theologico-political treatise p4(神学与政治专题研究4)-第21章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
… Page 59…
A Theologico…Political Treatise
can never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect；
or being influenced by any given emotion。 （11） It is true that it has the
right to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not； on all subjects；
entirely coincide with its own； but we are not discussing its strict rights；
but its proper course of action。 （12） I grant that it has the right to rule in
the most violent manner； and to put citizens to death for very trivial causes；
but no one supposes it can do this with the approval of sound judgment。
（13） Nay； inasmuch as such things cannot be done without extreme peril to
itself； we may even deny that it has the absolute power to do them； or；
consequently； the absolute right； for the rights of the sovereign are limited
by his power。
＇20：2＇ （14） Since； therefore； no one can abdicate his freedom of
judgment and feeling； since every man is by indefeasible natural right the
master of his own thoughts； it follows that men thinking in diverse and
contradictory fashions； cannot； without disastrous results； be compelled to
speak only according to the dictates of the supreme power。 （15） Not even
the most experienced； to say nothing of the multitude； know how to keep
silence。 （16） Men's common failing is to confide their plans to others；
though there be need for secrecy； so that a government would be most
harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching
what he thought； and would be moderate if such freedom were granted。
（17） Still we cannot deny that authority may be as much injured by words
as by actions； hence； although the freedom we are discussing cannot be
entirely denied to subjects； its unlimited concession would be most
baneful； we must； therefore； now inquire； how far such freedom can and
ought to be conceded without danger to the peace of the state； or the
power of the rulers； and this； as I said at the beginning of Chapter XVI。； is
my principal object。 （18） It follows； plainly； from the explanation given
above； of the foundations of a state； that the ultimate aim of government is
not to rule； or restrain； by fear； nor to exact obedience； but contrariwise； to
free every man from fear； that he may live in all possible security； in other
words； to strengthen his natural right to exist and work … without injury to
himself or others。
（20：19） No； the object of government is not to change men from
59
… Page 60…
A Theologico…Political Treatise
rational beings into beasts or puppets； but to enable them to develope their
minds and bodies in security； and to employ their reason unshackled；
neither showing hatred； anger； or deceit； nor watched with the eyes of
jealousy and injustice。 （20） In fact； the true aim of government is liberty。
（20：21） Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making
laws must either be vested in the body of the citizens； or in a portion of
them； or in one man。 （22） For； although mens free judgments are very
diverse； each one thinking that he alone knows everything； and although
complete unanimity of feeling and speech is out of the question； it is
impossible to preserve peace； unless individuals abdicate their right of
acting entirely on their own judgment。 ＇20：3＇ （23） Therefore； the
individual justly cedes the right of free action； though not of free reason
and judgment； no one can act against the authorities without danger to the
state； though his feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith； he
may even speak against them； provided that he does so from rational
conviction； not from fraud； anger； or hatred； and provided that he does not
attempt to introduce any change on his private authority。 （20：24） For
instance； supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound reason；
and should therefore be repealed； if he submits his opinion to the judgment
of the authorities （who； alone； have the right of making and repealing
laws）； and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law； he has deserved
well of the state； and has behaved as a good citizen should； but if he
accuses the authorities of injustice； and stirs up the people against them； or
if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without their consent； he is a
mere agitator and rebel。
（20：25） Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he
believes； without injury to the authority of his rulers； or to the public peace；
namely； by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it
affects action； and by doing nothing against their laws； though he be
compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes； and openly
feels； to be best。
（20：26） Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and
dutifulness； nay； it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt。
（27） We have shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities；
60
… Page 61…
A Theologico…Political Treatise
so that no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just； while
the highest regard for duty； as we have pointed out in the preceding
chapter； is exercised in maintaining public peace and tranquillity； these
could not be preserved if every man were to live as he pleased； therefore it
is no less than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws； for
if the practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily
follow。
（20：28） Hence； so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his
rulers； he in nowise contravenes his reason； for in obedience to reason he
transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to theirs。
（29） This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom； for in a conference
of great and small powers； schemes are seldom carried unanimously； yet
all unite in carrying out what is decided on； whether they voted for or
against。 （30） But I return to my proposition。
（20：31） From the fundamental notions of a state； we have discovered
how a man may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme
power： from the same premises we can no less easily determine what
opinions would be seditious。 （32） Evidently those which by their very
nature nullify the compact by which the right of free action was ceded。 （33）
For instance； a man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over
him； or that promises ought not to be kept； or that everyone should live as
he pleases； or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the
above… mentioned contract； is seditious； not so much from his actual
opinions and judgment； as from the deeds which they involve； for he who
maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly； or openly； he
made with his rulers。 （34） Other opinions which do not involve acts
violating the contract； such as revenge； anger； and t he like； are not
