second epilogue-第11章
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the modern history of Europe； though to the chroniclers of the
Crusades that event appeared as merely due to the will of certain
people。 In regard to the migration of the peoples it does not enter
anyone's head today to suppose that the renovation of the European
world depended on Attila's caprice。 The farther back in history the
object of our observation lies； the more doubtful does the free will
of those concerned in the event become and the more manifest the law
of inevitability。
The third consideration is the degree to which we apprehend that
endless chain of causation inevitably demanded by reason； in which
each phenomenon comprehended； and therefore man's every action； must
have its definite place as a result of what has gone before and as a
cause of what will follow。
The better we are acquainted with the physiological；
psychological； and historical laws deduced by observation and by which
man is controlled； and the more correctly we perceive the
physiological； psychological； and historical causes of the action； and
the simpler the action we are observing and the less complex the
character and mind of the man in question； the more subject to
inevitability and the less free do our actions and those of others
appear。
When we do not at all understand the cause of an action； whether a
crime； a good action； or even one that is simply nonmoral； we
ascribe a greater amount of freedom to it。 In the case of a crime we
most urgently demand the punishment for such an act； in the case of
a virtuous act we rate its merit most highly。 In an indifferent case
we recognize in it more individuality； originality； and
independence。 But if even one of the innumerable causes of the act
is known to us we recognize a certain element of necessity and are
less insistent on punishment for the crime； or the acknowledgment of
the merit of the virtuous act； or the freedom of the apparently
original action。 That a criminal was reared among male factors
mitigates his fault in our eyes。 The self…sacrifice of a father or
mother； or self…sacrifice with the possibility of a reward； is more
comprehensible than gratuitous self…sacrifice； and therefore seems
less deserving of sympathy and less the result of free will。 The
founder of a sect or party； or an inventor； impresses us less when
we know how or by what the way was prepared for his activity。 If we
have a large range of examples； if our observation is constantly
directed to seeking the correlation of cause and effect in people's
actions； their actions appear to us more under compulsion and less
free the more correctly we connect the effects with the causes。 If
we examined simple actions and had a vast number of such actions under
observation； our conception of their inevitability would be still
greater。 The dishonest conduct of the son of a dishonest father； the
misconduct of a woman who had fallen into bad company； a drunkard's
relapse into drunkenness； and so on are actions that seem to us less
free the better we understand their cause。 If the man whose actions we
are considering is on a very low stage of mental development； like a
child； a madman； or a simpleton… then； knowing the causes of the act
and the simplicity of the character and intelligence in question； we
see so large an element of necessity and so little free will that as
soon as we know the cause prompting the action we can foretell the
result。
On these three considerations alone is based the conception of
irresponsibility for crimes and the extenuating circumstances admitted
by all legislative codes。 The responsibility appears greater or less
according to our greater or lesser knowledge of the circumstances in
which the man was placed whose action is being judged； and according
to the greater or lesser interval of time between the commission of
the action and its investigation； and according to the greater or
lesser understanding of the causes that led to the action。
EP2｜CH10
CHAPTER X
Thus our conception of free will and inevitability gradually
diminishes or increases according to the greater or lesser
connection with the external world； the greater or lesser remoteness
of time； and the greater or lesser dependence on the causes in
relation to which we contemplate a man's life。
So that if we examine the case of a man whose connection with the
external world is well known； where the time between the action and
its examination is great； and where the causes of the action are
most accessible； we get the conception of a maximum of inevitability
and a minimum of free will。 If we examine a man little dependent on
external conditions； whose action was performed very recently； and the
causes of whose action are beyond our ken； we get the conception of
a minimum of inevitability and a maximum of freedom。
In neither case… however we may change our point of view； however
plain we may make to ourselves the connection between the man and
the external world； however inaccessible it may be to us； however long
or short the period of time； however intelligible or
incomprehensible the causes of the action may be… can we ever conceive
either complete freedom or complete necessity。
（1） To whatever degree we may imagine a man to be exempt from the
influence of the external world； we never get a conception of
freedom in space。 Every human action is inevitably conditioned by what
surrounds him and by his own body。 I lift my arm and let it fall。 My
action seems to me free； but asking myself whether I could raise my
arm in every direction； I see that I raised it in the direction in
which there was least obstruction to that action either from things
around me or from the construction of my own body。 I chose one out
of all the possible directions because in it there were fewest
obstacles。 For my action to be free it was necessary that it should
encounter no obstacles。 To conceive of a man being free we must
imagine him outside space； which is evidently impossible。
（2） However much we approximate the time of judgment to the time
of the deed； we never get a conception of freedom in time。 For if I
examine an action committed a second ago I must still recognize it
as not being free； for it is irrevocably linked to the moment at which
it was committed。 Can I lift my arm？ I lift it； but ask myself：
could I have abstained from lifting my arm at the moment that has
already passed？ To convince myself of this I do not lift it the next
moment。 But I am not now abstaining from doing so at the first
moment when I asked the question。 Time has gone by which I could not
detain； the arm I then lifted is no longer the same as the arm I now
refrain from lifting； nor is the air in which I lifted it the same
that now surrounds me。 The moment in which the first movement was made
is irrevocable； and at that moment I could make only one movement； and
whatever movement I made would be the only one。 That I did not lift my
arm a moment later does not prove that I could have abstained from
lifting it then。 And since I could make only one movement at that
single moment of time； it could not have been any other。 To imagine it
as free； it is necessary to imagine it in the present； on the boundary
between the past and the future… that is； outside time； which is
impossible。
（3） However much the difficulty of understanding the causes may be
increased； we never reach a conception of complete freedom； that is；
an absence of cause。 However inaccessible to us may be the cause of
the expression of will in any action； our own or another's； the
first demand of reason is the assumption of and search for a cause；
for without a cause no phenomenon is conceivable。 I raise my arm to
perform an action independently of any cause； but my wish to perform
an action without a cause is the cause of my action。
But even if… imagining a man quite exempt from all influences；
examining only his momentary action in the present； unevoked by any
cause… we were to admit so infinitely small a remainder of
inevitability as equaled zero； we should even then no
