the six enneads-第115章

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s　against　the　total　weight　which　if　heavy　it　increases；　black；　it　darkens；　white；　it　lightens；　fire　has　not　the　property　of　chilling　or　a　cold　body　that　of　warming。　　　　　Soul；　on　the　contrary；　operates　diversely　in　different　living　beings；　and　has　quite　contrary　effects　in　any　one：　its　productions　contain　the　solid　and　the　soft；　the　dense　and　the　sparse；　bright　and　dark；　heavy　and　light。　If　it　were　material；　its　quality…　and　the　colour　it　must　have…　would　produce　one　invariable　effect　and　not　the　variety　actually　observed。　　　　　5。　Again；　there　is　movement：　all　bodily　movement　is　uniform；　failing　an　incorporeal　soul；　how　account　for　diversity　of　movement？　Predilections；　reasons；　they　will　say；　that　is　all　very　well；　but　these　already　contain　that　variety　and　therefore　cannot　belong　to　body　which　is　one　and　simplex；　and；　besides；　is　not　participant　in　reason…　that　is；　not　in　the　sense　here　meant；　but　only　as　it　is　influenced　by　some　principle　which　confers　upon　it　the　qualities　of；　for　instance；　being　warm　or　cold。　　　　　Then　there　is　growth　under　a　time…law；　and　within　a　definite　limit：　how　can　this　belong　strictly　to　body？　Body　can　indeed　be　brought　to　growth；　but　does　not　itself　grow　except　in　the　sense　that　in　the　material　mass　a　capacity　for　growing　is　included　as　an　accessory　to　some　principle　whose　action　upon　the　body　causes　growth。　　　　　Supposing　the　soul　to　be　at　once　a　body　and　the　cause　of　growth；　then；　if　it　is　to　keep　pace　with　the　substance　it　augments；　it　too　must　grow；　that　means　it　must　add　to　itself　a　similar　bodily　material。　For　the　added　material　must　be　either　soul　or　soulless　body：　if　soul；　whence　and　how　does　it　enter；　and　by　what　process　is　it　adjoined　＇to　the　soul　which　by　hypothesis　is　body＇；　if　soulless；　how　does　such　an　addition　become　soul；　falling　into　accord　with　its　precedent；　making　one　thing　with　it；　sharing　the　stored　impressions　and　notions　of　that　initial　soul　instead；　rather；　of　remaining　an　alien　ignoring　all　the　knowledge　laid　up　before？　　　　　Would　not　such　a　soulless　addition　be　subject　to　just　such　loss　and　gain　of　substance；　in　fact　to　the　non…identity；　which　marks　the　rest　of　our　material　mass？　　　　　And；　if　this　were　so；　how　explain　our　memories　or　our　recognition　of　familiar　things　when　we　have　no　stably　identical　soul？　　　　　Assume　soul　to　be　a　body：　now　in　the　nature　of　body；　characteristically　divisible；　no　one　of　the　parts　can　be　identical　with　the　entire　being；　soul；　then；　is　a　thing　of　defined　size；　and　if　curtailed　must　cease　to　be　what　it　is；　in　the　nature　of　a　quantitative　entity　this　must　be　so；　for；　if　a　thing　of　magnitude　on　diminution　retains　its　identity　in　virtue　of　its　quality；　this　is　only　saying　that　bodily　and　quantitatively　it　is　different　even　if　its　identity　consists　in　a　quality　quite　independent　of　quantity。　　　　　What　answer　can　be　made　by　those　declaring　soul　to　be　corporeal？　Is　every　part　of　the　soul；　in　any　one　body；　soul　entire；　soul　perfectly　true　to　its　essential　being？　and　may　the　same　be　said　of　every　part　of　the　part？　If　so；　the　magnitude　makes　no　contribution　to　the　soul's　essential　nature；　as　it　must　if　soul　＇as　corporeal＇　were　a　definite　magnitude：　it　is；　as　body　cannot　be；　an　〃all…everywhere；〃　a　complete　identity　present　at　each　and　every　point；　the　part　all　that　the　whole　is。　　　　　To　deny　that　every　part　is　soul　is　to　make　soul　a　compound　from　soulless　elements。　Further；　if　a　definite　magnitude；　the　double　limit　of　larger　or　smaller；　is　to　be　imposed　upon　each　separate　soul；　then　anything　outside　those　limits　is　no　soul。　　　　　Now；　a　single　coition　and　a　single　sperm　suffice　to　a　twin　birth　or　in　the　animal　order　to　a　litter；　there　is　a　splitting　and　diverging　of　the　seed；　every　diverging　part　being　obviously　a　whole：　surely　no　honest　mind　can　fail　to　gather　that　a　thing　in　which　part　is　identical　with　whole　has　a　nature　which　transcends　quantity；　and　must　of　necessity　be　without　quantity：　only　so　could　it　remain　identical　when　quantity　is　filched　from　it；　only　by　being　indifferent　to　amount　or　extension；　by　being　in　essence　something　apart。　Thus　the　Soul　and　the　Reason…Principles　are　without　quantity。　　　　　6。　It　is　easy　to　show　that　if　the　Soul　were　a　corporeal　entity；　there　could　be　no　sense…perception；　no　mental　act；　no　knowledge；　no　moral　excellence；　nothing　of　all　that　is　noble。　　　　　There　can　be　no　perception　without　a　unitary　percipient　whose　identity　enables　it　to　grasp　an　object　as　an　entirety。　　　　　The　several　senses　will　each　be　the　entrance　point　of　many　diverse　perceptions；　in　any　one　object　there　may　be　many　characteristics；　any　one　organ　may　be　the　channel　of　a　group　of　objects；　as　for　instance　a　face　is　known　not　by　a　special　sense　for　separate　features；　nose；　eyes；　etc。；　but　by　one　sense　observing　all　in　one　act。　　　　　When　sight　and　hearing　gather　their　varying　information；　there　must　be　some　central　unity　to　which　both　report。　How　could　there　be　any　statement　of　difference　unless　all　sense…impressions　appeared　before　a　common　identity　able　to　take　the　sum　of　all？　　　　　This　there　must　be；　as　there　is　a　centre　to　a　circle；　the　sense…impressions　converging　from　every　point　of　occurrence　will　be　as　lines　striking　from　a　circumference　to　what　will　be　a　true　centre　of　perception　as　being　a　veritable　unity。　　　　　If　this　centre　were　to　break　into　separate　points…　so　that　the　sense…impressions　fell　upon　the　two　ends　of　a　line…　then；　either　it　must　reknit　itself　to　unity　and　identity；　perhaps　at　the　mid…point　of　the　line；　or　all　remains　unrelated；　every　end　receiving　the　report　of　its　particular　field　exactly　as　you　and　I　have　our　distinct　sense　experiences。　　　　　Suppose　the　sense…object　be　such　a　unity　as　a　face：　all　the　points　of　observation　must　be　brought　together　in　one　visual　total；　as　is　obvious　since　there　could　be　no　panorama　of　great　expanses　unless　the　detail　were　compressed　to　the　capacity　of　the　pupils。　　　　　Much　more　must　this　be　true　in　the　case　of　thoughts；　partless　entities　as　they　are；　impinging　upon　the　centre　of　consciousness　which　＇to　receive　them＇　must　itself　be　void　of　part。　　　　　Either　this　or；　supposing　the　centre　of　consciousness　to　be　a　thing　of　quantity　and　extension；　the　sensible　object　will　coincide　with　it　point　by　point　of　their　co…expansion　so　that　any　given　point　in　the　faculty　will　perceive　solely　what　coincides　with　it　in　the　object：　and　thus　nothing　in　us　could　perceive　any　thing　as　a　whole。　　　　　This　cannot　be：　the　faculty　entire　must　be　a　unity；　no　such　dividing　is　possible；　this　is　no　matter　in　which　we　can　think　of　equal　sections　coinciding；　the　centre　of　consciousness　has　no　such　relation　of　equality　with　any　sensible　object。　The　only　possible　ratio　of　divisibility　would　be　that　of　the　number　of　diverse　elements　in　the　impinging　sensation：　are　we　then　to　suppose　that　each　part　of　the　soul；　and　every　part　of　each　part；　will　have　perception？　Or　will　the　part　of　the　parts　have　none？　That　is　impossible：　every　part；　then；　has　perception；　the　＇hypothetical＇　magnitude；　of　soul　and　each　part　of　soul；　is　infinitely　divisible；　there　will　therefore　be　in　each　part　an　infinite　number　of　perceptions　of　the　object；　and　therefore　an　infinitude　of　representations　of　it　at　our　centre　of　consciousness。　　　　　If　the　sentient　be　a　material　entity　sensation　could　only　be　of　the　order　of　seal…impressions　struck　by　a　ring　on　wax；　in　this　case　by　sensible　objects　on　the　blood　or　on　the　intervenient　air。　　　　　If；　at　this；　the　impression　is　like　one　made　in　liquids…　as　would　be　reasonable…　it　will　be　confused　and　wavering　as　upon　water；　and　there　can　be　no　memory。　If　the　impressions　are　permanent；　then　either　no　fresh　ones　can　be　stamped　upon　the　occupied　ground…　and　there　can　be　no　change　of　sensations…　or；　others　being　made；　the　former　will　be　obliterated；　and　all　record　of　the　past　is　done　away　with。　　　　　If　memory　implies　fresh　sensations　imposed　upon　former　ones；　the　earlier　not　barring　their　way；　the　soul　cannot　be　a　material　entity。　　　　　7。　We　come　to　the　same　result　by　examining　the　sense　of　pain。　We　say　there　is　pain　in　the　finger：　the　trouble　is　doubtless　in　the　finger；　but　our　opponents　must　admit　that　the　sensation　of　the　pain　is　in　the　centre　of　consciousness。　The　suffering　member　is　one　thing；　the　sense　of　suffering　is　another：　how　does　this　ha