second epilogue-第7章

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but　did　so　correspond　in　the　latter。

　　For　an　order　to　be　certainly　executed；　it　is　necessary　that　a　man

should　order　what　can　be　executed。　But　to　know　what　can　and　what

cannot　be　executed　is　impossible；　not　only　in　the　case　of　Napoleon's

invasion　of　Russia　in　which　millions　participated；　but　even　in　the

simplest　event；　for　in　either　case　millions　of　obstacles　may　arise

to　prevent　its　execution。　Every　order　executed　is　always　one　of　an

immense　number　unexecuted。　All　the　impossible　orders　inconsistent　with

the　course　of　events　remain　unexecuted。　Only　the　possible　ones　get

linked　up　with　a　consecutive　series　of　commands　corresponding　to　a

series　of　events；　and　are　executed。

　　Our　false　conception　that　an　event　is　caused　by　a　command　which

precedes　it　is　due　to　the　fact　that　when　the　event　has　taken　place　and

out　of　thousands　of　others　those　few　commands　which　were　consistent

with　that　event　have　been　executed；　we　forget　about　the　others　that

were　not　executed　because　they　could　not　be。　Apart　from　that；　the

chief　source　of　our　error　in　this　matter　is　due　to　the　fact　that　in

the　historical　accounts　a　whole　series　of　innumerable；　diverse；　and

petty　events；　such　for　instance　as　all　those　which　led　the　French

armies　to　Russia；　is　generalized　into　one　event　in　accord　with　the

result　produced　by　that　series　of　events；　and　corresponding　with

this　generalization　the　whole　series　of　commands　is　also　generalized

into　a　single　expression　of　will。

　　We　say　that　Napoleon　wished　to　invade　Russia　and　invaded　it。　In

reality　in　all　Napoleon's　activity　we　never　find　anything　resembling

an　expression　of　that　wish；　but　find　a　series　of　orders；　or

expressions　of　his　will；　very　variously　and　indefinitely　directed。

Amid　a　long　series　of　unexecuted　orders　of　Napoleon's　one　series；

for　the　campaign　of　1812；　was　carried　out…　not　because　those　orders

differed　in　any　way　from　the　other；　unexecuted　orders　but　because　they

coincided　with　the　course　of　events　that　led　the　French　army　into

Russia；　just　as　in　stencil　work　this　or　that　figure　comes　out　not

because　the　color　was　laid　on　from　this　side　or　in　that　way；　but

because　it　was　laid　on　from　all　sides　over　the　figure　cut　in　the

stencil。

　　So　that　examining　the　relation　in　time　of　the　commands　to　the

events；　we　find　that　a　command　can　never　be　the　cause　of　the　event；

but　that　a　certain　definite　dependence　exists　between　the　two。

　　To　understand　in　what　this　dependence　consists　it　is　necessary　to

reinstate　another　omitted　condition　of　every　command　proceeding　not

from　the　Deity　but　from　a　man；　which　is；　that　the　man　who　gives　the

command　himself　takes　part　in

　　This　relation　of　the　commander　to　those　he　commands　is　just　what

is　called　power。　This　relation　consists　in　the　following：

　　For　common　action　people　always　unite　in　certain　combinations；　in

which　regardless　of　the　difference　of　the　aims　set　for　the　common

action；　the　relation　between　those　taking　part　in　it　is　always　the

same。

　　Men　uniting　in　these　combinations　always　assume　such　relations

toward　one　another　that　the　larger　number　take　a　more　direct　share；

and　the　smaller　number　a　less　direct　share；　in　the　collective　action

for　which　they　have　combined。

　　Of　all　the　combinations　in　which　men　unite　for　collective　action　one

of　the　most　striking　and　definite　examples　is　an　army。

　　Every　army　is　composed　of　lower　grades　of　the　service…　the　rank

and　file…　of　whom　there　are　always　the　greatest　number；　of　the　next

higher　military　rank…　corporals　and　noncommissioned　officers　of　whom

there　are　fewer；　and　of　still…higher　officers　of　whom　there　are

still　fewer；　and　so　on　to　the　highest　military　command　which　is

concentrated　in　one　person。

　　A　military　organization　may　be　quite　correctly　compared　to　a　cone；

of　which　the　base　with　the　largest　diameter　consists　of　the　rank　and

file；　the　next　higher　and　smaller　section　of　the　cone　consists　of

the　next　higher　grades　of　the　army；　and　so　on　to　the　apex；　the　point

of　which　will　represent　the　commander　in　chief。

　　The　soldiers；　of　whom　there　are　the　most；　form　the　lower　section

of　the　cone　and　its　base。　The　soldier　himself　does　the　stabbing；

hacking；　burning；　and　pillaging；　and　always　receives　orders　for

these　actions　from　men　above　him；　he　himself　never　gives　an　order。　The

noncommissioned　officers　（of　whom　there　are　fewer）　perform　the

action　itself　less　frequently　than　the　soldiers；　but　they　already　give

commands。　An　officer　still　less　often　acts　directly　himself；　but

commands　still　more　frequently。　A　general　does　nothing　but　command　the

troops；　indicates　the　objective；　and　hardly　ever　uses　a　weapon

himself。　The　commander　in　chief　never　takes　direct　part　in　the

action　itself；　but　only　gives　general　orders　concerning　the　movement

of　the　mass　of　the　troops。　A　similar　relation　of　people　to　one　another

is　seen　in　every　combination　of　men　for　common　activity…　in

agriculture；　trade；　and　every　administration。

　　And　so　without　particularly　analyzing　all　the　contiguous　sections　of

a　cone　and　of　the　ranks　of　an　army；　or　the　ranks　and　positions　in

any　administrative　or　public　business　whatever　from　the　lowest　to

the　highest；　we　see　a　law　by　which　men；　to　take　associated　action；

combine　in　such　relations　that　the　more　directly　they　participate　in

performing　the　action　the　less　they　can　command　and　the　more

numerous　they　are；　while　the　less　their　direct　participation　in　the

action　itself；　the　more　they　command　and　the　fewer　of　them　there

are；　rising　in　this　way　from　the　lowest　ranks　to　the　man　at　the　top；

who　takes　the　least　direct　share　in　the　action　and　directs　his

activity　chiefly　to　commanding。

　　This　relation　of　the　men　who　command　to　those　they　command　is　what

constitutes　the　essence　of　the　conception　called　power。

　　Having　restored　the　condition　of　time　under　which　all　events

occur；　find　that　a　command　is　executed　only　when　it　is　related　to　a

corresponding　series　of　events。　Restoring　the　essential　condition　of

relation　between　those　who　command　and　those　who　execute；　we　find　that

by　the　very　nature　of　the　case　those　who　command　take　the　smallest

part　in　the　action　itself　and　that　their　activity　is　exclusively

directed　to　commanding。

EP2｜CH7

　　CHAPTER　VII



　　When　an　event　is　taking　place　people　express　their　opinions　and

wishes　about　it；　and　as　the　event　results　from　the　collective　activity

of　many　people；　some　one　of　the　opinions　or　wishes　expressed　is　sure

to　be　fulfilled　if　but　approximately。　When　one　of　the　opinions

expressed　is　fulfilled；　that　opinion　gets　connected　with　the　event

as　a　command　preceding　it。

　　Men　are　hauling　a　log。　Each　of　them　expresses　his　opinion　as　to

how　and　where　to　haul　it。　They　haul　the　log　away；　and　it　happens

that　this　is　done　as　one　of　them　said。　He　ordered　it。　There　we　have

command　and　power　in　their　primary　form。　The　man　who　worked　most

with　his　hands　could　not　think　so　much　about　what　he　was　doing；　or

reflect　on　or　command　what　would　result　from　the　common　activity；

while　the　man　who　commanded　more　would　evidently　work　less　with　his

hands　on　account　of　his　greater　verbal　activity。

　　When　some　larger　concourse　of　men　direct　their　activity　to　a

common　aim　there　is　a　yet　sharper　division　of　those　who；　because　their

activity　is　given　to　directing　and　commanding；　take　less　less　part

in　the　direct　work。

　　When　a　man　works　alone　he　always　has　a　certain　set　of　reflections

which　as　it　seems　to　him　directed　his　past　activity；　justify　his

present　activity；　and　guide　him　in　planning　his　future　actions。　Just

the　same　is　done　by　a　concourse　of　people；　allowing　those　who　do　not

take　a　direct　part　in　the　activity　to　devise　considerations；

justifications；　and　surmises　concerning　their　collective　activity。

　　For　reasons　known　or　unknown　to　us　the　French　began　to　drown　and

kill　one　another。　And　corresponding　to　the　event　its　justification

appears　in　people's　belief　that　this　was　necessary　for　the　welfare

of　France；　for　liberty；　and　for　equality。　People　ceased　to　kill　one

another；　and　this　event　was　accompanied　by　its　justification　in　the

necessity　for　a　centr