the six enneads-第139章

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ut　it　they　cannot　be。　　　　　The　perception　of　Beauty　and　the　awe　and　the　stirring　of　passion　towards　it　are　for　those　already　in　some　degree　knowing　and　awakened：　but　the　Good；　as　possessed　long　since　and　setting　up　a　natural　tendency；　is　inherently　present　to　even　those　asleep　and　brings　them　no　wonder　when　some　day　they　see　it；　since　it　is　no　occasional　reminiscence　but　is　always　with　them　though　in　their　drowse　they　are　not　aware　of　it：　the　love　of　Beauty　on　the　contrary　sets　up　pain　when　it　appears；　for　those　that　have　seen　it　must　pursue。　This　love　of　Beauty　then　is　later　than　the　love　of　Good　and　comes　with　a　more　sophisticated　understanding；　hence　we　know　that　Beauty　is　a　secondary：　the　more　primal　appetition；　not　patent　to　sense；　our　movement　towards　our　good；　gives　witness　that　The　Good　is　the　earlier；　the　prior。　　　　　Again；　all　that　have　possessed　themselves　of　The　Good　feel　it　sufficient：　they　have　attained　the　end：　but　Beauty　not　all　have　known　and　those　that　have　judge　it　to　exist　for　itself　and　not　for　them；　as　in　the　charm　of　this　world　the　beauty　belongs　only　to　its　possessor。　　　　　Then；　too；　it　is　thought　enough　to　appear　loveable　whether　one　is　so　or　not：　but　no　one　wants　his　Good　in　semblance　only。　All　are　seeking　The　First　as　something　ranking　before　aught　else；　but　they　struggle　venomously　for　beauty　as　something　secondary　like　themselves：　thus　some　minor　personage　may　perhaps　challenge　equal　honour　with　the　King's　right…hand　man　on　pretext　of　similar　dependence；　forgetting　that；　while　both　owe　their　standing　to　the　monarch；　the　other　holds　the　higher　rank。　　　　　The　source　of　the　error　is　that　while　both　The　Good　and　The　Beautiful　participate　in　the　common　source；　The　One　precedes　both；　and　that；　in　the　Supreme　also；　The　Good　has　no　need　of　The　Beautiful；　while　the　Beautiful　does　need　The　Good。　　　　　The　Good　is　gentle　and　friendly　and　tender；　and　we　have　it　present　when　we　but　will。　Beauty　is　all　violence　and　stupefaction；　its　pleasure　is　spoiled　with　pain；　and　it　even　draws　the　thoughtless　away　from　The　Good　as　some　attraction　will　lure　the　child　from　the　father's　side：　these　things　tell　of　youth。　The　Good　is　the　older…　not　in　time　but　by　degree　of　reality…　and　it　has　the　higher　and　earlier　power；　all　power　in　fact；　for　the　sequent　holds　only　a　power　subordinate　and　delegated　of　which　the　prior　remains　sovereign。　　　　　Not　that　God　has　any　need　of　His　derivatives：　He　ignores　all　that　produced　realm；　never　necessary　to　Him；　and　remains　identically　what　He　was　before　He　brought　it　into　being。　So　too；　had　the　secondary　never　existed；　He　would　have　been　unconcerned；　exactly　as　He　would　not　have　grudged　existence　to　any　other　universe　that　might　spring　into　being　from　Him；　were　any　such　possible；　of　course　no　other　such　could　be　since　there　is　nothing　that　has　not　existence　once　the　All　exists。　　　　　But　God　never　was　the　All；　that　would　make　Him　dependent　upon　the　universe：　transcending　all；　He　was　able　at　once　to　make　all　things　and　to　leave　them　to　their　own　being；　He　above。　　　　　13。　The　Supreme；　as　the　Absolute　Good　and　not　merely　a　good　being　or　thing；　can　contain　nothing；　since　there　is　nothing　that　could　be　its　good。　　　　　Anything　it　could　contain　must　be　either　good　to　it　or　not　good；　but　in　the　supremely　and　primally　Good　there　can　be　nothing　not　good；　nor　can　the　Absolute　Good　be　a　container　to　the　Good：　containing；　then；　neither　the　good　nor　the　not　good　it　contains　nothing　and；　containing　nothing；　it　is　alone：　it　is　void　of　all　but　itself。　　　　　If　the　rest　of　being　either　is　good…　without　being　the　absolute　good…　or　is　not　good；　while　on　the　other　hand　the　Supreme　contains　neither　what　is　good　nor　what　is　not　good；　then；　containing　nothing；　it　is　The　Good　by　that　very　absence　of　content。　　　　　Thus　we　rob　it　of　its　very　being　as　The　Absolute　Good　if　we　ascribe　anything　to　it；　existence　or　intellect　or　goodness。　The　only　way　is　to　make　every　denial　and　no　assertion；　to　feign　no　quality　or　content　there　but　to　permit　only　the　〃It　is〃　in　which　we　pretend　to　no　affirmation　of　non…existent　attribute：　there　is　an　ignorant　praise　which；　missing　the　true　description；　drags　in　qualities　beneath　the　real　worth　and　so　abases；　philosophy　must　guard　against　attaching　to　the　Supreme　what　is　later　and　lower：　moving　above　all　that　order；　it　is　the　cause　and　source　of　all　these；　and　is　none　of　them。　　　　　For；　once　more；　the　nature　of　the　Good　is　not　such　as　to　make　it　all　things　or　a　thing　among　all：　that　would　range　it　under　the　same　classification　with　them　all　and　it　would　differ；　thus；　only　by　its　individual　quality；　some　specialty；　some　addition。　At　once　it　becomes　not　a　unity　but　a　duality；　there　is　one　common　element　not　good　and　another　element　that　is　good；　but　a　combination　so　made　up　of　good　and　not　good　cannot　be　the　purely　good；　the　primarily　good；　the　primarily　good　must　be　that　principle　in　which　the　better　element　has　more　effectively　participated　and　so　attained　its　goodness。　Any　good　thing　has　become　so　by　communion；　but　that　in　which　it　has　communion　is　not　a　thing　among　the　things　of　the　all；　therefore　the　Good　is　not　a　thing　of　the　All。　　　　　Since　there　is　this　Good　in　any　good　thing…　the　specific　difference　by　which　the　combination　becomes　good…　it　must　enter　from　elsewhere　than　the　world　of　things：　that　source　must　be　a　Good　absolute　and　isolated。　　　　　Thus　is　revealed　to　us　the　Primarily　existent；　the　Good；　above　all　that　has　being；　good　unalloyed；　containing　nothing　in　itself；　utterly　unmingling；　all…transcending；　cause　of　all。　　　　　Certainly　neither　Being　nor　Beauty　springs　from　evil　or　from　the　neutral；　the　maker；　as　the　more　consummate；　must　surpass　the　made。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SIXTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　THAT　THE　PRINCIPLE　TRANSCENDING　BEING　HAS　　　　　　　　　　　　　　NO　INTELLECTUAL　ACT。　WHAT　BEING　HAS　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INTELLECTION　PRIMALLY　AND　WHAT　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BEING　HAS　IT　SECONDARILY。

　　　　1。　There　is　a　principle　having　intellection　of　the　external　and　another　having　self…intellection　and　thus　further　removed　from　duality。　　　　　Even　the　first　mentioned　is　not　without　an　effort　towards　the　pure　unity　of　which　it　is　not　so　capable：　it　does　actually　contain　its　object；　though　as　something　other　than　itself。　　　　　In　the　self…intellective；　there　is　not　even　this　distinction　of　being：　self…conversing；　the　subject　is　its　own　object；　and　thus　takes　the　double　form　while　remaining　essentially　a　unity。　The　intellection　is　the　more　profound　for　this　internal　possession　of　the　object。　　　　　This　principle　is　the　primally　intellective　since　there　can　be　no　intellection　without　duality　in　unity。　If　there　is　no　unity；　perceiving　principle　and　perceived　object　will　be　different；　and　the　intellection；　therefore；　not　primal：　a　principle　concerned　with　something　external　cannot　be　the　primally　intellective　since　it　does　not　possess　the　object　as　integrally　its　own　or　as　itself；　if　it　does　possess　the　object　as　itself…　the　condition　of　true　intellection…　the　two　are　one。　Thus　＇in　order　to　primal　intellection＇　there　must　be　a　unity　in　duality；　while　a　pure　unity　with　no　counterbalancing　duality　can　have　no　object　for　its　intellection　and　ceases　to　be　intellective：　in　other　words　the　primally　intellective　must　be　at　once　simplex　and　something　else。　　　　　But　the　surest　way　of　realizing　that　its　nature　demands　this　combination　of　unity　and　duality　is　to　proceed　upwards　from　the　Soul；　where　the　distinction　can　be　made　more　dearly　since　the　duality　is　exhibited　more　obviously。　　　　　We　can　imagine　the　Soul　as　a　double　light；　a　lesser　corresponding　to　the　soul　proper；　a　purer　representing　its　intellective　phase；　if　now　we　suppose　this　intellective　light　equal　to　the　light　which　is　to　be　its　object；　we　no　longer　distinguish　between　them；　the　two　are　recognised　as　one：　we　know；　indeed；　that　there　are　two；　but　as　we　see　them　they　have　become　one：　this　gives　us　the　relation　between　the　intellective　subject　and　the　object　of　intellection　＇in　the　duality　and　unity　required　by　that　primal　intellection＇：　in　our　thought　we　have　made　the　two　into　one；　but　on　the　other　hand　the　one　thing　has　become　two；　making　itself　into　a　duality　at　the　moment　of　intellection；　or；　to　be　more　exact；　being　dual　by　the　fact　of　intellection　and　single　by　the　fact　that　i