phaedo-第7章

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　　Certainly；　he　ought。



　　But　do　you　think　that　every　man　is　able　to　give　a　reason　about　these



very　matters　of　which　we　are　speaking？



　　I　wish　that　they　could；　Socrates；　but　I　greatly　fear　that



to…morrow　at　this　time　there　will　be　no　one　able　to　give　a　reason



worth　having。



　　Then　you　are　not　of　opinion；　Simmias；　that　all　men　know　these



things？



　　Certainly　not。



　　Then　they　are　in　process　of　recollecting　that　which　they　learned



before。



　　Certainly。



　　But　when　did　our　souls　acquire　this　knowledge？…not　since　we　were



born　as　men？



　　Certainly　not。



　　And　therefore　previously？



　　Yes。



　　Then；　Simmias；　our　souls　must　have　existed　before　they　were　in　the



form　of　man…without　bodies；　and　must　have　had　intelligence。



　　Unless　indeed　you　suppose；　Socrates；　that　these　notions　were　given



us　at　the　moment　of　birth；　for　this　is　the　only　time　that　remains。



　　Yes；　my　friend；　but　when　did　we　lose　them？　for　they　are　not　in　us



when　we　are　born…that　is　admitted。　Did　we　lose　them　at　the　moment　of



receiving　them；　or　at　some　other　time？



　　No；　Socrates；　I　perceive　that　I　was　unconsciously　talking　nonsense。



　　Then　may　we　not　say；　Simmias；　that　if；　as　we　are　always　repeating；



there　is　an　absolute　beauty；　and　goodness；　and　essence　in　general；　and



to　this；　which　is　now　discovered　to　be　a　previous　condition　of　our



being；　we　refer　all　our　sensations；　and　with　this　compare



them…assuming　this　to　have　a　prior　existence；　then　our　souls　must　have



had　a　prior　existence；　but　if　not；　there　would　be　no　force　in　the



argument？　There　can　be　no　doubt　that　if　these　absolute　ideas　existed



before　we　were　born；　then　our　souls　must　have　existed　before　we　were



born；　and　if　not　the　ideas；　then　not　the　souls。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　I　am　convinced　that　there　is　precisely　the　same



necessity　for　the　existence　of　the　soul　before　birth；　and　of　the



essence　of　which　you　are　speaking：　and　the　argument　arrives　at　a



result　which　happily　agrees　with　my　own　notion。　For　there　is　nothing



which　to　my　mind　is　so　evident　as　that　beauty；　goodness；　and　other



notions　of　which　you　were　just　now　speaking　have　a　most　real　and



absolute　existence；　and　I　am　satisfied　with　the　proof。



　　Well；　but　is　Cebes　equally　satisfied？　for　I　must　convince　him　too。



　　I　think；　said　Simmias；　that　Cebes　is　satisfied：　although　he　is　the



most　incredulous　of　mortals；　yet　I　believe　that　he　is　convinced　of　the



existence　of　the　soul　before　birth。　But　that　after　death　the　soul　will



continue　to　exist　is　not　yet　proven　even　to　my　own　satisfaction。　I



cannot　get　rid　of　the　feeling　of　the　many　to　which　Cebes　was



referring…the　feeling　that　when　the　man　dies　the　soul　may　be



scattered；　and　that　this　may　be　the　end　of　her。　For　admitting　that　she



may　be　generated　and　created　in　some　other　place；　and　may　have　existed



before　entering　the　human　body；　why　after　having　entered　in　and　gone



out　again　may　she　not　herself　be　destroyed　and　come　to　an　end？



　　Very　true；　Simmias；　said　Cebes；　that　our　soul　existed　before　we　were



born　was　the　first　half　of　the　argument；　and　this　appears　to　have　been



proven；　that　the　soul　will　exist　after　death　as　well　as　before　birth



is　the　other　half　of　which　the　proof　is　still　wanting；　and　has　to　be



supplied。



　　But　that　proof；　Simmias　and　Cebes；　has　been　already　given；　said



Socrates；　if　you　put　the　two　arguments　together…I　mean　this　and　the



former　one；　in　which　we　admitted　that　everything　living　is　born　of　the



dead。　For　if　the　soul　existed　before　birth；　and　in　coming　to　life



and　being　born　can　be　born　only　from　death　and　dying；　must　she　not



after　death　continue　to　exist；　since　she　has　to　be　born　again？



surely　the　proof　which　you　desire　has　been　already　furnished。　Still



I　suspect　that　you　and　Simmias　would　be　glad　to　probe　the　argument



further；　like　children；　you　are　haunted　with　a　fear　that　when　the　soul



leaves　the　body；　the　wind　may　really　blow　her　away　and　scatter　her；



especially　if　a　man　should　happen　to　die　in　stormy　weather　and　not



when　the　sky　is　calm。



　　Cebes　answered　with　a　smile：　Then；　Socrates；　you　must　argue　us　out



of　our　fears…and　yet；　strictly　speaking；　they　are　not　our　fears；　but



there　is　a　child　within　us　to　whom　death　is　a　sort　of　hobgoblin；　him



too　we　must　persuade　not　to　be　afraid　when　he　is　alone　with　him　in　the



dark。



　　Socrates　said：　Let　the　voice　of　the　charmer　be　applied　daily　until



you　have　charmed　him　away。



　　And　where　shall　we　find　a　good　charmer　of　our　fears；　Socrates；



when　you　are　gone？



　　Hellas；　he　replied；　is　a　large　place；　Cebes；　and　has　many　good



men；　and　there　are　barbarous　races　not　a　few：　seek　for　him　among



them　all；　far　and　wide；　sparing　neither　pains　nor　money；　for　there



is　no　better　way　of　using　your　money。　And　you　must　not　forget　to



seek　for　him　among　yourselves　too；　for　he　is　nowhere　more　likely　to　be



found。



　　The　search；　replied　Cebes；　shall　certainly　be　made。　And　now；　if



you　please；　let　us　return　to　the　point　of　the　argument　at　which　we



digressed。



　　By　all　means；　replied　Socrates；　what　else　should　I　please？



　　Very　good；　he　said。



　　Must　we　not；　said　Socrates；　ask　ourselves　some　question　of　this



sort？…What　is　that　which；　as　we　imagine；　is　liable　to　be　scattered



away；　and　about　which　we　fear？　and　what　again　is　that　about　which　we



have　no　fear？　And　then　we　may　proceed　to　inquire　whether　that　which



suffers　dispersion　is　or　is　not　of　the　nature　of　soul…our　hopes　and



fears　as　to　our　own　souls　will　turn　upon　that。



　　That　is　true；　he　said。



　　Now　the　compound　or　composite　may　be　supposed　to　be　naturally



capable　of　being　dissolved　in　like　manner　as　of　being　compounded；



but　that　which　is　uncompounded；　and　that　only；　must　be；　if　anything



is；　indissoluble。



　　Yes；　that　is　what　I　should　imagine；　said　Cebes。



　　And　the　uncompounded　may　be　assumed　to　be　the　same　and　unchanging；



where　the　compound　is　always　changing　and　never　the　same？



　　That　I　also　think；　he　said。



　　Then　now　let　us　return　to　the　previous　discussion。　Is　that　idea　or



essence；　which　in　the　dialectical　process　we　define　as　essence　of　true



existence…whether　essence　of　equality；　beauty；　or　anything　else：　are



these　essences；　I　say；　liable　at　times　to　some　degree　of　change？　or



are　they　each　of　them　always　what　they　are；　having　the　same　simple；



self…existent　and　unchanging　forms；　and　not　admitting　of　variation



at　all；　or　in　any　way；　or　at　any　time？



　　They　must　be　always　the　same；　Socrates；　replied　Cebes。



　　And　what　would　you　say　of　the　many　beautiful…whether　men　or　horses



or　garments　or　any　other　things　which　may　be　called　equal　or



beautiful…are　they　all　unchanging　and　the　same　always；　or　quite　the



reverse？　May　they　not　rather　be　described　as　almost　always　changing



and　hardly　ever　the　same　either　with　themselves　or　with　one　another？



　　The　latter；　replied　Cebes；　they　are　always　in　a　state　of　change。



　　And　these　you　can　touch　and　see　and　perceive　with　the　senses；　but



the　unchanging　things　you　can　only　perceive　with　the　mind…they　are



invisible　and　are　not　seen？



　　That　is　very　true；　he　said。



　　Well；　then；　he　added；　let　us　suppose　that　there　are　two　sorts　of



existences；　one　seen；　the　other　unseen。



　　Let　us　suppose　them。



　　The　seen　is　the　changing；　and　the　unseen　is　the　unchanging。



　　That　may　be　also　supposed。



　　And；　further；　is　not　one　part　of　us　body；　and　the　rest　of　us　soul？



　　To　be　sure。



　　And　to　which　class　may　we　say　that　the　body　is　more　alike　and　akin？



　　Clearly　to　the　seen：　no　one　can　doubt　that。



　　And　is　the　soul　seen　or　not　seen？



　　Not　by　man；　Socrates。



　　And　by　〃seen〃　and　〃not　seen〃　is　meant　by　us　that　which　is　or　is



not　visible　to　the　eye　of　man？



　　Yes；　to　the　eye　of　man。



　　And　what　do　we　say　of　the　soul？　is　that　seen　or　not　seen？



　　Not　seen。



　　Unseen　then？



　　Yes。