the six enneads-第152章
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y observe that some things have an inactive or dormant relation; with which their actuality is entirely simultaneous; others; combining power and function with their relation; have the relation in some mode always even though the mode be merely that of potentiality; but attain to actual being only in contact with their correlatives。 Or perhaps all distinctions may be reduced to that between producer and product; where the product merely gives a name to the producer of its actuality: an example of this is the relation of father to son; though here both producer and product have a sort of actuality; which we call life。 Are we thus; then; to divide Relation; and thereby reject the notion of an identical common element in the different kinds of Relation; making it a universal rule that the relation takes a different character in either correlative? We must in this case recognise that in our distinction between productive and non…productive relations we are overlooking the equivocation involved in making the terms cover both action and passion; as though these two were one; and ignoring the fact that production takes a different form in the two correlatives。 Take the case of equality; producing equals: nothing is equal without equality; nothing identical without identity。 Greatness and smallness both entail a presence… the presence of greatness and smallness respectively。 When we come to greater and smaller; the participants in these relations are greater and smaller only when greatness and smallness are actually observed in them。 9。 It follows that in the cases specified above… agent; knowledge and the rest… the relation must be considered as in actual operation; and the Act and the Reason…Principle in the Act must be assumed to be real: in all other cases there will be simply participation in an Ideal…Form; in a Reason…Principle。 If Reality implied embodiment; we should indeed be forced to deny Reality to these conditions called relative; if however we accord the pre…eminent place to the unembodied and to the Reason…Principles; and at the same time maintain that relations are Reason…Principles and participate in Ideal…Forms; we are bound to seek their causes in that higher sphere。 Doubleness; it is clear; is the cause of a thing being double; and from it is derived halfness。 Some correlatives owe their designations to the same Form; others to opposite Forms; it is thus that two objects are simultaneously double and half of each other; and one great and the other small。 It may happen that both correlatives exist in one object…likeness and unlikeness; and; in general; identity and difference; so that the same thing will be at once like and unlike; identical and different。 The question arises here whether sharing in the same Form could make one man depraved and another more depraved。 In the case of total depravity; clearly the two are made equal by the absence of a Form。 Where there is a difference of degree; the one has participated in a Form which has failed to predominate; the other in a Form which has failed still more: or; if we choose the negative aspect; we may think of them both as failing to participate in a Form which naturally belonged to them。 Sensation may be regarded as a Form of double origin 'determined both by the sense…organ and by the sensible object'; and similarly with knowledge。 Habit is an Act directed upon something had 'some experience produced by habit' and binding it as it were with the subject having 'experiencing'; as the Act of production binds producer and product。 Measurement is an Act of the measurer upon the measured object: it too is therefore a kind of Reason…Principle。 Now if the condition of being related is regarded as a Form having a generic unity; Relation must be allowed to be a single genus owing its reality to a Reason…Principle involved in all instances。 If however the Reason…Principles 'governing the correlatives' stand opposed and have the differences to which we have referred; there may perhaps not be a single genus; but this will not prevent all relatives being expressed in terms of a certain likeness and falling under a single category。 But even if the cases of which we have spoken can be subsumed under a single head; it is nevertheless impossible to include in a single genus all that goes with them in the one common category: for the category includes negations and derivatives… not only; for example; double but also its negative; the resultant doubleness and the act of doubling。 But we cannot include in one genus both the thing and its negative… double and not…double; relative and not…relative… any more than in dealing with the genus animal we can insert in it the nonanimal。 Moreover; doubleness and doubling have only the relation to double that whiteness has to white; they cannot be classed as identical with it。 10。 As regards Quality; the source of what we call a 〃quale;〃 we must in the first place consider what nature it possesses in accordance with which it produces the 〃qualia;〃 and whether; remaining one and the same in virtue of that common ground; it has also differences whereby it produces the variety of species。 If there is no common ground and the term Quality involves many connotations; there cannot be a single genus of Quality。 What then will be the common ground in habit; disposition; passive quality; figure; shape? In light; thick and lean? If we hold this common ground to be a power adapting itself to the forms of habits; dispositions and physical capacities; a power which gives the possessor whatever capacities he has; we have no plausible explanation of incapacities。 Besides; how are figure and the shape of a given thing to be regarded as a power? Moreover; at this; Being will have no power qua Being but only when Quality has been added to it; and the activities of those substances which are activities in the highest degree; will be traceable to Quality; although they are autonomous and owe their essential character to powers wholly their own! Perhaps; however; qualities are conditioned by powers which are posterior to the substances as such 'and so do not interfere with their essential activities'。 Boxing; for example; is not a power of man qua man; reasoning is: therefore reasoning; on this hypothesis; is not quality but a natural possession of the mature human being; it therefore is called a quality only by analogy。 Thus; Quality is a power which adds the property of being qualia to substances already existent。 The differences distinguishing substances from each other are called qualities only by analogy; they are; more strictly; Acts and Reason…Principles; or parts of Reason…Principles; and though they may appear merely to qualify the substance; they in fact indicate its essence。 Qualities in the true sense… those; that is; which determine qualia… being in accordance with our definition powers; will in virtue of this common ground be a kind of Reason…Principle; they will also be in a sense Forms; that is; excellences and imperfections whether of soul or of body。 But how can they all be powers? Beauty or health of soul or body; very well: but surely not ugliness; disease; weakness; incapacity。 In a word; is powerlessness a power? It may be urged that these are qualities in so far as qualia are also named after them: but may not the qualia be so called by analogy; and not in the strict sense of the single principle? Not only may the term be understood in the four ways 'of Aristotle'; but each of the four may have at least a twofold significance。 In the first place; Quality is not merely a question of action and passion; involving a simple distinction between the potentially active 'quality' and the passive: health; disposition and habit; disease; strength and weakness are also classed as qualities。 It follows that the common ground is not power; but something we have still to seek。 Again; not all qualities can be regarded as Reason…Principles: chronic disease cannot be a Reason…Principle。 Perhaps; however; we must speak in such cases of privations; restricting the term 〃Quantities〃 to Ideal…Forms and powers。 Thus we shall have; not a single genus; but reference only to the unity of a cate