the six enneads-第156章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
still different from Action and cannot belong to the same genus as activity； though if they are both Motion； it will so belong； on the principle that alteration must be regarded as qualitative motion。 Does it follow that whenever alteration proceeds from Quality； it will be activity and Action； the quale remaining impassive？ It may be that if the quale remains impassive； the alteration will be in the category of Action； whereas if； while its energy is directed outwards； it also suffers… as in beating… it will cease to belong to that category： or perhaps there is nothing to prevent its being in both categories at one and the same moment。 If then an alteration be conditioned by Passivity alone； as is the case with rubbing； on what ground is it assigned to Action rather than to Passivity？ Perhaps the Passivity arises from the fact that a counter…rubbing is involved。 But are we； in view of this counter…motion； to recognize the presence of two distinct motions？ No： one only。 How then can this one motion be both Action and Passion？ We must suppose it to be Action in proceeding from an object； and Passion in being directly upon another… though it remains the same motion throughout。 Suppose however Passion to be a different motion from Action： how then does its modification of the patient object change that patient's character without the agent being affected by the patient？ For obviously an agent cannot be passive to the operation it performs upon another。 Can it be that the fact of motion existing elsewhere creates the Passion； which was not Passion in the agent？ If the whiteness of the swan； produced by its Reason…Principle； is given at its birth； are we to affirm Passion of the swan on its passing into being？ If； on the contrary； the swan grows white after birth； and if there is a cause of that growth and the corresponding result； are we to say that the growth is a Passion？ Or must we confine Passion to purely qualitative change？ One thing confers beauty and another takes it： is that which takes beauty to be regarded as patient？ If then the source of beauty… tin； suppose… should deteriorate or actually disappear； while the recipient… copper… improves； are we to think of the copper as passive and the tin active？ Take the learner： how can he be regarded as passive； seeing that the Act of the agent passes into him ＇and becomes his Act＇？ How can the Act； necessarily a simple entity； be both Act and Passion？ No doubt the Act is not in itself a Passion； nonetheless； the learner coming to possess it will be a patient by the fact of his appropriation of an experience from outside： he will not； of course； be a patient in the sense of having himself performed no Act； learning… like seeing… is not analogous to being struck； since it involves the acts of apprehension and recognition。 21。 How； then； are we to recognise Passivity； since clearly it is not to be found in the Act from outside which the recipient in turn makes his own？ Surely we must look for it in cases where the patient remains without Act； the passivity pure。 Imagine a case where an agent improves； though its Act tends towards deterioration。 Or； say； a a man's activity is guided by evil and is allowed to dominate another's without restraint。 In these cases the Act is clearly wrong； the Passion blameless。 What then is the real distinction between Action and Passion？ Is it that Action starts from within and is directed upon an outside object； while Passion is derived from without and fulfilled within？ What； then； are we to say of such cases as thought and opinion which originate within but are not directed outwards？ Again； the Passion 〃being heated〃 rises within the self； when that self is provoked by an opinion to reflection or to anger； without the intervention of any external。 Still it remains true that Action； whether self…centred or with external tendency； is a motion rising in the self。 How then do we explain desire and other forms of aspiration？ Aspiration must be a motion having its origin in the object aspired to； though some might disallow 〃origin〃 and be content with saying that the motion aroused is subsequent to the object； in what respect； then； does aspiring differ from taking a blow or being borne down by a thrust？ Perhaps； however； we should divide aspirations into two classes； those which follow intellect being described as Actions； the merely impulsive being Passions。 Passivity now will not turn on origin； without or within… within there can only be deficiency； but whenever a thing； without itself assisting in the process； undergoes an alteration not directed to the creation of Being but changing the thing for the worse or not for the better； such an alteration will be regarded as a Passion and as entailing passivity。 If however 〃being heated〃 means 〃acquiring heat；〃 and is sometimes found to contribute to the production of Being and sometimes not； passivity will be identical with impassivity： besides； 〃being heated〃 must then have a double significance ＇according as it does or does not contribute to Being＇。 The fact is； however； that 〃being heated；〃 even when it contributes to Being； involves the presence of a patient ＇distinct from the being produced＇。 Take the case of the bronze which has to be heated and so is a patient； the being is a statue； which is not heated except accidentally ＇by the accident of being contained in the bronze＇。 If then the bronze becomes more beautiful as a result of being heated and in the same proportion； it certainly becomes so by passivity； for passivity must； clearly； take two forms： there is the passivity which tends to alteration for better or for worse； and there is the passivity which has neither tendency。 22。 Passivity； thus； implies the existence within of a motion functioning somehow or other in the direction of alteration。 Action too implies motion within； whether the motion be aimless or whether it be driven by the impulse comported by the term 〃Action〃 to find its goal in an external object。 There is Motion in both Action and Passion； but the differentia distinguishing Action from Passion keeps Action impassive； while Passion is recognised by the fact that a new state replaces the old； though nothing is added to the essential character of the patient； whenever Being ＇essential Being＇ is produced； the patient remains distinct。 Thus； what is Action in one relation may be Passion in another。 One same motion will be Action from the point of view of A； Passion from that of B； for the two are so disposed that they might well be consigned to the category of Relation… at any rate in the cases where the Action entails a corresponding Passion： neither correlative is found in isolation； each involves both Action and Passion； though A acts as mover and B is moved： each then involves two categories。 Again； A gives motion to B； B receives it； so that we have a giving and a receiving… in a word； a relation。 But a recipient must possess what it has received。 A thing is admitted to possess its natural colour： why not its motion also？ Besides； independent motions such as walking and thought do； in fact； involve the possession of the powers respectively to walk and to think。 We are reminded to enquire whether thought in the form of providence constitutes Action； to be subject to providence is apparently Passion； for such thought is directed to an external； the object of the providential arrangement。 But it may well be that neither is the exercise of providence an action； even though the thought is concerned with an external； nor subjection to it a Passion。 Thought itself need not be an action； for it does not go outward towards its object but remains self…gathered。 It is not always an activity； all Acts need not be definable as activities； for they need not produce an effect； activity belongs to Act only accidentally。 Does it follow that if a man as he walks produces footprints； he cannot be considered to have performed an action？ Certainly as a result of his existing something distinct from himself has come into being。 Yet perhaps we should regard both action and Act as merely accidental； because he did not aim at this result： it would be as we speak of Action even i
