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第6章

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hypothesis unconfirmed by the experience of history。

  The theory of the transference of the collective will of the

people to historic persons may perhaps explain much in the domain of

jurisprudence and be essential for its purposes; but in its

application to history; as soon as revolutions; conquests; or civil

wars occur… that is; as soon as history begins… that theory explains

nothing。

  The theory seems irrefutable just because the act of transference of

the people's will cannot be verified; for it never occurred。

  Whatever happens and whoever may stand at the head of affairs; the

theory can always say that such and such a person took the lead

because the collective will was transferred to him。

  The replies this theory gives to historical questions are like the

replies of a man who; watching the movements of a herd of cattle and

paying no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage in

different parts of the field; or to the driving of the herdsman;

should attribute the direction the herd takes to what animal happens

to be at its head。

  〃The herd goes in that direction because the animal in front leads

it and the collective will of all the other animals is vested in

that leader。〃 This is what historians of the first class say… those

who assume the unconditional transference of the people's will。

  〃If the animals leading the herd change; this happens because the

collective will of all the animals is transferred from one leader to

another; according to whether the animal is or is not leading them

in the direction selected by the whole herd。〃 Such is the reply

historians who assume that the collective will of the people is

delegated to rulers under conditions which they regard as known。 (With

this method of observation it often happens that the observer;

influenced by the direction he himself prefers; regards those as

leaders who; owing to the people's change of direction; are no

longer in front; but on one side; or even in the rear。)

  〃If the animals in front are continually changing and the

direction of the whole herd is constantly altered; this is because

in order to follow a given direction the animals transfer their will

to the animals that have attracted our attention; and to study the

movements of the herd we must watch the movements of all the prominent

animals moving on all sides of the herd。〃 So say the third class of

historians who regard all historical persons; from monarchs to

journalists; as the expression of their age。

  The theory of the transference of the will of the people to historic

persons is merely a paraphrase… a restatement of the question in other

words。

  What causes historical events? Power。 What is power? Power is the

collective will of the people transferred to one person。 Under what

condition is the will of the people delegated to one person? On

condition that that person expresses the will of the whole people。

That is; power is power: in other words; power is a word the meaning

of which we do not understand。



  If the realm of human knowledge were confined to abstract reasoning;

then having subjected to criticism the explanation of 〃power〃 that

juridical science gives us; humanity would conclude that power is

merely a word and has no real existence。 But to understand phenomena

man has; besides abstract reasoning; experience by which he verifies

his reflections。 And experience tells us that power is not merely a

word but an actually existing phenomenon。

  Not to speak of the fact that no description of the collective

activity of men can do without the conception of power; the

existence of power is proved both by history and by observing

contemporary events。

  Whenever an event occurs a man appears or men appear; by whose

will the event seems to have taken place。 Napoleon III issues a decree

and the French go to Mexico。 The King of Prussia and Bismarck issue

decrees and an army enters Bohemia。 Napoleon I issues a decree and

an army enters Russia。 Alexander I gives a command and the French

submit to the Bourbons。 Experience shows us that whatever event occurs

it is always related to the will of one or of several men who have

decreed it。

  The historians; in accord with the old habit of acknowledging divine

intervention in human affairs; want to see the cause of events in

the expression of the will of someone endowed with power; but that

supposition is not confirmed either by reason or by experience。

  On the one side reflection shows that the expression of a man's

will… his words… are only part of the general activity expressed in an

event; as for instance in a war or a revolution; and so without

assuming an incomprehensible; supernatural force… a miracle… one

cannot admit that words can be the immediate cause of the movements of

millions of men。 On the other hand; even if we admitted that words

could be the cause of events; history shows that the expression of the

will of historical personages does not in most cases produce any

effect; that is to say; their commands are often not executed; and

sometimes the very opposite of what they order occurs。

  Without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of humanity

we cannot regard 〃power〃 as the cause of events。

  Power; from the standpoint of experience; is merely the relation

that exists between the expression of someone's will and the execution

of that will by others。

  To explain the conditions of that relationship we must first

establish a conception of the expression of will; referring it to

man and not to the Deity。

  If the Deity issues a command; expresses His will; as ancient

history tells us; the expression of that will is independent of time

and is not caused by anything; for the Divinity is not controlled by

an event。 But speaking of commands that are the expression of the will

of men acting in time and in relation to one another; to explain the

connection of commands with events we must restore: (1) the

condition of all that takes place: the continuity of movement in

time both of the events and of the person who commands; and (2) the

inevitability of the connection between the person commanding and

those who execute his command。

EP2|CH6

  CHAPTER VI



  Only the expression of the will of the Deity; not dependent on time;

can relate to a whole series of events occurring over a period of

years or centuries; and only the Deity; independent of everything; can

by His sole will determine the direction of humanity's movement; but

man acts in time and himself takes part in what occurs。

  Reinstating the first condition omitted; that of time; we see that

no command can be executed without some preceding order having been

given rendering the execution of the last command possible。

  No command ever appears spontaneously; or itself covers a whole

series of occurrences; but each command follows from another; and

never refers to a whole series of events but always to one moment only

of an event。

  When; for instance; we say that Napoleon ordered armies to go to

war; we combine in one simultaneous expression a whole series of

consecutive commands dependent one on another。 Napoleon could not have

commanded an invasion of Russia and never did so。 Today he ordered

such and such papers to be written to Vienna; to Berlin; and to

Petersburg; tomorrow such and such decrees and orders to the army; the

fleet; the commissariat; and so on and so on… millions of commands;

which formed a whole series corresponding to a series of events

which brought the French armies into Russia。

  If throughout his reign Napoleon gave commands concerning an

invasion of England and expended on no other undertaking so much

time and effort; and yet during his whole reign never once attempted

to execute that design but undertook an expedition into Russia; with

which country he considered it desirable to be in alliance (a

conviction he repeatedly expressed)… this came about because his

commands did not correspond to the course of events in the first case;

but did so correspond in the latter。

  For an order to be certain

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