a discourse on method-第12章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


and　the　other　internal　affections　can　likewise　impress　upon　it　divers　ideas；　what　must　be　understood　by　the　common　sense　（sensus　communis）　in　which　these　ideas　are　received；　by　the　memory　which　retains　them；　by　the　fantasy　which　can　change　them　in　various　ways；　and　out　of　them　compose　new　ideas；　and　which；　by　the　same　means；　distributing　the　animal　spirits　through　the　muscles；　can　cause　the　members　of　such　a　body　to　move　in　as　many　different　ways；　and　in　a　manner　as　suited；　whether　to　the　objects　that　are　presented　to　its　senses　or　to　its　internal　affections；　as　can　take　place　in　our　own　case　apart　from　the　guidance　of　the　will。　　Nor　will　this　appear　at　all　strange　to　those　who　are　acquainted　with　the　variety　of　movements　performed　by　the　different　automata；　or　moving　machines　fabricated　by　human　industry；　and　that　with　help　of　but　few　pieces　compared　with　the　great　multitude　of　bones；　muscles；　nerves；　arteries；　veins；　and　other　parts　that　are　found　in　the　body　of　each　animal。　　Such　persons　will　look　upon　this　body　as　a　machine　made　by　the　hands　of　God；　which　is　incomparably　better　arranged；　and　adequate　to　movements　more　admirable　than　is　any　machine　of　human　invention。　　And　here　I　specially　stayed　to　show　that；　were　there　such　machines　exactly　resembling　organs　and　outward　form　an　ape　or　any　other　irrational　animal；　we　could　have　no　means　of　knowing　that　they　were　in　any　respect　of　a　different　nature　from　these　animals；　but　if　there　were　machines　bearing　the　image　of　our　bodies；　and　capable　of　imitating　our　actions　as　far　as　it　is　morally　possible；　there　would　still　remain　two　most　certain　tests　whereby　to　know　that　they　were　not　therefore　really　men。　　Of　these　the　first　is　that　they　could　never　use　words　or　other　signs　arranged　in　such　a　manner　as　is　competent　to　us　in　order　to　declare　our　thoughts　to　others：　　for　we　may　easily　conceive　a　machine　to　be　so　constructed　that　it　emits　vocables；　and　even　that　it　emits　some　correspondent　to　the　action　upon　it　of　external　objects　which　cause　a　change　in　its　organs；　for　example；　if　touched　in　a　particular　place　it　may　demand　what　we　wish　to　say　to　it；　if　in　another　it　may　cry　out　that　it　is　hurt；　and　such　like；　but　not　that　it　should　arrange　them　variously　so　as　appositely　to　reply　to　what　is　said　in　its　presence；　as　men　of　the　lowest　grade　of　intellect　can　do。　　The　second　test　is；　that　although　such　machines　might　execute　many　things　with　equal　or　perhaps　greater　perfection　than　any　of　us；　they　would；　without　doubt；　fail　in　certain　others　from　which　it　could　be　discovered　that　they　did　not　act　from　knowledge；　but　solely　from　the　disposition　of　their　organs：　　for　while　reason　is　an　universal　instrument　that　is　alike　available　on　every　occasion；　these　organs；　on　the　contrary；　need　a　particular　arrangement　for　each　particular　action；　whence　it　must　be　morally　impossible　that　there　should　exist　in　any　machine　a　diversity　of　organs　sufficient　to　enable　it　to　act　in　all　the　occurrences　of　life；　in　the　way　in　which　our　reason　enables　us　to　act。　　Again；　by　means　of　these　two　tests　we　may　likewise　know　the　difference　between　men　and　brutes。　　For　it　is　highly　deserving　of　remark；　that　there　are　no　men　so　dull　and　stupid；　not　even　idiots；　as　to　be　incapable　of　joining　together　different　words；　and　thereby　constructing　a　declaration　by　which　to　make　their　thoughts　understood；　and　that　on　the　other　hand；　there　is　no　other　animal；　however　perfect　or　happily　circumstanced；　which　can　do　the　like。　　Nor　does　this　inability　arise　from　want　of　organs：　　for　we　observe　that　magpies　and　parrots　can　utter　words　like　ourselves；　and　are　yet　unable　to　speak　as　we　do；　that　is；　so　as　to　show　that　they　understand　what　they　say；　in　place　of　which　men　born　deaf　and　dumb；　and　thus　not　less；　but　rather　more　than　the　brutes；　destitute　of　the　organs　which　others　use　in　speaking；　are　in　the　habit　of　spontaneously　inventing　certain　signs　by　which　they　discover　their　thoughts　to　those　who；　being　usually　in　their　company；　have　leisure　to　learn　their　language。　And　this　proves　not　only　that　the　brutes　have　less　reason　than　man；　but　that　they　have　none　at　all：　　for　we　see　that　very　little　is　required　to　enable　a　person　to　speak；　and　since　a　certain　inequality　of　capacity　is　observable　among　animals　of　the　same　species；　as　well　as　among　men；　and　since　some　are　more　capable　of　being　instructed　than　others；　it　is　incredible　that　the　most　perfect　ape　or　parrot　of　its　species；　should　not　in　this　be　equal　to　the　most　stupid　infant　of　its　kind　or　at　least　to　one　that　was　crack…brained；　unless　the　soul　of　brutes　were　of　a　nature　wholly　different　from　ours。　　And　we　ought　not　to　confound　speech　with　the　natural　movements　which　indicate　the　passions；　and　can　be　imitated　by　machines　as　well　as　manifested　by　animals；　nor　must　it　be　thought　with　certain　of　the　ancients；　that　the　brutes　speak；　although　we　do　not　understand　their　language。　　For　if　such　were　the　case；　since　they　are　endowed　with　many　organs　analogous　to　ours；　they　could　as　easily　communicate　their　thoughts　to　us　as　to　their　fellows。　　It　is　also　very　worthy　of　remark；　that；　though　there　are　many　animals　which　manifest　more　industry　than　we　in　certain　of　their　actions；　the　same　animals　are　yet　observed　to　show　none　at　all　in　many　others：　　so　that　the　circumstance　that　they　do　better　than　we　does　not　prove　that　they　are　endowed　with　mind；　for　it　would　thence　follow　that　they　possessed　greater　reason　than　any　of　us；　and　could　surpass　us　in　all　things；　on　the　contrary；　it　rather　proves　that　they　are　destitute　of　reason；　and　that　it　is　nature　which　acts　in　them　according　to　the　disposition　of　their　organs：　　thus　it　is　seen；　that　a　clock　composed　only　of　wheels　and　weights　can　number　the　hours　and　measure　time　more　exactly　than　we　with　all　our　skin。

I　had　after　this　described　the　reasonable　soul；　and　shown　that　it　could　by　no　means　be　educed　from　the　power　of　matter；　as　the　other　things　of　which　I　had　spoken；　but　that　it　must　be　expressly　created；　and　that　it　is　not　sufficient　that　it　be　lodged　in　the　human　body　exactly　like　a　pilot　in　a　ship；　unless　perhaps　to　move　its　members；　but　that　it　is　necessary　for　it　to　be　joined　and　united　more　closely　to　the　body；　in　order　to　have　sensations　and　appetites　similar　to　ours；　and　thus　constitute　a　real　man。　I　here　entered；　in　conclusion；　upon　the　subject　of　the　soul　at　considerable　length；　because　it　is　of　the　greatest　moment：　　for　after　the　error　of　those　who　deny　the　existence　of　God；　an　error　which　I　think　I　have　already　sufficiently　refuted；　there　is　none　that　is　more　powerful　in　leading　feeble　minds　astray　from　the　straight　path　of　virtue　than　the　supposition　that　the　soul　of　the　brutes　is　of　the　same　nature　with　our　own；　and　consequently　that　after　this　life　we　have　nothing　to　hope　for　or　fear；　more　than　flies　and　ants；　in　place　of　which；　when　we　know　how　far　they　differ　we　much　better　comprehend　the　reasons　which　establish　that　the　soul　is　of　a　nature　wholly　independent　of　the　body；　and　that　consequently　it　is　not　liable　to　die　with　the　latter　and；　finally；　because　no　other　causes　are　observed　capable　of　destroying　it；　we　are　naturally　led　thence　to　judge　that　it　is　immortal。



PART　VI

Three　years　have　now　elapsed　since　I　finished　the　treatise　containing　all　these　matters；　and　I　was　beginning　to　revise　it；　with　the　view　to　put　it　into　the　hands　of　a　printer；　when　I　learned　that　persons　to　whom　I　greatly　defer；　and　whose　authority　over　my　actions　is　hardly　less　influential　than　is　my　own　reason　over　my　thoughts；　had　condemned　a　certain　doctrine　in　physics；　published　a　short　time　previously　by　another　individual　to　which　I　will　not　say　that　I　adhered；　but　only　that；　previously　to　their　censure　I　had　observed　in　it　nothing　which　I　could　imagine　to　be　prejudicial　either　to　religion　or　to　the　state；　and　nothing　therefore　which　would　have　prevented　me　from　giving　expression　to　it　in　writing；　if　reason　had　persuaded　me　of　its　truth；　and　this　led　me　to　fear　lest　among　my　own　doctrines　likewise　some　one　might　be　found　in　which　I　had　departed　from　the　truth；　notwithstanding　the　great　care　I　have　always　taken　not　to　accord　belief　to　new　opinions　of　which　I　had　not　the　most　certain　demonstrations；　and　not　to　give　expression　to　aught　that　mi