vill2-第3章
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former owner of the manor was never seised of him； and not being seised could not transfer the seisin to the present owner； although he transferred the manor。 For the defendant it is pleaded； that going about freely is no enfranchisement； that by the gift of the manor every right connected with the manor was also conferred and that consequently the new lord could at any moment lay hands on his man； as the former lord could have done in his time。 Ultimately the plaintiff offers to join issue on the question； whether the servant had been a villain regardant to the manor of C。 or not。 The defendant asserts； rather late in the day； that even if the person in question was not a villain regardant to the manor of C。 the mere fact of his being a villain in gross would entitle his lord to call him away。 This attempt to start on a new line is not allowed by the Court because the claim had originally been traversed on the ground of the connexion with the manor。 The peculiarity of the case is that a third person has an interest to prove that the man claimed as villain had been as a free man。 Usually there were but two parties in the contest about status； the lord pulling one way and the person claimed pulling the other way； but； through the influence of the Statute of Labourers； in our case lord and labourer were at one against a third party； the labourer's employer。 The acknowledgment of villainage by the servant did not settle the question； because； though binding for the future； it was not sufficient to show that villainage had existed in the past； that is at the time when the contract of hire and service was broken through the interference of the lord。 Everything depended on the settlement of one question was the lord seised at the time； or not？ Both parties agree that the lord was not actually seised of the person； both agree that he was seised of the manor； and both suppose that if the person had as a matter of fact been attached to the manor it would have amounted to a seisin of the person。 And so the contention is shifted to this point： can a man be claimed through the medium of a manor； if he has not been actually living； working and serving in it？ The court assumes the possibility； and so the parties appeal to the country to decide whether in point of fact Ralph Crips the shepherd had been in legal if not in actual connexion with the manor； i。e。 could be traced to it personally or through his relatives。 The case is interesting in many ways。 It shows that the same man could be according to the point of view considered both as a villain in regard to a manor； and as a villain in gross。 The relative character of the classification is thus illustrated as well as its importance for practical purposes。 The transmission of a manor is taken to include the persons engaged in the cultivation of its soil； and even those whose ancestors have been engaged in such cultivation； and who have no special plea for severing the connexion。 As to the outcome of the whole inquiry； we may； it seems to me； safely establish the following points： 1。 The terms 'regardant' and 'in gross' have nothing to do with a legal distinction of status。 2。 They come up in connexion with the modes of proof and pleading during the fourteenth century。 3。 They may apply to the same person from different points of view。 4。 'Villain in gross' means a villain without further qualification； 'villain regardant to a manor' means villain by reference to a manor。 5。 The connexion with a manor； though only a matter of fact and not binding the lord in any way； might yet be legally serviceable to him； as a means of establishing and proving his rights over the person he claimed。 I need hardly mention； after what has been said； that there is no such thing as this distinction in the thirteenth century law books。 I must not omit； however； to refer to one expression which may be taken to stand in the place of the later 'villain regardant to a manor。' Britton （ii； 55） gives the formula of the special plea of villain ge to the assize of mort d'ancestor in the following words。 'Ou il poie dire qe il est soen vileyn et soen astrier et demourrant en son villenage。' There can be no doubt that residence on the lord's land is meant； and the term astrier leads even further； it implies residence at a particular hearth or in a particular house。 Fleta gives the assize of novel disseisin to those who have been a long time away from their villain hearth* （'extra astrum suum villanum；' p； 217）。 If the term 'astrier' were restricted to villains it would have proved a great deal more than the 'villain regardant' usually relied upon。 But it is of very wide application。 Britton uses it of free men entitled to rights of common by reason of tenements they hold in a township （i； 392）。 Bracton speaks of the case of a nephew coming into an inheritance in preference to the uncle because he had been living at the same hearth or in the same hall （in atrio or astro） with the former owner；* and in such or a similar sense the word appears to have been usually employed by lawyers。* On the other hand； if we look in Bracton's treatise for parallel passages to those quoted from the Fleta and Britton about the villain astrier； we find only a reference to the fact that the person in question was a serf and holding in villainage and under the sway of a lord；* and so there is nothing to denote special condition in the astrer。 When the term occurs in connexion with villainage it serves to show that a person was not only a bondman born； but actually living in the power of his lord； and not in a state of liberty。 The allusion to the hearth cannot possibly mean that the man sits in his own homestead； because only a few of the villains could have been holders of separate homesteads； and so it must mean that he was sitting in a homestead belonging to his lord； which is quite in keeping with the application of the term in the case of inheritance。 The facts we have been examining certainly suppose that in the villains we have chiefly to do with peasants tilling the earth and dependent on manorial organisation。 They disclose the working of one element which is not to be simply deduced from the idea of personal dependence。 It may be called subjection to territorial power。 The possession of a manor carries the possession of cultivators with it。 It is always important to decide whether a bondman is in the seisin of his lord or not； and the chief means to show it is to trace his connexion with the territorial lordship。 The interposition of the manor in the relation between master and man is； of course； a striking feature and it gives a very characteristic turn to medieval servitude。 But if it is not consistent with the general theory laid down in the thirteenth century law books； it does not lead to anything like the Roman colonatus。 The serf is not placed on a particular plot of land to do definite services under the protection of the State。 He may be shifted from one plot within the jurisdiction of his lord to another； from one area of jurisdiction to another； from rural labour to industrial work or house work； from one set of customs and services to another。 He is not protected by his predial connexion against his lord； and in fact such predial connexion is utilised to hold and bind him to his lord。 We may say； that the unfree peasant of English feudalism was legally a personal dependant； but that his personal dependence was enforced through territorial lordship。
NOTES：
1。 Thorold Rogers； History of Agriculture and Prices； i。 70； Six Centuries of Work and Wages； 44。 Cf Chandler； Five Court Rolls of Great Cressingham in the county of Norfolk； 1885； pp。 viii； ix。
2。 Stubbs； Seventeen Lectures； 304； 305； Maitland； Introduction to the Note…book of Bracton； 4 sqq。
3。 Dial。 de Scacc。 Ii。 10 （Select Charters； p。 222）。 Cf i。 10； p。 192。
4。 Glanville； v。 5； Bracton； 4； 5； Fleta； i。 2； Britton； ed。 Nichols； i。 194。
1。 Bracton； 5； Britton； i。 197。 Pollock； Land…laws； App。 C； is quite right as to the fundamental distinction between status and tenure； but he goes too far； I think； in trying to trace the steps by which names originally applying to different things got confused in the terminology of the Common Law。 A
