the six enneads-第157章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


s　merely　accidental；　because　he　did　not　aim　at　this　result：　it　would　be　as　we　speak　of　Action　even　in　things　inanimate…　〃fire　heats；〃　〃the　drug　worked。〃　　　　　So　much　for　Action　and　Passion。　　　　　23。　As　for　Possession；　if　the　term　is　used　comprehensively；　why　are　not　all　its　modes　to　be　brought　under　one　category？　Possession；　thus；　would　include　the　quantum　as　possessing　magnitude；　the　quale　as　possessing　colour；　it　would　include　fatherhood　and　the　complementary　relationships；　since　the　father　possesses　the　son　and　the　son　possesses　the　father：　in　short；　it　would　include　all　belongings。　　　　　If；　on　the　contrary；　the　category　of　Possession　comprises　only　the　things　of　the　body；　such　as　weapons　and　shoes；　we　first　ask　why　this　should　be　so；　and　why　their　possession　produces　a　single　category；　while　burning；　cutting；　burying　or　casting　them　out　do　not　give　another　or　others。　If　it　is　because　these　things　are　carried　on　the　person；　then　one's　mantle　lying　on　a　couch　will　come　under　a　different　category　from　that　of　the　mantle　covering　the　person。　If　the　ownership　of　possession　suffices；　then　clearly　one　must　refer　to　the　one　category　of　Possession　all　objects　identified　by　being　possessed；　every　case　in　which　possession　can　be　established；　the　character　of　the　possessed　object　will　make　no　difference。　　　　　If　however　Possession　is　not　to　be　predicated　of　Quality　because　Quality　stands　recognised　as　a　category；　nor　of　Quantity　because　the　category　of　Quantity　has　been　received；　nor　of　parts　because　they　have　been　assigned　to　the　category　of　Substance；　why　should　we　predicate　Possession　of　weapons；　when　they　too　are　comprised　in　the　accepted　category　of　Substance？　Shoes　and　weapons　are　clearly　substances。　　　　　How；　further；　is　〃He　possesses　weapons；〃　signifying　as　it　does　that　the　action　of　arming　has　been　performed　by　a　subject；　to　be　regarded　as　an　entirely　simple　notion；　assignable　to　a　single　category？　　　　　Again；　is　Possession　to　be　restricted　to　an　animate　possessor；　or　does　it　hold　good　even　of　a　statue　as　possessing　the　objects　above　mentioned？　The　animate　and　inanimate　seem　to　possess　in　different　ways；　and　the　term　is　perhaps　equivocal。　Similarly；　〃standing〃　has　not　the　same　connotation　as　applied　to　the　animate　and　the　inanimate。　　　　　Besides；　how　can　it　be　reasonable　for　what　is　found　only　in　a　limited　number　of　cases　to　form　a　distinct　generic　category？　　　　　24。　There　remains　Situation；　which　like　Possession　is　confined　to　a　few　instances　such　as　reclining　and　sitting。　　　　　Even　so；　the　term　is　not　used　without　qualification：　we　say　〃they　are　placed　in　such　and　such　a　manner；〃　〃he　is　situated　in　such　and　such　a　position。〃　The　position　is　added　from　outside　the　genus。　　　　　In　short；　Situation　signifies　〃being　in　a　place〃；　there　are　two　things　involved；　the　position　and　the　place：　why　then　must　two　categories　be　combined　into　one？　　　　　Moreover；　if　sitting　signifies　an　Act；　it　must　be　classed　among　Acts；　if　a　Passion；　it　goes　under　the　category　to　which　belong　Passions　complete　and　incomplete。　　　　　Reclining　is　surely　nothing　but　〃lying　up；〃　and　tallies　with　〃lying　down〃　and　〃lying　midway。〃　But　if　the　reclining　belongs　thus　to　the　category　of　Relation；　why　not　the　recliner　also？　For　as　〃on　the　right〃　belongs　to　the　Relations；　so　does　〃the　thing　on　the　right〃；　and　similarly　with　〃the　thing　on　the　left。〃　　　　　25。　There　are　those　who　lay　down　four　categories　and　make　a　fourfold　division　into　Substrates；　Qualities；　States；　and　Relative　States；　and　find　in　these　a　common　Something；　and　so　include　everything　in　one　genus。　　　　　Against　this　theory　there　is　much　to　be　urged；　but　particularly　against　this　posing　of　a　common　Something　and　a　single　all…embracing　genus。　This　Something；　it　may　be　submitted；　is　unintelligible　to　themselves；　is　indefinable；　and　does　not　account　either　for　bodies　or　for　the　bodiless。　Moreover；　no　room　is　left　for　a　differentia　by　which　this　Something　may　be　distinguished。　Besides；　this　common　Something　is　either　existent　or　non…existent：　if　existent；　it　must　be　one　or　other　of　its　＇four＇　species；…　if　non…existent；　the　existent　is　classed　under　the　non…existent。　But　the　objections　are　countless；　we　must　leave　them　for　the　present　and　consider　the　several　heads　of　the　division。　　　　　To　the　first　genus　are　assigned　Substrates；　including　Matter；　to　which　is　given　a　priority　over　the　others；　so　that　what　is　ranked　as　the　first　principle　comes　under　the　same　head　with　things　which　must　be　posterior　to　it　since　it　is　their　principle。　　　　　First；　then：　the　prior　is　made　homogeneous　with　the　subsequent。　Now　this　is　impossible：　in　this　relation　the　subsequent　owes　its　existence　to　the　prior；　whereas　among　things　belonging　to　one　same　genus　each　must　have；　essentially；　the　equality　implied　by　the　genus；　for　the　very　meaning　of　genus　is　to　be　predicated　of　the　species　in　respect　of　their　essential　character。　And　that　Matter　is　the　basic　source　of　all　the　rest　of　things；　this　school；　we　may　suppose；　would　hardly　deny。　　　　　Secondly：　since　they　treat　the　Substrate　as　one　thing；　they　do　not　enumerate　the　Existents；　they　look　instead　for　principles　of　the　Existents。　There　is　however　a　difference　between　speaking　of　the　actual　Existents　and　of　their　principles。　　　　　If　Matter　is　taken　to　be　the　only　Existent；　and　all　other　things　as　modifications　of　Matter；　it　is　not　legitimate　to　set　up　a　single　genus　to　embrace　both　the　Existent　and　the　other　things；　consistency　requires　that　Being　＇Substance＇　be　distinguished　from　its　modifications　and　that　these　modifications　be　duly　classified。　　　　　Even　the　distinction　which　this　theory　makes　between　Substrates　and　the　rest　of　things　is　questionable。　The　Substrate　is　＇necessarily＇　one　thing　and　admits　of　no　differentia…　except　perhaps　in　so　far　as　it　is　split　up　like　one　mass　into　its　various　parts；　and　yet　not　even　so；　since　the　notion　of　Being　implies　continuity：　it　would　be　better；　therefore；　to　speak　of　the　Substrate；　in　the　singular。　　　　　26。　But　the　error　in　this　theory　is　fundamental。　To　set　Matter　the　potential　above　everything；　instead　of　recognising　the　primacy　of　actuality；　is　in　the　highest　degree　perverse。　If　the　potential　holds　the　primacy　among　the　Existents；　its　actualization　becomes　impossible；　it　certainly　cannot　bring　itself　into　actuality：　either　the　actual　exists　previously；　and　so　the　potential　is　not　the　first…principle；　or；　if　the　two　are　to　be　regarded　as　existing　simultaneously；　the　first…principles　must　be　attributed　to　hazard。　Besides；　if　they　are　simultaneous；　why　is　not　actuality　given　the　primacy？　Why　is　the　potential　more　truly　real　than　the　actual？　　　　　Supposing　however　that　the　actual　does　come　later　than　the　potential；　how　must　the　theory　proceed？　Obviously　Matter　does　not　produce　Form：　the　unqualified　does　not　produce　Quality；　nor　does　actuality　take　its　origin　in　the　potential；　for　that　would　mean　that　the　actual　was　inherent　in　the　potential；　which　at　once　becomes　a　dual　thing。　　　　　Furthermore；　God　becomes　a　secondary　to　Matter；　inasmuch　as　even　he　is　regarded　as　a　body　composed　of　Matter　and　Form…　though　how　he　acquires　the　Form　is　not　revealed。　If　however　he　be　admitted　to　exist　apart　from　Matter　in　virtue　of　his　character　as　a　principle　and　a　rational　law　＇logos＇；　God　will　be　bodiless；　the　Creative　Power　bodiless。　If　we　are　told　that　he　is　without　Matter　but　is　composite　in　essence　by　the　fact　of　being　a　body；　this　amounts　to　introducing　another　Matter；　the　Matter　of　God。　　　　　Again；　how　can　Matter　be　a　first…principle；　seeing　that　it　is　body？　Body　must　necessarily　be　a　plurality；　since　all　bodies　are　composite　of　Matter　and　Quality。　If　however　body　in　this　case　is　to　be　understood　in　some　different　way；　then　Matter　is　identified　with　body　only　by　an　equivocation。　　　　　If　the　possession　of　three　dimensions　is　given　as　the　characteristic　of　body；　then　we　are　dealing　simply　with　mathematical　body。　If　resistance　is　added；　we　are　no　longer　considering　a　unity：　besides；　resistance　is　a　quality　or　at　least　derived　from　Quality。　　　　　And　whence　is　this　resistance　supposed　to　come？　Whence　the　three　dimensions？　What　is　the　source　of　their　existence？　Matter　is　not　comprised　in　the　concept　of　the　three…dimensional；　nor　the　three…dimensional　in　the　concept　of　Matter；　if　Matter　partake