the ethics(part v)-第3章

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by　any　means　have　been　preserved。　So　also　we　see　that　no　one　pities　an



infant；　because　it　cannot　speak；　walk；　or　reason；　or　lastly；　because　it



passes　so　many　years；　as　it　were；　in　unconsciousness。　Whereas；　if　most



people　were　born　full…grown　and　only　one　here　and　there　as　an　infant；



everyone　would　pity　the　infants；　because　infancy　would　not　then　be　looked　on



as　a　state　natural　and　necessary；　but　as　a　fault　or　delinquency　in　Nature；



and　we　may　note　several　other　instances　of　the　same　sort。











Prop。VII。　Emotions　which　are　aroused　or　spring　from　reason；　if



we　take　account　of　time；　are　stronger　than　those；　which　are



attributable　to　particular　objects　that　we　regard　as　absent。







Proof。…　We　do　not　regard　a　thing　as　absent；　by　reason　of　the　emotion



wherewith　we　conceive　it；　but　by　reason　of　the　body；　being　affected　by



another　emotion　excluding　the　existence　of　the　said　thing　（II：xvii。）。



Wherefore；　the　emotion；　which　is　referred　to　the　thing　which　we　regard　as



absent；　is　not　of　a　nature　to　overcome　the　rest　of　a　man's　activities　and



power　（IV：vi。）；　but　is；　on　the　contrary；　of　a　nature　to　be　in　some　sort



controlled　by　the　emotions；　which　exclude　the　existence　of　its　external



cause　（IV：ix。）。　But　an　emotion　which　springs　from　reason　is　necessarily



referred　to　the　common　properties　of　things　（see　the　def。　of　reason　in



II：xl。Note。ii。）；　which　we　always　regard　as　present　（for　there　can　be　nothing



to　exclude　their　present　existence）；　and　which　we　always　conceive　in　the



same　manner　（II：xxxviii。）。　Wherefore　an　emotion　of　this　kind　always　remains



the　same；　and　consequently　（V：Ax。i。）　emotions；　which　are　contrary　thereto



and　are　not　kept　going　by　their　external　causes；　will　be　obliged　to　adapt



themselves　to　it　more　and　more；　until　they　are　no　longer　contrary　to　it；　to



this　extent　the　emotion　which　springs　from　reason　is　more　powerful。　Q。E。D。











Prop。VIII。　An　emotion　is　stronger　in　proportion　to　the　number　of



simultaneous　concurrent　causes　whereby　it　is　aroused。







Proof。…　Many　simultaneous　causes　are　more　powerful　than　a　few　（III：vii。）：



therefore　（IV：v。）；　in　proportion　to　the　increased　number　of　simultaneous



causes　whereby　it　is　aroused；　an　emotion　becomes　stronger。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　This　proposition　is　also　evident　from　V：Ax。ii。







Prop。IX。　An　emotion；　which　is　attributable　to　many　and　diverse



causes　which　the　mind　regards　as　simultaneous　with　the　emotion



itself；　is　less　hurtful；　and　we　are　less　subject　thereto　and　less



affected　towards　each　of　its　causes；　than　if　it　were　a　different　and



equally　powerful　emotion　attributable　to　fewer　causes　or　to　a



single　cause。







Proof…。　An　emotion　is　only　bad　or　hurtful；　in　so　far　as　it　hinders　the　mind



from　being　able　to　think　（IV：xxvi。；　IV：xxvii。）；　therefore；　an　emotion；



whereby　the　mind　is　determined　to　the　contemplation　of　several　things　at



once；　is　less　hurtful　than　another　equally　powerful　emotion；　which　so



engrosses　the　mind　in　the　single　contemplation　of　a　few　objects　or　of　one；



that　it　is　unable　to　think　of　anything　else；　this　was　our　first　point。



Again；　as　the　mind's　essence；　in　other　words；　its　power　（III：vii。）；　consists



solely　in　thought　（II：xi。）；　the　mind　is　less　passive　in　respect　to　an



emotion；　which　causes　it　to　think　of　several　things　at　once；　than　in　regard



to　an　equally　strong　emotion；　which　keeps　it　engrossed　in　the　contemplation



of　a　few　or　of　a　single　object：　this　was　our　second　point。　Lastly；　this



emotion　（III：xlviii。）；　in　so　far　as　it　is　attributable　to　several　causes；　is



less　powerful　in　regard　to　each　of　them。　Q。E。D。











Prop。X。　So　long　as　we　are　not　assailed　by　emotions　contrary　to



our　nature；　we　have　the　power　of　arranging　and　associating　the



modifications　of　our　body　according　to　the　intellectual　order。







Proof。…　The　emotions；　which　are　contrary　to　our　nature；　that　is　（IV：xxx。）；



which　are　bad；　are　bad　in　so　far　as　they　impede　the　mind　from　understanding



（IV：xxvii。）。　So　long；　therefore；　as　we　are　not　assailed　by　emotions　contrary



to　our　nature；　the　mind's　power；　whereby　it　endeavours　to　understand　things



（IV：xxvi。）；　is　not　impeded；　and　therefore　it　is　able　to　form　clear　and



distinct　ideas　and　to　deduce　them　one　from　another　（II：xl。Note。ii。　and



II：xlvii。Note）；　consequently　we　have　in　such　cases　the　power　of　arranging



and　associating　the　modifications　of　the　body　according　to　the　intellectual



order。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　By　this　power　of　rightly　arranging　and　associating　the　bodily



modifications　we　can　guard　ourselves　from　being　easily　affected　by　evil



emotions。　For　（V：vii。）　a　greater　force　is　needed　for　controlling　the



emotions；　when　they　are　arranged　and　associated　according　to　the



intellectual　order；　than　when　they；　are　uncertain　and　unsettled。　The　best　we



can　do；　therefore；　so　long　as　we　do　not　possess　a　perfect　knowledge　of　our



emotions；　is　to　frame　a　system　of　right　conduct；　or　fixed　practical



precepts；　to　commit　it　to　memory；　and　to　apply　it　forthwith　to　the



particular　circumstances　which　now　and　again　meet　us　in　life；　so　that　our



imagination　may　become　fully　imbued　therewith；　and　that　it　may　be　always



ready　to　our　hand。　For　instance；　we　have　laid　down　among　the　rules　of　life



（IV：xlvi。；　&　Note）；　that　hatred　should　be　overcome　with　love　or　high…



mindedness；　and　not　required　with　hatred　in　return。　Now；　that　this　precept



of　reason　may　be　always　ready　to　our　hand　in　time　of　need；　we　should　often



think　over　and　reflect　upon　the　wrongs　generally　committed　by　men；　and　in



what　manner　and　way　they　may　be　best　warded　off　by　high…mindedness：　we　shall



thus　associate　the　idea　of　wrong　with　the　idea　of　this　precept；　which



accordingly　will　always　be　ready　for　use　when　a　wrong　is　done　to　us



（II：xviii。）。　If　we　keep　also　in　readiness　the　notion　of　our　true



advantage；　and　of　the　good　which　follows　from　mutual　friendships；　and　common



fellowships；　further；　if　we　remember　that　complete　acquiescence　is　the



result　of　the　right　way　of　life　（IV：lii。）；　and　that　men；　no　less　than



everything　else；　act　by　the　necessity　of　their　nature：　in　such　case　I　say



the　wrong；　or　the　hatred；　which　commonly　arises　therefrom；　will　engross　a



very　small　part　of　our　imagination　and　will　be　easily　overcome；　or；　if　the



anger　which　springs　from　a　grievous　wrong　be　not　overcome　easily；　it　will



nevertheless　be　overcome；　though　not　without　a　spiritual　conflict；　far



sooner　than　if　we　had　not　thus　reflected　on　the　subject　beforehand。　As　is



indeed　evident　from　V：vi。；V：vii。；V：viii。　We　should；　in　the　same　way；　reflect



on　courage　as　a　means　of　overcoming　fear；　the　ordinary　dangers　of　life



should　frequently　be　brought　to　mind　and　imagined；　together　with　the　means



whereby　through　readiness　of　resource　and　strength　of　mind　we　can　avoid　and



overcome　them。　But　we　must　note；　that　in　arranging　our　thoughts　and



conceptions　we　should　always　bear　in　mind　that　which　is　good　in　every



individual　thing　（IV：lxiii。Coroll。　and　III：lix。）；　in　order　that　we　may



always　be　determined　to　action　by　an　emotion　of　pleasure。　For　instance；　if



a　man　sees　that　he　is　too　keen　in　the　pursuit　of　honour；　let　him　think　over



its　right　use；　the　end　for　which　it　should　be　pursued；　and　the　means　whereby



he　may　attain　it。　Let　him　not　think　of　its　misuse；　and　its　emptiness；　and



the　fickleness　of　mankind；　and　the　like；　whereof　no　man　thinks　except



through　a　morbidness　of　disposition；　with　thoughts　like　these　do　the



most　ambitious　most　torment　themselves；　when　they　despair　of　gaining　the



distinctions　they　hanker　after；　and　in　thus　giving　vent　to　their　anger　would



fain　appear　wise。　Wherefore　it　is　certain　that　those；　who　cry　out　the



loudest　against　the　misuse　of　honour　and　the　vanity　of　the　world；　are　those



who　most　greedily　covet　it。　This　is　not　peculiar　to　the　ambitious；　but　is



common　to　all　who　are　ill…u