the six enneads-第151章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
ferent points of view either an action or an experience： or we may think of speech as action upon a substrate ＇air＇ and experience within that substrate。 If however voice is not characteristically impact； but is simply air； two categories will be involved： voice is significant； and the one category will not be sufficient to account for this significance without associating with a second。 With regard to time； if it is to be thought of as a measure； we must determine what it is that applies this measure。 It must clearly be either Soul or the Present Moment。 If on the contrary we take time to be something measured and regard it as being of such and such extension… a year； for example… then we may consider it as a quantity： essentially however time is of a different nature； the very fact that we can attribute this or that length to it shows us that it is not length： in other words； time is not Quantity。 Quantity in the strict sense is the Quantity not inbound with things； if things became quantities by mere participation in Quantity； then Substance itself would be identical with Quantity。 Equality and inequality must be regarded as properties of Quantity…Absolute； not of the participants； or of them not essentially but only accidentally： such participants as 〃three yards' length；〃 which becomes a quantity； not as belonging to a single genus of Quantity； but by being subsumed under the one head； the one category。 6。 In considering Relation we must enquire whether it possesses the community of a genus； or whether it may on other grounds be treated as a unity。 Above all； has Relation… for example； that of right and left； double and half… any actuality？ Has it； perhaps； actuality in some cases only； as for instance in what is termed 〃posterior〃 but not in what is termed 〃prior〃？ Or is its actuality in no case conceivable？ What meaning； then； are we to attach to double and half and all other cases of less and more； to habit and disposition； reclining； sitting； standing； to father； son； master； slave； to like； unlike； equal； unequal； to active and passive； measure and measured； or again to knowledge and sensation； as related respectively to the knowable and the sensible？ Knowledge； indeed； may be supposed to entail in relation to the known object some actual entity corresponding to that object's Ideal Form； and similarly with sensation as related to the sense…object。 The active will perform some constant function in relation to the passive； as will the measure in relation to the measured。 But what will emerge from the relation of like to like？ Nothing will emerge。 Likeness is the inherence of qualitative identity； its entire content is the quality present in the two objects。 From equality； similarly； nothing emerges。 The relation merely presupposes the existence of a quantitative identity；… is nothing but our judgement comparing objects essentially independent and concluding； 〃This and that have the same magnitude； the same quality； this has produced that； this is superior to that。〃 Again； what meaning can sitting and standing have apart from sitter and stander？ The term 〃habit〃 either implies a having； in which case it signifies possession； or else it arises from something had； and so denotes quality； and similarly with disposition。 What then in these instances can be the meaning of correlatives apart from our conception of their juxtaposition？ 〃Greater〃 may refer to very different magnitudes； 〃different〃 to all sorts of objects： the comparison is ours； it does not lie in the things themselves。 Right and left； before and behind； would seem to belong less to the category of Relation than to that of Situation。 Right means 〃situated at one point；〃 left means 〃situated at another。〃 But the right and left are in our conception； nothing of them in the things themselves。 Before and after are merely two times； the relation is again of our making。 7。 Now if we do not mean anything by Relation but are victims of words； none of the relations mentioned can exist： Relation will be a notion void of content。 Suppose however that we do possess ourselves of objective truth when in comparing two points of time we pronounce one prior； or posterior； to the other； that priority does entail something distinct from the objects to which it refers； admit an objective truth behind the relation of left and right： does this apply also to magnitudes； and is the relation exhibiting excess and deficiency also something distinct from the quantities involved？ Now one thing is double of another quite apart from our speech or thought； one thing possesses and another is possessed before we notice the fact； equals do not await our comparison but… and this applies to Quality as well as Quantity… rest upon an identity existing between the objects compared： in all the conditions in which we assert Relation the mutual relation exists over and above the objects； we perceive it as already existent； our knowledge is directed upon a thing； there to be known… a clear testimony to the reality of Relation。 In these circumstances we can no longer put the question of its existence。 We have simply to distinguish： sometimes the relation subsists while the objects remain unaltered and even apart； sometimes it depends upon their combination； sometimes； while they remain unchanged； the relation utterly ceases； or； as happens with right and near； becomes different。 These are the facts which chiefly account for the notion that Relation has no reality in such circumstances。 Our task； thus； is to give full value to this elusive character of Relation； and； then to enquire what there is that is constant in all these particular cases and whether this constant is generic or accidental； and having found this constant； we must discover what sort of actuality it possesses。 It need hardly be said that we are not to affirm Relation where one thing is simply an attribute of another； as a habit is an attribute of a soul or of a body； it is not Relation when a soul belongs to this individual or dwells in that body。 Relation enters only when the actuality of the relationships is derived from no other source than Relation itself； the actuality must be； not that which is characteristic of the substances in question； but that which is specifically called relative。 Thus double with its correlative； half gives actuality neither to two yards' length or the number two； nor to one yard's length or the number one； what happens is that； when these quantities are viewed in their relation； they are found to be not merely two and one respectively； but to produce the assertion and to exhibit the fact of standing one to the other in the condition of double and half。 Out of the objects in a certain conjunction this condition of being double and half has issued as something distinct from either； double and half have emerged as correlatives； and their being is precisely this of mutual dependence； the double exists by its superiority over the half； and the half by its inferiority； there is no priority to distinguish double from half； they arise simultaneously。 It is another question whether they endure simultaneously。 Take the case of father and son； and such relationships； the father dies； but the other is still his son； and so with brothers。 Moreover； we see likeness where one of the like people is dead。 8。 But we are digressing： we must resume our enquiry into the cause of dissimilarity among relations。 Yet we must first be informed what reality； common to all cases； is possessed by this Existence derived from mutual conditions。 Now the common principle in question cannot be a body。 The only alternative is that； if it does exist； it be something bodiless； either in the objects thus brought together or outside of them。 Further； if Relation always takes the same form； the term is univocal ＇and specific differentiation is impossible＇； if not； that is if it differs from case to case； the term is equivocal； and the same reality will not necessarily be implied by the mere use of the term Relation。 How then shall we distinguish relations？ We may observe that some things have an inactive or dormant relation； with which their actuality is entir
