phaedo-第6章

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doctrine　of　recollection　brought　to　my　own　recollection；　and；　from



what　Cebes　has　said；　I　am　beginning　to　recollect　and　be　convinced；　but



I　should　still　like　to　hear　what　more　you　have　to　say。



　　This　is　what　I　would　say；　he　replied：　We　should　agree；　if　I　am　not



mistaken；　that　what　a　man　recollects　he　must　have　known　at　some



previous　time。



　　Very　true。



　　And　what　is　the　nature　of　this　recollection？　And；　in　asking　this；



I　mean　to　ask　whether；　when　a　person　has　already　seen　or　heard　or　in



any　way　perceived　anything；　and　he　knows　not　only　that；　but



something　else　of　which　he　has　not　the　same；　but　another　knowledge；　we



may　not　fairly　say　that　he　recollects　that　which　comes　into　his



mind。　Are　we　agreed　about　that？



　　What　do　you　mean？



　　I　mean　what　I　may　illustrate　by　the　following　instance：　The



knowledge　of　a　lyre　is　not　the　same　as　the　knowledge　of　a　man？



　　True。



　　And　yet　what　is　the　feeling　of　lovers　when　they　recognize　a　lyre；　or



a　garment；　or　anything　else　which　the　beloved　has　been　in　the　habit　of



using？　Do　not　they；　from　knowing　the　lyre；　form　in　the　mind's　eye　an



image　of　the　youth　to　whom　the　lyre　belongs？　And　this　is　recollection：



and　in　the　same　way　anyone　who　sees　Simmias　may　remember　Cebes；　and



there　are　endless　other　things　of　the　same　nature。



　　Yes；　indeed；　there　are…endless；　replied　Simmias。



　　And　this　sort　of　thing；　he　said；　is　recollection；　and　is　most



commonly　a　process　of　recovering　that　which　has　been　forgotten　through



time　and　inattention。



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　Well；　and　may　you　not　also　from　seeing　the　picture　of　a　horse　or　a



lyre　remember　a　man？　and　from　the　picture　of　Simmias；　you　may　be　led



to　remember　Cebes？



　　True。



　　Or　you　may　also　be　led　to　the　recollection　of　Simmias　himself？



　　True；　he　said。



　　And　in　all　these　cases；　the　recollection　may　be　derived　from



things　either　like　or　unlike？



　　That　is　true。



　　And　when　the　recollection　is　derived　from　like　things；　then　there　is



sure　to　be　another　question；　which　is；　whether　the　likeness　of　that



which　is　recollected　is　in　any　way　defective　or　not。



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　And　shall　we　proceed　a　step　further；　and　affirm　that　there　is　such　a



thing　as　equality；　not　of　wood　with　wood；　or　of　stone　with　stone；



but　that；　over　and　above　this；　there　is　equality　in　the　abstract？



Shall　we　affirm　this？



　　Affirm；　yes；　and　swear　to　it；　replied　Simmias；　with　all　the



confidence　in　life。



　　And　do　we　know　the　nature　of　this　abstract　essence？



　　To　be　sure；　he　said。



　　And　whence　did　we　obtain　this　knowledge？　Did　we　not　see　equalities



of　material　things；　such　as　pieces　of　wood　and　stones；　and　gather　from



them　the　idea　of　an　equality　which　is　different　from　them？…you　will



admit　that？　Or　look　at　the　matter　again　in　this　way：　Do　not　the　same



pieces　of　wood　or　stone　appear　at　one　time　equal；　and　at　another



time　unequal？



　　That　is　certain。



　　But　are　real　equals　ever　unequal？　or　is　the　idea　of　equality　ever



inequality？



　　That　surely　was　never　yet　known；　Socrates。



　　Then　these　（so…called）　equals　are　not　the　same　with　the　idea　of



equality？



　　I　should　say；　clearly　not；　Socrates。



　　And　yet　from　these　equals；　although　differing　from　the　idea　of



equality；　you　conceived　and　attained　that　idea？



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　Which　might　be　like；　or　might　be　unlike　them？



　　Yes。



　　But　that　makes　no　difference；　whenever　from　seeing　one　thing　you



conceived　another；　whether　like　or　unlike；　there　must　surely　have　been



an　act　of　recollection？



　　Very　true。



　　But　what　would　you　say　of　equal　portions　of　wood　and　stone；　or　other



material　equals？　and　what　is　the　impression　produced　by　them？　Are　they



equals　in　the　same　sense　as　absolute　equality？　or　do　they　fall　short



of　this　in　a　measure？



　　Yes；　he　said；　in　a　very　great　measure；　too。



　　And　must　we　not　allow　that　when　I　or　anyone　look　at　any　object；



and　perceive　that　the　object　aims　at　being　some　other　thing；　but　falls



short　of；　and　cannot　attain　to　it…he　who　makes　this　observation　must



have　had　previous　knowledge　of　that　to　which；　as　he　says；　the　other；



although　similar；　was　inferior？



　　Certainly。



　　And　has　not　this　been　our　case　in　the　matter　of　equals　and　of



absolute　equality？



　　Precisely。



　　Then　we　must　have　known　absolute　equality　previously　to　the　time



when　we　first　saw　the　material　equals；　and　reflected　that　all　these



apparent　equals　aim　at　this　absolute　equality；　but　fall　short　of　it？



　　That　is　true。



　　And　we　recognize　also　that　this　absolute　equality　has　only　been



known；　and　can　only　be　known；　through　the　medium　of　sight　or　touch；　or



of　some　other　sense。　And　this　I　would　affirm　of　all　such　conceptions。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　as　far　as　the　argument　is　concerned；　one　of　them　is



the　same　as　the　other。



　　And　from　the　senses；　then；　is　derived　the　knowledge　that　all



sensible　things　aim　at　an　idea　of　equality　of　which　they　fall　short…is



not　that　true？



　　Yes。



　　Then　before　we　began　to　see　or　hear　or　perceive　in　any　way；　we



must　have　had　a　knowledge　of　absolute　equality；　or　we　could　not　have



referred　to　that　the　equals　which　are　derived　from　the　senses…for　to



that　they　all　aspire；　and　of　that　they　fall　short？



　　That；　Socrates；　is　certainly　to　be　inferred　from　the　previous



statements。



　　And　did　we　not　see　and　hear　and　acquire　our　other　senses　as　soon



as　we　were　born？



　　Certainly。



　　Then　we　must　have　acquired　the　knowledge　of　the　ideal　equal　at



some　time　previous　to　this？



　　Yes。



　　That　is　to　say；　before　we　were　born；　I　suppose？



　　True。



　　And　if　we　acquired　this　knowledge　before　we　were　born；　and　were　born



having　it；　then　we　also　knew　before　we　were　born　and　at　the　instant　of



birth　not　only　equal　or　the　greater　or　the　less；　but　all　other



ideas；　for　we　are　not　speaking　only　of　equality　absolute；　but　of



beauty；　goodness；　justice；　holiness；　and　all　which　we　stamp　with　the



name　of　essence　in　the　dialectical　process；　when　we　ask　and　answer



questions。　Of　all　this　we　may　certainly　affirm　that　we　acquired　the



knowledge　before　birth？



　　That　is　true。



　　But　if；　after　having　acquired；　we　have　not　forgotten　that　which　we



acquired；　then　we　must　always　have　been　born　with　knowledge；　and　shall



always　continue　to　know　as　long　as　life　lasts…for　knowing　is　the



acquiring　and　retaining　knowledge　and　not　forgetting。　Is　not



forgetting；　Simmias；　just　the　losing　of　knowledge？



　　Quite　true；　Socrates。



　　But　if　the　knowledge　which　we　acquired　before　birth　was　lost　by　us



at　birth；　and　afterwards　by　the　use　of　the　senses　we　recovered　that



which　we　previously　knew；　will　not　that　which　we　call　learning　be　a



process　of　recovering　our　knowledge；　and　may　not　this　be　rightly



termed　recollection　by　us？



　　Very　true。



　　For　this　is　clear；　that　when　we　perceived　something；　either　by　the



help　of　sight　or　hearing；　or　some　other　sense；　there　was　no　difficulty



in　receiving　from　this　a　conception　of　some　other　thing　like　or　unlike



which　had　been　forgotten　and　which　was　associated　with　this；　and



therefore；　as　I　was　saying；　one　of　two　alternatives　follows：　either　we



had　this　knowledge　at　birth；　and　continued　to　know　through　life；　or；



after　birth；　those　who　are　said　to　learn　only　remember；　and　learning



is　recollection　only。



　　Yes；　that　is　quite　true；　Socrates。



　　And　which　alternative；　Simmias；　do　you　prefer？　Had　we　the



knowledge　at　our　birth；　or　did　we　remember　afterwards　the　things　which



we　knew　previously　to　our　birth？



　　I　cannot　decide　at　the　moment。



　　At　any　rate　you　can　decide　whether　he　who　has　knowledge　ought　or



ought　not　to　be　able　to　give　a　reason　for　what　he　knows。



　　Certainly；　he　ought。



　　But　do　you　think　that　every　man　is　able　to　give　a　reason　about　these



very　matters　of　which　we