second epilogue-第10章

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　　In　regard　to　this　question；　history　stands　to　the　other　sciences

as　experimental　science　stands　to　abstract　science。

　　The　subject　for　history　is　not　man's　will　itself　but　our

presentation　of　it。

　　And　so　for　history；　the　insoluble　mystery　presented　by　the

incompatibility　of　free　will　and　inevitability　does　not　exist　as　it

does　for　theology；　ethics；　and　philosophy。　History　surveys　a

presentation　of　man's　life　in　which　the　union　of　these　two

contradictions　has　already　taken　place。

　　In　actual　life　each　historic　event；　each　human　action；　is　very

clearly　and　definitely　understood　without　any　sense　of

contradiction；　although　each　event　presents　itself　as　partly　free

and　partly　compulsory。

　　To　solve　the　question　of　how　freedom　and　necessity　are　combined

and　what　constitutes　the　essence　of　these　two　conceptions；　the

philosophy　of　history　can　and　should　follow　a　path　contrary　to　that

taken　by　other　sciences。　Instead　of　first　defining　the　conceptions

of　freedom　and　inevitability　in　themselves；　and　then　ranging　the

phenomena　of　life　under　those　definitions；　history　should　deduce　a

definition　of　the　conception　of　freedom　and　inevitability　themselves

from　the　immense　quantity　of　phenomena　of　which　it　is　cognizant　and

that　always　appear　dependent　on　these　two　elements。

　　Whatever　presentation　of　the　activity　of　many　men　or　of　an

individual　we　may　consider；　we　always　regard　it　as　the　result　partly

of　man's　free　will　and　partly　of　the　law　of　inevitability。

　　Whether　we　speak　of　the　migration　of　the　peoples　and　the

incursions　of　the　barbarians；　or　of　the　decrees　of　Napoleon　III；　or　of

someone's　action　an　hour　ago　in　choosing　one　direction　out　of

several　for　his　walk；　we　are　unconscious　of　any　contradiction。　The

degree　of　freedom　and　inevitability　governing　the　actions　of　these

people　is　clearly　defined　for　us。

　　Our　conception　of　the　degree　of　freedom　often　varies　according　to

differences　in　the　point　of　view　from　which　we　regard　the　event；　but

every　human　action　appears　to　us　as　a　certain　combination　of　freedom

and　inevitability。　In　every　action　we　examine　we　see　a　certain　measure

of　freedom　and　a　certain　measure　of　inevitability。　And　always　the　more

freedom　we　see　in　any　action　the　less　inevitability　do　we　perceive；

and　the　more　inevitability　the　less　freedom。

　　The　proportion　of　freedom　to　inevitability　decreases　and　increases

according　to　the　point　of　view　from　which　the　action　is　regarded；

but　their　relation　is　always　one　of　inverse　proportion。

　　A　sinking　man　who　clutches　at　another　and　drowns　him；　or　a　hungry

mother　exhausted　by　feeding　her　baby；　who　steals　some　food；　or　a　man

trained　to　discipline　who　on　duty　at　the　word　of　command　kills　a

defenseless　man…　seem　less　guilty；　that　is；　less　free　and　more　subject

to　the　law　of　necessity；　to　one　who　knows　the　circumstances　in　which

these　people　were　placed；　and　more　free　to　one　who　does　not　know

that　the　man　was　himself　drowning；　that　the　mother　was　hungry；　that

the　soldier　was　in　the　ranks；　and　so　on。　Similarly　a　man　who　committed

a　murder　twenty　years　ago　and　has　since　lived　peaceably　and　harmlessly

in　society　seems　less　guilty　and　his　action　more　due　to　the　law　of

inevitability；　to　someone　who　considers　his　action　after　twenty

years　have　elapsed　than　to　one　who　examined　it　the　day　after　it　was

committed。　And　in　the　same　way　every　action　of　an　insane；　intoxicated；

or　highly　excited　man　appears　less　free　and　more　inevitable　to　one　who

knows　the　mental　condition　of　him　who　committed　the　action；　and

seems　more　free　and　less　inevitable　to　one　who　does　not　know　it。　In

all　these　cases　the　conception　of　freedom　is　increased　or　diminished

and　the　conception　of　compulsion　is　correspondingly　decreased　or

increased；　according　to　the　point　of　view　from　which　the　action　is

regarded。　So　that　the　greater　the　conception　of　necessity　the

smaller　the　conception　of　freedom　and　vice　versa。

　　Religion；　the　common　sense　of　mankind；　the　science　of　jurisprudence；

and　history　itself　understand　alike　this　relation　between　necessity

and　freedom。

　　All　cases　without　exception　in　which　our　conception　of　freedom　and

necessity　is　increased　and　diminished　depend　on　three　considerations：

　　（1）　The　relation　to　the　external　world　of　the　man　who　commits　the

deeds。

　　（2）　His　relation　to　time。

　　（3）　His　relation　to　the　causes　leading　to　the　action。

　　The　first　consideration　is　the　clearness　of　our　perception　of　the

man's　relation　to　the　external　world　and　the　greater　or　lesser

clearness　of　our　understanding　of　the　definite　position　occupied　by

the　man　in　relation　to　everything　coexisting　with　him。　This　is　what

makes　it　evident　that　a　drowning　man　is　less　free　and　more　subject

to　necessity　than　one　standing　on　dry　ground；　and　that　makes　the

actions　of　a　man　closely　connected　with　others　in　a　thickly

populated　district；　or　of　one　bound　by　family；　official；　or　business

duties；　seem　certainly　less　free　and　more　subject　to　necessity　than

those　of　a　man　living　in　solitude　and　seclusion。

　　If　we　consider　a　man　alone；　apart　from　his　relation　to　everything

around　him；　each　action　of　his　seems　to　us　free。　But　if　we　see　his

relation　to　anything　around　him；　if　we　see　his　connection　with

anything　whatever…　with　a　man　who　speaks　to　him；　a　book　he　reads；

the　work　on　which　he　is　engaged；　even　with　the　air　he　breathes　or

the　light　that　falls　on　the　things　about　him…　we　see　that　each　of

these　circumstances　has　an　influence　on　him　and　controls　at　least　some

side　of　his　activity。　And　the　more　we　perceive　of　these　influences　the

more　our　conception　of　his　freedom　diminishes　and　the　more　our

conception　of　the　necessity　that　weighs　on　him　increases。

　　The　second　consideration　is　the　more　or　less　evident　time　relation

of　the　man　to　the　world　and　the　clearness　of　our　perception　of　the

place　the　man's　action　occupies　in　time。　That　is　the　ground　which

makes　the　fall　of　the　first　man；　resulting　in　the　production　of　the

human　race；　appear　evidently　less　free　than　a　man's　entry　into

marriage　today。　It　is　the　reason　why　the　life　and　activity　of　people

who　lived　centuries　ago　and　are　connected　with　me　in　time　cannot

seem　to　me　as　free　as　the　life　of　a　contemporary；　the　consequences

of　which　are　still　unknown　to　me。

　　The　degree　of　our　conception　of　freedom　or　inevitability　depends

in　this　respect　on　the　greater　or　lesser　lapse　of　time　between　the

performance　of　the　action　and　our　judgment　of　it。

　　If　I　examine　an　act　I　performed　a　moment　ago　in　approximately　the

same　circumstances　as　those　I　am　in　now；　my　action　appears　to　me

undoubtedly　free。　But　if　I　examine　an　act　performed　a　month　ago；

then　being　in　different　circumstances；　I　cannot　help　recognizing

that　if　that　act　had　not　been　committed　much　that　resulted　from　it…

good；　agreeable；　and　even　essential…　would　not　have　taken　place。　If

I　reflect　on　an　action　still　more　remote；　ten　years　ago　or　more；

then　the　consequences　of　my　action　are　still　plainer　to　me　and　I

find　it　hard　to　imagine　what　would　have　happened　had　that　action　not

been　performed。　The　farther　I　go　back　in　memory；　or　what　is　the　same

thing　the　farther　I　go　forward　in　my　judgment；　the　more　doubtful

becomes　my　belief　in　the　freedom　of　my　action。

　　In　history　we　find　a　very　similar　progress　of　conviction

concerning　the　part　played　by　free　will　in　the　general　affairs　of

humanity。　A　contemporary　event　seems　to　us　to　be　indubitably　the　doing

of　all　the　known　participants；　but　with　a　more　remote　event　we　already

see　its　inevitable　results　which　prevent　our　considering　anything　else

possible。　And　the　farther　we　go　back　in　examining　events　the　less

arbitrary　do　they　appear。

　　The　Austro…Prussian　war　appears　to　us　undoubtedly　the　result　of

the　crafty　conduct　of　Bismarck；　and　so　on。　The　Napoleonic　wars　still

seem　to　us；　though　already　questionably；　to　be　the　outcome　of　their

heroes'　will。　But　in　the　Crusades　we　already　see　an　event　occupying

its　definite　place　in　history　and　without　which　we　cannot　imagine

the　modern　history　of　Europe；　though　to　the　chroniclers　of　the

Crusades　that　event　appeared　as　mere