the six enneads-第94章

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his　loftier　knows　all；　when　it　breaks　from　the　union；　it　retains　some　of　the　experiences　of　its　companion；　but　dismisses　others；　thus　we　accept　the　talk　of　our　less　valued　associates；　but；　on　a　change　of　company；　we　remember　little　from　the　first　set　and　more　from　those　in　whom　we　recognize　a　higher　quality。　　　　　32。　But　the　memory　of　friends；　children；　wife？　Country　too；　and　all　that　the　better　sort　of　man　may　reasonably　remember？　　　　　All　these；　the　one　＇the　lower　man＇　retains　with　emotion；　the　authentic　man　passively：　for　the　experience；　certainly；　was　first　felt　in　that　lower　phase　from　which；　however；　the　best　of　such　impressions　pass　over　to　the　graver　soul　in　the　degree　in　which　the　two　are　in　communication。　　　　　The　lower　soul　must　be　always　striving　to　attain　to　memory　of　the　activities　of　the　higher：　this　will　be　especially　so　when　it　is　itself　of　a　fine　quality；　for　there　will　always　be　some　that　are　better　from　the　beginning　and　bettered　here　by　the　guidance　of　the　higher。　　　　　The　loftier；　on　the　contrary；　must　desire　to　come　to　a　happy　forgetfulness　of　all　that　has　reached　it　through　the　lower：　for　one　reason；　there　is　always　the　possibility　that　the　very　excellence　of　the　lower　prove　detrimental　to　the　higher；　tending　to　keep　it　down　by　sheer　force　of　vitality。　In　any　case　the　more　urgent　the　intention　towards　the　Supreme；　the　more　extensive　will　be　the　soul's　forgetfulness；　unless　indeed；　when　the　entire　living　has；　even　here；　been　such　that　memory　has　nothing　but　the　noblest　to　deal　with：　in　this　world　itself；　all　is　best　when　human　interests　have　been　held　aloof；　so；　therefore；　it　must　be　with　the　memory　of　them。　In　this　sense　we　may　truly　say　that　the　good　soul　is　the　forgetful。　It　flees　multiplicity；　it　seeks　to　escape　the　unbounded　by　drawing　all　to　unity；　for　only　thus　is　it　free　from　entanglement；　light…footed；　self…conducted。　Thus　it　is　that　even　in　this　world　the　soul　which　has　the　desire　of　the　other　is　putting　away；　amid　its　actual　life；　all　that　is　foreign　to　that　order。　It　brings　there　very　little　of　what　it　has　gathered　here；　as　long　as　it　is　in　the　heavenly　regions　only；　it　will　have　more　than　it　can　retain。　　　　　The　Hercules　of　the　heavenly　regions　would　still　tell　of　his　feats：　but　there　is　the　other　man　to　whom　all　of　that　is　trivial；　he　has　been　translated　to　a　holier　place；　he　has　won　his　way　to　the　Intellectual　Realm；　he　is　more　than　Hercules；　proven　in　the　combats　in　which　the　combatants　are　the　wise。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FOURTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROBLEMS　OF　THE　SOUL　（2）。

　　　　1。　What；　then；　will　be　the　Soul's　discourse；　what　its　memories　in　the　Intellectual　Realm；　when　at　last　it　has　won　its　way　to　that　Essence？　　　　　Obviously　from　what　we　have　been　saying；　it　will　be　in　contemplation　of　that　order；　and　have　its　Act　upon　the　things　among　which　it　now　is；　failing　such　Contemplation　and　Act；　its　being　is　not　there。　Of　things　of　earth　it　will　know　nothing；　it　will　not；　for　example；　remember　an　act　of　philosophic　virtue；　or　even　that　in　its　earthly　career　it　had　contemplation　of　the　Supreme。　　　　　When　we　seize　anything　in　the　direct　intellectual　act　there　is　room　for　nothing　else　than　to　know　and　to　contemplate　the　object；　and　in　the　knowing　there　is　not　included　any　previous　knowledge；　all　such　assertion　of　stage　and　progress　belongs　to　the　lower　and　is　a　sign　of　the　altered；　this　means　that；　once　purely　in　the　Intellectual；　no　one　of　us　can　have　any　memory　of　our　experience　here。　Further；　if　all　intellection　is　timeless…　as　appears　from　the　fact　that　the　Intellectual　beings　are　of　eternity　not　of　time…　there　can　be　no　memory　in　the　intellectual　world；　not　merely　none　of　earthly　things　but　none　whatever：　all　is　presence　There；　for　nothing　passes　away；　there　is　no　change　from　old　to　new。　　　　　This；　however；　does　not　alter　the　fact　that　distinction　exists　in　that　realm…　downwards　from　the　Supreme　to　the　Ideas；　upward　from　the　Ideas　to　the　Universal　and　to　the　Supreme。　Admitting　that　the　Highest；　as　a　self…contained　unity；　has　no　outgoing　effect；　that　does　not　prevent　the　soul　which　has　attained　to　the　Supreme　from　exerting　its　own　characteristic　Act：　it　certainly　may　have　the　intuition；　not　by　stages　and　parts；　of　that　Being　which　is　without　stage　and　part。　　　　　But　that　would　be　in　the　nature　of　grasping　a　pure　unity？　　　　　No：　in　the　nature　of　grasping　all　the　intellectual　facts　of　a　many　that　constitutes　a　unity。　For　since　the　object　of　vision　has　variety　＇distinction　within　its　essential　oneness＇　the　intuition　must　be　multiple　and　the　intuitions　various；　just　as　in　a　face　we　see　at　the　one　glance　eyes　and　nose　and　all　the　rest。　　　　　But　is　not　this　impossible　when　the　object　to　be　thus　divided　and　treated　as　a　thing　of　grades；　is　a　pure　unity？　　　　　No：　there　has　already　been　discrimination　within　the　Intellectual…Principle；　the　Act　of　the　soul　is　little　more　than　a　reading　of　this。　　　　　First　and　last　is　in　the　Ideas　not　a　matter　of　time；　and　so　does　not　bring　time　into　the　soul's　intuition　of　earlier　and　later　among　them。　There　is　a　grading　by　order　as　well：　the　ordered　disposition　of　some　growing　thing　begins　with　root　and　reaches　to　topmost　point；　but；　to　one　seeing　the　plant　as　a　whole；　there　is　no　other　first　and　last　than　simply　that　of　the　order。　　　　　Still；　the　soul　＇in　this　intuition　within　the　divine＇　looks　to　what　is　a　unity；　next　it　entertains　multiplicity；　all　that　is：　how　explain　this　grasping　first　of　the　unity　and　later　of　the　rest？　　　　　The　explanation　is　that　the　unity　of　this　power　＇the　Supreme＇　is　such　as　to　allow　of　its　being　multiple　to　another　principle　＇the　soul＇；　to　which　it　is　all　things　and　therefore　does　not　present　itself　as　one　indivisible　object　of　intuition：　its　activities　do　not　＇like　its　essence＇　fall　under　the　rule　of　unity；　they　are　for　ever　multiple　in　virtue　of　that　abiding　power；　and　in　their　outgoing　they　actually　become　all　things。　　　　　For　with　the　Intellectual　or　Supreme…　considered　as　distinct　from　the　One…　there　is　already　the　power　of　harbouring　that　Principle　of　Multiplicity；　the　source　of　things　not　previously　existent　in　its　superior。　　　　　2。　Enough　on　that　point：　we　come　now　to　the　question　of　memory　of　the　personality？　　　　　There　will　not　even　be　memory　of　the　personality；　no　thought　that　the　contemplator　is　the　self…　Socrates；　for　example…　or　that　it　is　Intellect　or　Soul。　In　this　connection　it　should　be　borne　in　mind　that；　in　contemplative　vision；　especially　when　it　is　vivid；　we　are　not　at　the　time　aware　of　our　own　personality；　we　are　in　possession　of　ourselves　but　the　activity　is　towards　the　object　of　vision　with　which　the　thinker　becomes　identified；　he　has　made　himself　over　as　matter　to　be　shaped；　he　takes　ideal　form　under　the　action　of　the　vision　while　remaining；　potentially；　himself。　This　means　that　he　is　actively　himself　when　he　has　intellection　of　nothing。　　　　　Or；　if　he　is　himself　＇pure　and　simple＇；　he　is　empty　of　all：　if；　on　the　contrary；　he　is　himself　＇by　the　self…possession　of　contemplation＇　in　such　a　way　as　to　be　identified　with　what　is　all；　then　by　the　act　of　self…intellection　he　has　the　simultaneous　intellection　of　all：　in　such　a　case　self…intuition　by　personal　activity　brings　the　intellection；　not　merely　of　the　self；　but　also　of　the　total　therein　embraced；　and　similarly　the　intuition　of　the　total　of　things　brings　that　of　the　personal　self　as　included　among　all。　　　　　But　such　a　process　would　appear　to　introduce　into　the　Intellectual　that　element　of　change　against　which　we　ourselves　have　only　now　been　protesting？　　　　　The　answer　is　that；　while　unchangeable　identity　is　essential　to　the　Intellectual…Principle；　the　soul；　lying　so　to　speak　on　the　borders　of　the　Intellectual　Realm；　is　amenable　to　change；　it　has；　for　example；　its　inward　advance；　and　obviously　anything　that　attains　position　near　to　something　motionless　does　so　by　a　change　directed　towards　that　unchanging　goal　and　is　not　itself　motionless　in　the　same　degree。　Nor　is　it　really　change　to　turn　from　the　self　to　the　constituents　of　self　or　from　those　constituents　to　the　self；　and　in　this　case　the　contemplator　is　the　total；　the　duality　has　become　unity。　　　　　None　the　less　the　soul；　even　in　the　Intellectual　Realm；　is　under　the　dispensation　of　a　variety　confronting　it　and　a　content　of　i