the six enneads-第83章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


　is　present　as　one　whole　in　each　of　its　severed　parts；　since　amid　that　multiplicity　in　which　complete　individuality　has　entailed　complete　partition；　there　is　a　permanent　identity；　we　may　think　of　colour；　qualities　of　all　kinds；　some　particular　shape；　which　can　be　present　in　many　unrelated　objects　at　the　one　moment；　each　entire　and　yet　with　no　community　of　experience　among　the　various　manifestations。　In　the　case　of　such　ideal…forms　we　may　affirm　complete　partibility。　　　　　But；　on　the　other　hand；　that　first　utterly　indivisible　Kind　must　be　accompanied　by　a　subsequent　Essence；　engendered　by　it　and　holding　indivisibility　from　it　but；　in　virtue　of　the　necessary　outgo　from　source；　tending　firmly　towards　the　contrary；　the　wholly　partible；　this　secondary　Essence　will　take　an　intermediate　Place　between　the　first　substance；　the　undivided；　and　that　which　is　divisible　in　material　things　and　resides　in　them。　Its　presence；　however；　will　differ　in　one　respect　from　that　of　colour　and　quantity；　these；　no　doubt；　are　present　identically　and　entire　throughout　diverse　material　masses；　but　each　several　manifestation　of　them　is　as　distinct　from　every　other　as　the　mass　is　from　the　mass。　　　　　The　magnitude　present　in　any　mass　is　definitely　one　thing；　yet　its　identity　from　part　to　part　does　not　imply　any　such　community　as　would　entail　common　experience；　within　that　identity　there　is　diversity；　for　it　is　a　condition　only；　not　the　actual　Essence。　　　　　The　Essence；　very　near　to　the　impartible；　which　we　assert　to　belong　to　the　Kind　we　are　now　dealing　with；　is　at　once　an　Essence　and　an　entrant　into　body；　upon　embodiment；　it　experiences　a　partition　unknown　before　it　thus　bestowed　itself。　　　　　In　whatsoever　bodies　it　occupies…　even　the　vastest　of　all；　that　in　which　the　entire　universe　is　included…　it　gives　itself　to　the　whole　without　abdicating　its　unity。　　　　　This　unity　of　an　Essence　is　not　like　that　of　body；　which　is　a　unit　by　the　mode　of　continuous　extension；　the　mode　of　distinct　parts　each　occupying　its　own　space。　Nor　is　it　such　a　unity　as　we　have　dealt　with　in　the　case　of　quality。　　　　　The　nature；　at　once　divisible　and　indivisible；　which　we　affirm　to　be　soul　has　not　the　unity　of　an　extended　thing：　it　does　not　consist　of　separate　sections；　its　divisibility　lies　in　its　presence　at　every　point　of　the　recipient；　but　it　is　indivisible　as　dwelling　entire　in　the　total　and　entire　in　any　part。　　　　　To　have　penetrated　this　idea　is　to　know　the　greatness　of　the　soul　and　its　power；　the　divinity　and　wonder　of　its　being；　as　a　nature　transcending　the　sphere　of　Things。　　　　　Itself　devoid　of　mass；　it　is　present　to　all　mass：　it　exists　here　and　yet　is　There；　and　this　not　in　distinct　phases　but　with　unsundered　identity：　thus　it　is　〃parted　and　not　parted；〃　or；　better；　it　has　never　known　partition；　never　become　a　parted　thing；　but　remains　a　self…gathered　integral；　and　is　〃parted　among　bodies〃　merely　in　the　sense　that　bodies；　in　virtue　of　their　own　sundered　existence；　cannot　receive　it　unless　in　some　partitive　mode；　the　partition；　in　other　words；　is　an　occurrence　in　body　not　in　soul。　　　　　2。　It　can　be　demonstrated　that　soul　must；　necessarily；　be　of　just　this　nature　and　that　there　can　be　no　other　soul　than　such　a　being；　one　neither　wholly　partible　but　both　at　once。　　　　　If　it　had　the　nature　of　body　it　would　consist　of　isolated　members　each　unaware　of　the　conditions　of　every　other；　there　would　be　a　particular　soul…　say　a　soul　of　the　finger…　answering　as　a　distinct　and　independent　entity　to　every　local　experience；　in　general　terms；　there　would　be　a　multiplicity　of　souls　administering　each　individual；　and；　moreover；　the　universe　would　be　governed　not　by　one　soul　but　by　an　incalculable　number；　each　standing　apart　to　itself。　But；　without　a　dominant　unity；　continuity　is　meaningless。　　　　　The　theory　that　〃Impressions　reach　the　leading…principle　by　progressive　stages〃　must　be　dismissed　as　mere　illusion。　　　　　In　the　first　place；　it　affirms　without　investigation　a　〃leading〃　phase　of　the　soul。　　　　　What　can　justify　this　assigning　of　parts　to　the　soul；　the　distinguishing　one　part　from　another？　What　quantity；　or　what　difference　of　quality；　can　apply　to　a　thing　defined　as　a　self…consistent　whole　of　unbroken　unity？　　　　　Again；　would　perception　be　vested　in　that　leading　principle　alone；　or　in　the　other　phases　as　well？　　　　　If　a　given　experience　bears　only　on　that　〃leading　principle；〃　it　would　not　be　felt　as　lodged　in　any　particular　members　of　the　organism；　if；　on　the　other　hand；　it　fastens　on　some　other　phase　of　the　soul…　one　not　constituted　for　sensation…　that　phase　cannot　transmit　any　experience　to　the　leading　principle；　and　there　can　be　no　sensation。　　　　　Again；　suppose　sensation　vested　in　the　〃leading…principle〃　itself：　then；　a　first　alternative；　it　will　be　felt　in　some　one　part　of　that　＇some　specifically　sensitive　phase＇；　the　other　part　excluding　a　perception　which　could　serve　no　purpose；　or；　in　the　second　alternative；　there　will　be　many　distinct　sensitive　phases；　an　infinite　number；　with　difference　from　one　to　another。　In　that　second　case；　one　sensitive　phase　will　declare　〃I　had　this　sensation　primarily〃；　others　will　have　to　say　〃I　felt　the　sensation　that　rose　elsewhere〃；　but　either　the　site　of　the　experience　will　be　a　matter　of　doubt　to　every　phase　except　the　first；　or　each　of　the　parts　of　the　soul　will　be　deceived　into　allocating　the　occurrence　within　its　own　particular　sphere。　　　　　If；　on　the　contrary；　the　sensation　is　vested　not　merely　in　the　〃leading　principle；〃　but　in　any　and　every　part　of　the　soul；　what　special　function　raises　the　one　rather　than　the　other　into　that　leading　rank；　or　why　is　the　sensation　to　be　referred　to　it　rather　than　elsewhere？　And　how；　at　this；　account　for　the　unity　of　the　knowledge　brought　in　by　diverse　senses；　by　eyes；　by　ears？　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　if　the　soul　is　a　perfect　unity…　utterly　strange　to　part；　a　self…gathered　whole…　if　it　continuously　eludes　all　touch　of　multiplicity　and　divisibility…　then；　no　whole　taken　up　into　it　can　ever　be　ensouled；　soul　will　stand　as　circle…centre　to　every　object　＇remote　on　the　circumference＇；　and　the　entire　mass　of　a　living　being　is　soulless　still。　　　　　There　is；　therefore；　no　escape：　soul　is；　in　the　degree　indicated；　one　and　many；　parted　and　impartible。　We　cannot　question　the　possibility　of　a　thing　being　at　once　a　unity　and　multi…present；　since　to　deny　this　would　be　to　abolish　the　principle　which　sustains　and　administers　the　universe；　there　must　be　a　Kind　which　encircles　and　supports　all　and　conducts　all　with　wisdom；　a　principle　which　is　multiple　since　existence　is　multiple；　and　yet　is　one　soul　always　since　a　container　must　be　a　unity：　by　the　multiple　unity　of　its　nature；　it　will　furnish　life　to　the　multiplicity　of　the　series　of　an　all；　by　its　impartible　unity；　it　will　conduct　a　total　to　wise　ends。　　　　　In　the　case　of　things　not　endowed　with　intelligence；　the　〃leading…principle〃　is　their　mere　unity…　a　lower　reproduction　of　the　soul's　efficiency。　　　　　This　is　the　deeper　meaning　of　the　profound　passage　＇in　the　Timaeus＇；　where　we　read　〃By　blending　the　impartible；　eternally　unchanging　essence　with　that　in　division　among　bodies；　he　produced　a　third　form　of　essence　partaking　of　both　qualities。〃　　　　　Soul；　therefore；　is；　in　this　definite　sense；　one　and　many；　the　Ideal…Form　resident　in　body　is　many　and　one；　bodies　themselves　are　exclusively　many；　the　Supreme　is　exclusively　one。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THIRD　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROBLEMS　OF　THE　SOUL　（1）。

　　　　1。　The　soul：　what　dubious　questions　concerning　it　admit　of　solution；　or　where　we　must　abide　our　doubt…　with；　at　least；　the　gain　of　recognizing　the　problem　that　confronts　us…　this　is　matter　well　worth　attention。　On　what　subject　can　we　more　reasonably　expend　the　time　required　by　minute　discussion　and　investigation？　Apart　from　much　else；　it　is　enough　that　such　an　enquiry　illuminates　two　grave　questions：　of　what　sphere　the　soul　is　the　principle；　and　whence　the　soul　itself　springs。　Moreover；　we　will　be　only　obeying　the　ordinance　of　the　God　who　bade　us　know　ourselves。　　　　　Our　general　instinct　to　seek　and　learn；　our　longing　to　possess　ourselves　of　whatsoever　is　lovely　in　the　vision　will；　in　all　reason；　set　us　enquiring　into　the　nature　of　the　instrument　with　which　we　search。　　　　　Now　even　in　the　univ