the six enneads-第204章

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o　understand　that　beauty　depends　upon　the　Forms；　He　being　set　above　all　that　is　beautiful　here。　The　Forms　are　in　that　passage　secondaries；　their　sequels　being　attached　to　them　as　dependent　thirds：　it　is　clear　thus　that　by　〃the　products　of　the　thirds〃　is　meant　this　world；　dependent　upon　soul。　　　　　Soul　dependent　upon　Intellectual…Principle　and　Intellectual…Principle　upon　the　Good；　all　is　linked　to　the　Supreme　by　intermediaries；　some　close；　some　nearing　those　of　the　closer　attachment；　while　the　order　of　sense　stands　remotest；　dependent　upon　soul。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　EIGHTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　FREE…WILL　AND　THE　WILL　OF　THE　ONE。

　　　　1。　Can　there　be　question　as　to　whether　the　gods　have　voluntary　action？　Or　are　we　to　take　it　that；　while　we　may　well　enquire　in　the　case　of　men　with　their　combination　of　powerlessness　and　hesitating　power；　the　gods　must　be　declared　omnipotent；　not　merely　some　things　but　all　lying　at　their　nod？　Or　is　power　entire；　freedom　of　action　in　all　things；　to　be　reserved　to　one　alone；　of　the　rest　some　being　powerful；　others　powerless；　others　again　a　blend　of　power　and　impotence？　　　　　All　this　must　come　to　the　test：　we　must　dare　it　even　of　the　Firsts　and　of　the　All…Transcendent　and；　if　we　find　omnipotence　possible；　work　out　how　far　freedom　extends。　The　very　notion　of　power　must　be　scrutinized　lest　in　this　ascription　we　be　really　making　power　identical　with　Essential　Act；　and　even　with　Act　not　yet　achieved。　　　　　But　for　the　moment　we　may　pass　over　these　questions　to　deal　with　the　traditional　problem　of　freedom　of　action　in　ourselves。　　　　　To　begin　with；　what　must　be　intended　when　we　assert　that　something　is　in　our　power；　what　is　the　conception　here？　　　　　To　establish　this　will　help　to　show　whether　we　are　to　ascribe　freedom　to　the　gods　and　still　more　to　God；　or　to　refuse　it；　or　again；　while　asserting　it；　to　question　still；　in　regard　both　to　the　higher　and　lower…　the　mode　of　its　presence。　　　　　What　then　do　we　mean　when　we　speak　of　freedom　in　ourselves　and　why　do　we　question　it？　　　　　My　own　reading　is　that；　moving　as　we　do　amid　adverse　fortunes；　compulsions；　violent　assaults　of　passion　crushing　the　soul；　feeling　ourselves　mastered　by　these　experiences；　playing　slave　to　them；　going　where　they　lead；　we　have　been　brought　by　all　this　to　doubt　whether　we　are　anything　at　all　and　dispose　of　ourselves　in　any　particular。　　　　　This　would　indicate　that　we　think　of　our　free　act　as　one　which　we　execute　of　our　own　choice；　in　no　servitude　to　chance　or　necessity　or　overmastering　passion；　nothing　thwarting　our　will；　the　voluntary　is　conceived　as　an　event　amenable　to　will　and　occurring　or　not　as　our　will　dictates。　Everything　will　be　voluntary　that　is　produced　under　no　compulsion　and　with　knowledge；　our　free　act　is　what　we　are　masters　to　perform。　　　　　Differing　conceptually；　the　two　conditions　will　often　coincide　but　sometimes　will　clash。　Thus　a　man　would　be　master　to　kill；　but　the　act　will　not　be　voluntary　if　in　the　victim　he　had　failed　to　recognise　his　own　father。　Perhaps　however　that　ignorance　is　not　compatible　with　real　freedom：　for　the　knowledge　necessary　to　a　voluntary　act　cannot　be　limited　to　certain　particulars　but　must　cover　the　entire　field。　Why；　for　example；　should　killing　be　involuntary　in　the　failure　to　recognise　a　father　and　not　so　in　the　failure　to　recognise　the　wickedness　of　murder？　If　because　the　killer　ought　to　have　learned；　still　ignorance　of　the　duty　of　learning　and　the　cause　of　that　ignorance　remain　alike　involuntary。　　　　　2。　A　cardinal　question　is　where　we　are　to　place　the　freedom　of　action　ascribed　to　us。　　　　　It　must　be　founded　in　impulse　or　in　some　appetite；　as　when　we　act　or　omit　in　lust　or　rage　or　upon　some　calculation　of　advantage　accompanied　by　desire。　　　　　But　if　rage　or　desire　implied　freedom　we　must　allow　freedom　to　animals；　infants；　maniacs；　the　distraught；　the　victims　of　malpractice　producing　incontrollable　delusions。　And　if　freedom　turns　on　calculation　with　desire；　does　this　include　faulty　calculation？　Sound　calculation；　no　doubt；　and　sound　desire；　but　then　comes　the　question　whether　the　appetite　stirs　the　calculation　or　the　calculation　the　appetite。　　　　　Where　the　appetites　are　dictated　by　the　very　nature　they　are　the　desires　of　the　conjoint　of　soul　and　body　and　then　soul　lies　under　physical　compulsions：　if　they　spring　in　the　soul　as　an　independent；　then　much　that　we　take　to　be　voluntary　is　in　reality　outside　of　our　free　act。　Further；　every　emotion　is　preceded　by　some　meagre　reasoning；　how　then　can　a　compelling　imagination；　an　appetite　drawing　us　where　it　will；　be　supposed　to　leave　us　masters　in　the　ensuing　act？　Need；　inexorably　craving　satisfaction；　is　not　free　in　face　of　that　to　which　it　is　forced：　and　how　at　all　can　a　thing　have　efficiency　of　its　own　when　it　rises　from　an　extern；　has　an　extern　for　very　principle；　thence　taking　its　Being　as　it　stands？　It　lives　by　that　extern；　lives　as　it　has　been　moulded：　if　this　be　freedom；　there　is　freedom　in　even　the　soulless；　fire　acts　in　accordance　with　its　characteristic　being。　　　　　We　may　be　reminded　that　the　Living　Form　and　the　soul　know　what　they　do。　But；　if　this　is　knowledge　by　perception；　it　does　not　help　towards　the　freedom　of　the　act；　perception　gives　awareness；　not　mastery：　if　true　knowing　is　meant；　either　this　is　the　knowing　of　something　happening…　once　more　awareness…　with　the　motive…　force　still　to　seek；　or　the　reasoning　and　knowledge　have　acted　to　quell　the　appetite；　then　we　have　to　ask　to　what　this　repression　is　to　be　referred　and　where　it　has　taken　place。　If　it　is　that　the　mental　process　sets　up　an　opposing　desire　we　must　assure　ourselves　how；　if　it　merely　stills　the　appetite　with　no　further　efficiency　and　this　is　our　freedom；　then　freedom　does　not　depend　upon　act　but　is　a　thing　of　the　mind…　and　in　truth　all　that　has　to　do　with　act；　the　very　most　reasonable；　is　still　of　mixed　value　and　cannot　carry　freedom。　　　　　3。　All　this　calls　for　examination；　the　enquiry　must　bring　us　close　to　the　solution　as　regards　the　gods。　　　　　We　have　traced　self…disposal　to　will；　will　to　reasoning　and；　next　step；　to　right　reasoning；　perhaps　to　right　reasoning　we　must　add　knowledge；　for　however　sound　opinion　and　act　may　be　they　do　not　yield　true　freedom　when　the　adoption　of　the　right　course　is　the　result　of　hazard　or　of　some　presentment　from　the　fancy　with　no　knowledge　of　the　foundations　of　that　rightness。　　　　　Taking　it　that　the　presentment　of　fancy　is　not　a　matter　of　our　will　and　choice；　how　can　we　think　those　acting　at　its　dictation　to　be　free　agents？　Fancy　strictly；　in　our　use；　takes　it　rise　from　conditions　of　the　body；　lack　of　food　and　drink　sets　up　presentments；　and　so　does　the　meeting　of　these　needs；　similarly　with　seminal　abundance　and　other　humours　of　the　body。　We　refuse　to　range　under　the　principle　of　freedom　those　whose　conduct　is　directed　by　such　fancy：　the　baser　sort；　therefore；　mainly　so　guided；　cannot　be　credited　with　self…disposal　or　voluntary　act。　Self…disposal；　to　us；　belongs　to　those　who；　through　the　activities　of　the　Intellectual…Principle；　live　above　the　states　of　the　body。　The　spring　of　freedom　is　the　activity　of　Intellectual…Principle；　the　highest　in　our　being；　the　proposals　emanating　thence　are　freedom；　such　desires　as　are　formed　in　the　exercise　of　the　Intellectual　act　cannot　be　classed　as　involuntary；　the　gods；　therefore；　that　live　in　this　state；　living　by　Intellectual…Principle　and　by　desire　conformed　to　it；　possess　freedom。　　　　　4。　It　will　be　asked　how　act　rising　from　desire　can　be　voluntary；　since　desire　pulls　outward　and　implies　need；　to　desire　is　still　to　be　drawn；　even　though　towards　the　good。　　　　　Intellectual…Principle　itself　comes　under　the　doubt；　having　a　certain　nature　and　acting　by　that　nature　can　it　be　said　to　have　freedom　and　self…disposal…　in　an　act　which　it　cannot　leave　unenacted？　It　may　be　asked；　also；　whether　freedom　may　strictly　be　affirmed　of　such　beings　as　are　not　engaged　in　action。　　　　　However　that　may　be；　where　there　is　such　act　there　is　compulsion　from　without；　since；　failing　motive；　act　will　not　be　performed。　These　higher　beings；　too；　obey　their　own　nature；　where　then　is　their　freedom？　　　　　But；　on　the　other　hand；　can　there　be　talk　of　constraint　where　there　is　no　compulsion　to　obey　an　extern；　and　how　can　any　movement　towards　a　good