antecedence　and　sequence。

And　the　last；　in　every　case　to　make　enumerations　so　complete；　and　reviews　so　general；　that　I　might　be　assured　that　nothing　was　omitted。

The　long　chains　of　simple　and　easy　reasonings　by　means　of　which　geometers　are　accustomed　to　reach　the　conclusions　of　their　most　difficult　demonstrations；　had　led　me　to　imagine　that　all　things；　to　the　knowledge　of　which　man　is　competent；　are　mutually　connected　in　the　same　way；　and　that　there　is　nothing　so　far　removed　from　us　as　to　be　beyond　our　reach；　or　so　hidden　that　we　cannot　discover　it；　provided　only　we　abstain　from　accepting　the　false　for　the　true；　and　always　preserve　in　our　thoughts　the　order　necessary　for　the　deduction　of　one　truth　from　another。　　And　I　had　little　difficulty　in　determining　the　objects　with　which　it　was　necessary　to　commence；　for　I　was　already　persuaded　that　it　must　be　with　the　simplest　and　easiest　to　know；　and；　considering　that　of　all　those　who　have　hitherto　sought　truth　in　the　sciences；　the　mathematicians　alone　have　been　able　to　find　any　demonstrations；　that　is；　any　certain　and　evident　reasons；　I　did　not　doubt　but　that　such　must　have　been　the　rule　of　their　investigations。　　I　resolved　to　commence；　therefore；　with　the　examination　of　the　simplest　objects；　not　anticipating；　however；　from　this　any　other　advantage　than　that　to　be　found　in　accustoming　my　mind　to　the　love　and　nourishment　of　truth；　and　to　a　distaste　for　all　such　reasonings　as　were　unsound。　　But　I　had　no　intention　on　that　account　of　attempting　to　master　all　the　particular　sciences　commonly　denominated　mathematics：　　but　observing　that；　however　different　their　objects；　they　all　agree　in　considering　only　the　various　relations　or　proportions　subsisting　among　those　objects；　I　thought　it　best　for　my　purpose　to　consider　these　proportions　in　the　most　general　form　possible；　without　referring　them　to　any　objects　in　particular；　except　such　as　would　most　facilitate　the　knowledge　of　them；　and　without　by　any　means　restricting　them　to　these；　that　afterwards　I　might　thus　be　the　better　able　to　apply　them　to　every　other　class　of　objects　to　which　they　are　legitimately　applicable。　　Perceiving　further；　that　in　order　to　understand　these　relations　I　should　sometimes　have　to　consider　them　one　by　one　and　sometimes　only　to　bear　them　in　mind；　or　embrace　them　in　the　aggregate；　I　thought　that；　in　order　the　better　to　consider　them　individually；　I　should　view　them　as　subsisting　between　straight　lines；　than　which　I　could　find　no　objects　more　simple；　or　capable　of　being　more　distinctly　represented　to　my　imagination　and　senses；　and　on　the　other　hand；　that　in　order　to　retain　them　in　the　memory　or　embrace　an　aggregate　of　many；　I　should　express　them　by　certain　characters　the　briefest　possible。　　In　this　way　I　believed　that　I　could　borrow　all　that　was　best　both　in　geometrical　analysis　and　in　algebra；　and　correct　all　the　defects　of　the　one　by　help　of　the　other。

And；　in　point　of　fact；　the　accurate　observance　of　these　few　precepts　gave　me；　I　take　the　liberty　of　saying；　such　ease　in　unraveling　all　the　questions　embraced　in　these　two　sciences；　that　in　the　two　or　three　months　I　devoted　to　their　examination；　not　only　did　I　reach　solutions　of　questions　I　had　formerly　deemed　exceedingly　difficult　but　even　as　regards　questions　of　the　solution　of　which　I　continued　ignorant；　I　was　enabled；　as　it　appeared　to　me；　to　determine　the　means　whereby；　and　the　extent　to　which　a　solution　was　possible；　results　attributable　to　the　circumstance　that　I　commenced　with　the　simplest　and　most