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Of the Origin of Government

by David Hume




    Man born in a family; is compelled to maintain society; from
necessity; from natural inclination; and from habit。 The same
creature; in his farther progress; is engaged to establish
political society; in order to administer justice; without which
there can be no peace among them; nor safety; nor mutual
intercourse。 We are; therefore; to look upon all the vast
apparatus of our government; as having ultimately no other object
or purpose but the distribution of justice; or; in other words;
the support of the twelve judges。 Kings and parliaments; fleets
and armies; officers of the court and revenue; ambassadors;
ministers; and privy…counsellors; are all subordinate in their
end to this part of administration。 Even the clergy; as their
duty leads them to inculcate morality; may justly be thought; so
far as regards this world; to have no other useful object of
their institution。
    All men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain
peace and order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of
peace and order for the maintenance of society。 Yet;
notwithstanding this strong and obvious necessity; such is the
frailty or perverseness of our nature! it is impossible to keep
men; faithfully and unerringly; in the paths of justice。 Some
extraordinary circumstances may happen; in which a man finds his
interests to be more promoted by fraud or rapine; than hurt by
the breach which his injustice makes in the social union。 But
much more frequently; he is seduced from his great and important;
but distant interests; by the allurement of present; though often
very frivolous temptations。 This great weakness is incurable in
human nature。
    Men must; therefore; endeavour to palliate what they cannot
cure。 They must institute some persons; under the appellation of
magistrates; whose peculiar office it is; to point out the
decrees of equity; to punish transgressors; to correct fraud and
violence; and to oblige men; however reluctant; to consult their
own real and permanent interests。 In a word; OBEDIENCE is a new
duty which must be invented to support that of JUSTICE; and the
tyes of equity must be corroborated by those of allegiance。
    But still; viewing matters in an abstract light; it may be
thought; that nothing is gained by this alliance; and that the
factitious duty of obedience; from its very nature; lays as
feeble a hold of the human mind; as the primitive and natural
duty of justice。 Peculiar interests and present temptations may
overcome the one as well as the other。 They are equally exposed
to the same inconvenience。 And the man; who is inclined to be a
bad neighbour; must be led by the same motives; well or ill
understood; to be a bad citizen and subject。 Not to mention; that
the magistrate himself may often be negligent; or partial; or
unjust in his administration。
    Experience; however; proves; that there is a great difference
between the cases。 Order in society; we find; is much better
maintained by means of government; and our duty to the magistrate
is more strictly guarded by the principles of human nature; than
our duty to our fellow…citizens。 The love of dominion is so
strong in the breast of man; that many; not only submit to; but
court all the dangers; and fatigues; and cares of government; and
men; once raised to that station; though often led astray by
private passions; find; in ordinary cases; a visible interest in
the impartial administration of justice。 The persons; who first
attain this distinction by the consent; tacit or express; of the
people; must be endowed with superior personal qualities of
valour; force; integrity; or prudence; which command respect and
confidence: and after government is established; a regard to
birth; rank; and station has a mighty influence over men; and
enforces the decrees of the magistrate。 The prince or leader
exclaims against every disorder; which disturbs his society。 He
summons all his partizans and all men of probity to aid him in
correcting and redressing it: and he is readily followed by all
indifferent persons in the execution of his office。 He soon
acquires the power of rewarding these services; and in the
progress of society; he establishes subordinate ministers and
often a military force; who find an immediate and a visible
interest; in supporting his authority。 Habit soon consolidates
what other principles of human nature had imperfectly founded;
and men; once accustomed to obedience; never think of departing
from that path; in which they and their ancestors have constantly
trod; and to which they are confined by so many urgent and
visible motives。
    But though this progress of human affairs may appear certain
and inevitable; and though the support which allegiance brings to
justice; be founded on obvious principles of human nature; it
cannot be expected that men should beforehand be able to discover
them; or foresee their operation。 Government commences more
casually and more imperfectly。 It is probable; that the first
ascendant of one man over multitudes begun during a state of war;
where the superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself
most visibly; where unanimity and concert are most requisite; and
where the pernicious effects of disorder are most sensibly felt。
The long continuance of that state; an incident common among
savage tribes; enured the people to submission; and if the
chieftain possessed as much equity as prudence and valour; he
became; even during peace; the arbiter of all differences; and
could gradually; by a mixture of force and consent; establish his
authority。 The benefit sensibly felt from his influence; made it
be cherished by the people; at least by the peaceable and well
disposed among them; and if his son enjoyed the same good
qualities; government advanced the sooner to maturity and
perfection; but was still in a feeble state; till the farther
progress of improvement procured the magistrate a revenue; and
enabled him to bestow rewards on the several instruments of his
administration; and to inflict punishments on the refractory and
disobedient。 Before that period; each exertion of his influence
must have been particular; and founded on the peculiar
circumstances of the case。 After it; submission was no longer a
matter of choice in the bulk of the community; but was rigorously
exacted by the authority of the supreme magistrate。
    In all governments; there is a perpetual intestine struggle;
open or secret; between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY; and neither of
them can ever absolutely prevail in the contest。 A great
sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in every
government; yet even the authority; which confines liberty; can
never; and perhaps ought never; in any constitution; to become
quite entire and uncontroulable。 The sultan is master of the life
and fortune of any individual; but will not be permitted to
impose new taxes on his subjects: a French monarch can impose
taxes at pleasure; but would find it dangerous to attempt the
lives and fortunes of individuals。 Religion also; in most
countries; is commonly found to be a very intractable principle;
and other principles or prejudices frequently resist all the
authority of the civil magistrate; whose power; being founded on
opinion; can never subvert other opinions; equally rooted with
that of his title to dominion。 The government; which; in common
appellation; receives the appellation of free; is that which
admits of a partition of power among several members; whose
united authority is no less; or is commonly greater than that of
any monarch; but who; in the usual course of administration; must
act by general and equal laws; that are previously known to all
the members and to all their subjects。 In this sense; it must be
owned; that liberty is the perfection of civil society; but still
authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence:
and in those contests; which so often take place between the one
and the other; the latter may; on that account; challenge the
preference。 Unless perhaps one may say (and it may be said with
some reason) that a circumstance; which is essential to th

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