the six enneads-第128章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
s we may know our own form and entire bodily organism by sense…perception： such knowing does not cover the whole field； the knowing element has not had the required cognisance at once of its associates and of itself； this is not the self…knower asked for； it is merely something that knows something else。 Either we must exhibit the self…knowing of an uncompounded being… and show how that is possible… or abandon the belief that any being can possess veritable self…cognition。 To abandon the belief is not possible in view of the many absurdities thus entailed。 It would be already absurd enough to deny this power to the soul or mind； but the very height of absurdity to deny it to the nature of the Intellectual…Principle； presented thus as knowing the rest of things but not attaining to knowledge； or even awareness； of itself。 It is the province of sense and in some degree of understanding and judgement； but not of the Intellectual…Principle； to handle the external； though whether the Intellectual…Principle holds the knowledge of these things is a question to be examined； but it is obvious that the Intellectual…Principle must have knowledge of the Intellectual objects。 Now； can it know those objects alone or must it not simultaneously know itself； the being whose function it is to know just those things？ Can it have self…knowledge in the sense ＇dismissed above as inadequate＇ of knowing its content while it ignores itself？ Can it be aware of knowing its members and yet remain in ignorance of its own knowing self？ Self and content must be simultaneously present： the method and degree of this knowledge we must now consider。 2。 We begin with the soul； asking whether it is to be allowed self…knowledge and what the knowing principle in it would be and how operating。 The sense…principle in it we may at once decide； takes cognisance only of the external； even in any awareness of events within the body it occupies； this is still the perception of something external to a principle dealing with those bodily conditions not as within but as beneath itself。 The reasoning…principle in the Soul acts upon the representations standing before it as the result of sense…perception； these it judges； combining； distinguishing： or it may also observe the impressions； so to speak； rising from the Intellectual…Principle； and has the same power of handling these； and reasoning will develop to wisdom where it recognizes the new and late…coming impressions ＇those of sense＇ and adapts them； so to speak； to those it holds from long before… the act which may be described as the soul's Reminiscence。 So far as this； the efficacy of the Intellectual…Principle in the Soul certainly reaches； but is there also introversion and self…cognition or is that power to be reserved strictly for the Divine Mind？ If we accord self…knowing to this phase of the soul we make it an Intellectual…Principle and will have to show what distinguishes it from its prior； if we refuse it self…knowing； all our thought brings us step by step to some principle which has this power； and we must discover what such self…knowing consists in。 If； again； we do allow self…knowledge in the lower we must examine the question of degree； for if there is no difference of degree； then the reasoning principle in soul is the Intellectual…Principle unalloyed。 We ask； then； whether the understanding principle in the soul has equally the power of turning inwards upon itself or whether it has no more than that of comprehending the impressions； superior and inferior； which it receives。 The first stage is to discover what this comprehension is。 3。 Sense sees a man and transmits the impression to the understanding。 What does the understanding say？ It has nothing to say as yet； it accepts and waits； unless； rather； it questions within itself 〃Who is this？〃… someone it has met before… and then； drawing on memory； says； 〃Socrates。〃 If it should go on to develop the impression received； it distinguishes various elements in what the representative faculty has set before it； supposing it to say 〃Socrates； if the man is good；〃 then； while it has spoken upon information from the senses； its total pronouncement is its own； it contains within itself a standard of good。 But how does it thus contain the good within itself？ It is； itself； of the nature of the good and it has been strengthened still towards the perception of all that is good by the irradiation of the Intellectual…Principle upon it； for this pure phase of the soul welcomes to itself the images implanted from its prior。 But why may we not distinguish this understanding phase as Intellectual…Principle and take soul to consist of the later phases from the sensitive downwards？ Because all the activities mentioned are within the scope of a reasoning faculty； and reasoning is characteristically the function of soul。 Why not； however； absolve the question by assigning self…cognisance to this phase？ Because we have allotted to soul the function of dealing… in thought and in multiform action… with the external； and we hold that observation of self and of the content of self must belong to Intellectual…Principle。 If any one says； 〃Still； what precludes the reasoning soul from observing its own content by some special faculty？〃 he is no longer posting a principle of understanding or of reasoning but； simply； bringing in the Intellectual…Principle unalloyed。 But what precludes the Intellectual…Principle from being present； unalloyed； within the soul？ Nothing； we admit； but are we entitled therefore to think of it as a phase of soul？ We cannot describe it as belonging to the soul though we do describe it as our Intellectual…Principle； something distinct from the understanding； advanced above it； and yet ours even though we cannot include it among soul…phases： it is ours and not ours； and therefore we use it sometimes and sometimes not； whereas we always have use of the understanding； the Intellectual…Principle is ours when we act by it； not ours when we neglect it。 But what is this acting by it？ Does it mean that we become the Intellectual…Principle so that our utterance is the utterance of the Intellectual…Principle； or that we represent it？ We are not the Intellectual…Principle； we represent it in virtue of that highest reasoning faculty which draws upon it。 Still； we perceive by means of the perceptive faculty and are； ourselves； the percipients： may we not say the same of the intellective act？ No： our reasoning is our own； we ourselves think the thoughts that occupy the understanding… for this is actually the We… but the operation of the Intellectual…Principle enters from above us as that of the sensitive faculty from below； the We is the soul at its highest； the mid…point between two powers； between the sensitive principle； inferior to us； and the intellectual principle superior。 We think of the perceptive act as integral to ourselves because our sense…perception is uninterrupted； we hesitate as to the Intellectual…Principle both because we are not always occupied with it and because it exists apart； not a principle inclining to us but one to which we incline when we choose to look upwards。 The sensitive principle is our scout； the Intellectual…Principle our King。 4。 But we； too； are king when we are moulded to the Intellectual…Principle。 That correspondence may be brought about in two ways： either the radii from that centre are traced upon us to be our law or we are filled full of the Divine Mind； which again may have become to us a thing seen and felt as a presence。 Hence our self…knowing comes to the knowing of all the rest of our being in virtue of this thing patently present； or by that power itself communicating to us its own power of self…knowing； or by our becoming identical with that principle of knowledge。 Thus the self…knower is a double person： there is the one that takes cognisance of the principle in virtue of which understanding occurs in the soul or mind； and there is the higher； knowing himself by the Intellectual…Principle with which he becomes identical： this latter knows the self as no longer man but as a being that has become something oth
