the six enneads-第122章

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ty；　governs　the　universe　through　that　part　of　it　which　leans　to　the　body　side；　but　since　it　does　not　exercise　a　will　based　on　calculation　as　we　do…　but　proceeds　by　purely　intellectual　act　as　in　the　execution　of　an　artistic　conception…　its　ministrance　is　that　of　a　labourless　overpoising；　only　its　lowest　phase　being　active　upon　the　universe　it　embellishes。　　　　　The　souls　that　have　gone　into　division　and　become　appropriated　to　some　thing　partial　have　also　their　transcendent　phase；　but　are　preoccupied　by　sensation；　and　in　the　mere　fact　of　exercising　perception　they　take　in　much　that　clashes　with　their　nature　and　brings　distress　and　trouble　since　the　object　of　their　concern　is　partial；　deficient；　exposed　to　many　alien　influences；　filled　with　desires　of　its　own　and　taking　its　pleasure；　that　pleasure　which　is　its　lure。　　　　　But　there　is　always　the　other；　that　which　finds　no　savour　in　passing　pleasure；　but　holds　its　own　even　way。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　NINTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ARE　ALL　SOULS　ONE？。

　　　　1。　That　the　Soul　of　every　individual　is　one　thing　we　deduce　from　the　fact　that　it　is　present　entire　at　every　point　of　the　body…　the　sign　of　veritable　unity…　not　some　part　of　it　here　and　another　part　there。　In　all　sensitive　beings　the　sensitive　soul　is　an　omnipresent　unity；　and　so　in　the　forms　of　vegetal　life　the　vegetal　soul　is　entire　at　each　several　point　throughout　the　organism。　　　　　Now　are　we　to　hold　similarly　that　your　soul　and　mine　and　all　are　one；　and　that　the　same　thing　is　true　of　the　universe；　the　soul　in　all　the　several　forms　of　life　being　one　soul；　not　parcelled　out　in　separate　items；　but　an　omnipresent　identity？　　　　　If　the　soul　in　me　is　a　unity；　why　need　that　in　the　universe　be　otherwise　seeing　that　there　is　no　longer　any　question　of　bulk　or　body？　And　if　that；　too；　is　one　soul　and　yours；　and　mine；　belongs　to　it；　then　yours　and　mine　must　also　be　one：　and　if；　again；　the　soul　of　the　universe　and　mine　depend　from　one　soul；　once　more　all　must　be　one。　　　　　What　then　in　itself　is　this　one　soul？　　　　　First　we　must　assure　ourselves　of　the　possibility　of　all　souls　being　one　as　that　of　any　given　individual　is。　　　　　It　must；　no　doubt；　seem　strange　that　my　soul　and　that　of　any　and　everybody　else　should　be　one　thing　only：　it　might　mean　my　feelings　being　felt　by　someone　else；　my　goodness　another's　too；　my　desire；　his　desire；　all　our　experience　shared　with　each　other　and　with　the　（one…souled）　universe；　so　that　the　very　universe　itself　would　feel　whatever　I　felt。　　　　　Besides　how　are　we　to　reconcile　this　unity　with　the　distinction　of　reasoning　soul　and　unreasoning；　animal　soul　and　vegetal？　　　　　Yet　if　we　reject　that　unity；　the　universe　itself　ceases　to　be　one　thing　and　souls　can　no　longer　be　included　under　any　one　principle。　　　　　2。　Now　to　begin　with；　the　unity　of　soul；　mine　and　another's；　is　not　enough　to　make　the　two　totals　of　soul　and　body　identical。　An　identical　thing　in　different　recipients　will　have　different　experiences；　the　identity　Man；　in　me　as　I　move　and　you　at　rest；　moves　in　me　and　is　stationary　in　you：　there　is　nothing　stranger；　nothing　impossible；　in　any　other　form　of　identity　between　you　and　me；　nor　would　it　entail　the　transference　of　my　emotion　to　any　outside　point：　when　in　any　one　body　a　hand　is　in　pain；　the　distress　is　felt　not　in　the　other　but　in　the　hand　as　represented　in　the　centralizing　unity。　　　　　In　order　that　my　feelings　should　of　necessity　be　yours；　the　unity　would　have　to　be　corporeal：　only　if　the　two　recipient　bodies　made　one；　would　the　souls　feel　as　one。　　　　　We　must　keep　in　mind；　moreover；　that　many　things　that　happen　even　in　one　same　body　escape　the　notice　of　the　entire　being；　especially　when　the　bulk　is　large：　thus　in　huge　sea…beasts；　it　is　said；　the　animal　as　a　whole　will　be　quite　unaffected　by　some　membral　accident　too　slight　to　traverse　the　organism。　　　　　Thus　unity　in　the　subject　of　any　experience　does　not　imply　that　the　resultant　sensation　will　be　necessarily　felt　with　any　force　upon　the　entire　being　and　at　every　point　of　it：　some　transmission　of　the　experience　may　be　expected；　and　is　indeed　undeniable；　but　a　full　impression　on　the　sense　there　need　not　be。　　　　　That　one　identical　soul　should　be　virtuous　in　me　and　vicious　in　someone　else　is　not　strange：　it　is　only　saying　that　an　identical　thing　may　be　active　here　and　inactive　there。　　　　　We　are　not　asserting　the　unity　of　soul　in　the　sense　of　a　complete　negation　of　multiplicity…　only　of　the　Supreme　can　that　be　affirmed…　we　are　thinking　of　soul　as　simultaneously　one　and　many；　participant　in　the　nature　divided　in　body；　but　at　the　same　time　a　unity　by　virtue　of　belonging　to　that　Order　which　suffers　no　division。　　　　　In　myself　some　experience　occurring　in　a　part　of　the　body　may　take　no　effect　upon　the　entire　man　but　anything　occurring　in　the　higher　reaches　would　tell　upon　the　partial：　in　the　same　way　any　influx　from　the　All　upon　the　individual　will　have　manifest　effect　since　the　points　of　sympathetic　contact　are　numerous…　but　as　to　any　operation　from　ourselves　upon　the　All　there　can　be　no　certainty。　　　　　3。　Yet；　looking　at　another　set　of　facts；　reflection　tells　us　that　we　are　in　sympathetic　relation　to　each　other；　suffering；　overcome；　at　the　sight　of　pain；　naturally　drawn　to　forming　attachments；　and　all　this　can　be　due　only　to　some　unity　among　us。　　　　　Again；　if　spells　and　other　forms　of　magic　are　efficient　even　at　a　distance　to　attract　us　into　sympathetic　relations；　the　agency　can　be　no　other　than　the　one　soul。　　　　　A　quiet　word　induces　changes　in　a　remote　object；　and　makes　itself　heard　at　vast　distances…　proof　of　the　oneness　of　all　things　within　the　one　soul。　　　　　But　how　reconcile　this　unity　with　the　existence　of　a　reasoning　soul；　an　unreasoning；　even　a　vegetal　soul？　　　　　＇It　is　a　question　of　powers＇：　the　indivisible　phase　is　classed　as　reasoning　because　it　is　not　in　division　among　bodies；　but　there　is　the　later　phase；　divided　among　bodies；　but　still　one　thing　and　distinct　only　so　as　to　secure　sense…perception　throughout；　this　is　to　be　classed　as　yet　another　power；　and　there　is　the　forming　and　making　phase　which　again　is　a　power。　But　a　variety　of　powers　does　not　conflict　with　unity；　seed　contains　many　powers　and　yet　it　is　one　thing；　and　from　that　unity　rises；　again；　a　variety　which　is　also　a　unity。　　　　　But　why　are　not　all　the　powers　of　this　unity　present　everywhere？　　　　　The　answer　is　that　even　in　the　case　of　the　individual　soul　described；　similarly；　as　permeating　its　body；　sensation　is　not　equally　present　in　all　the　parts；　reason　does　not　operate　at　every　point；　the　principle　of　growth　is　at　work　where　there　is　no　sensation…　and　yet　all　these　powers　join　in　the　one　soul　when　the　body　is　laid　aside。　　　　　The　nourishing　faculty　as　dependent　from　the　All　belongs　also　to　the　All…Soul：　why　then　does　it　not　come　equally　from　ours？　　　　　Because　what　is　nourished　by　the　action　of　this　power　is　a　member　of　the　All；　which　itself　has　sensation　passively；　but　the　perception；　which　is　an　intellectual　judgement；　is　individual　and　has　no　need　to　create　what　already　exists；　though　it　would　have　done　so　had　the　power　not　been　previously　included；　of　necessity；　in　the　nature　of　the　All。　　　　　4。　These　reflections　should　show　that　there　is　nothing　strange　in　that　reduction　of　all　souls　to　one。　But　it　is　still　necessary　to　enquire　into　the　mode　and　conditions　of　the　unity。　　　　　Is　it　the　unity　of　origin　in　a　unity？　And　if　so；　is　the　one　divided　or　does　it　remain　entire　and　yet　produce　variety？　and　how　can　an　essential　being；　while　remaining　its　one　self；　bring　forth　others？　　　　　Invoking　God　to　become　our　helper；　let　us　assert；　that　the　very　existence　of　many　souls　makes　certain　that　there　is　first　one　from　which　the　many　rise。　　　　　Let　us　suppose；　even；　the　first　soul　to　be　corporeal。　　　　　Then　＇by　the　nature　of　body＇　the　many　souls　could　result　only　from　the　splitting　up　of　that　entity；　each　an　entirely　different　substance：　if　this　body…soul　be　uniform　in　kind；　each　of　the　resultant　souls　must　be　of　the　one　kind；　they　will　all　carry　the　one　Form　undividedly　and　will　differ　only　in　their　volumes。　Now；　if　their　being　souls　depended　upon　their　volumes　they　would　be　distinct；　but　if　it　is　ideal…form　that　makes　them　souls；　then　all　are；　in　virtue　of　this　Idea；　one。　　　　　But　this　is　simply　saying　th