shorter logic-第9章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
perception。 Under this head we must also class the philosophy which proposes to
build upon 'anthropology'； facts of consciousness； inward sense； or outward
experience。 It may happen； however； that empirical is an epithet applicable only
to the form of scientific exposition； while intuitive sagacity has arranged what are
mere phenomena； according to the essential sequence of the notion。 In such a
case the contrasts between the varied and numerous phenomena brought together
serve to eliminate the external and accidental circumstances of their conditions；
and the universal thus comes clearly into view。 Guided by such an intuition；
experimental physics will present the rational science of Nature … as history will
present the science of human affairs and actions … in an external picture； which
mirrors the philosophic notion。
§17
It may seem as if philosophy； in order to start on its course； had； like the rest of
the sciences； to begin with a subjective presupposition。 The sciences postulate
their respective objects； such as space； number； or whatever it be； and it might be
supposed that philosophy had also to postulate the existence of thought。 But the
two cases are not exactly parallel。 It is by the free act of thought that it occupies a
point of view； in which it is for its own self； and thus gives itself an object of its
own production。 Nor is this all。 The very point of view； which originally is taken
on its own evidence only； must in the course of the science be converted to a
result … the ultimate result in which philosophy returns into itself and reaches the
point with which it began。 In this manner philosophy exhibits the appearance of a
circle which closes with itself； and has no beginning in the same way as the other
sciences have。 To speak of a beginning of philosophy has a meaning only in
relation to a person who proposes to commence the study； and not in relation to
the science as science。 The same thing may be thus expressed。 The notion of
science … the notion therefore with which we start … which； for the very reason
that it is initial； implies a separation between the thought which is our object； and
the subject philosophising which is； as it were； external to the former； must be
grasped and comprehended by the science itself。 This is in short； the one single
aim； action； and goal of philosophy … to arrive at the notion of its notion； and thus
secure its return and its satisfaction。
§18
As the whole science； and only the whole； can exhibit what the Idea or system of
reason is； it is impossible to give in a preliminary way a general impression of a
philosophy。 Nor can a division of philosophy into its parts be intelligible； except in
connection with the system。 A preliminary division； like the limited conception
from which it comes； can only be an anticipation。 Here however it is premised
that the Idea turns out to be the thought which is completely identical with itself；
and not identical simply in the abstract； but also in its action of setting itself over
against itself； so as to gain a being of its own； and yet of being in full possession
of itself while it is in this other。 Thus philosophy is subdivided into three parts：
I。 Logic： the science of the Idea in and for itself。
II。 The Philosophy of Nature： the science of the Idea in its otherness。
III。 The Philosophy of Mind： the science of the Idea come back to itself out of
that otherness。
As observed in §15； the differences between the several philosophical sciences
are only aspects or specialisations of the one Idea or system of reason； which and
which alone is alike exhibited in these different media。 In Nature nothing else
would have to be discerned； except the Idea； but the Idea has here divested itself
of its proper being。 In Mind； again； the Idea has asserted a being of its own； and
is on the way to become absolute。 Every such form in which the Idea is
expressed is at the same time a passing or fleeting stage； and hence each of these
subdivisions has not only to know its contents as an object which has being for
the time； but also in the same act to expound how these contents pass into their
higher circle。 To represent the relation between them as a division； therefore；
leads to misconception； for it co…ordinates the several parts or sciences one beside
another； as if they had no innate development； but were； like so many species；
really and radically distinct。
II： Preliminary Notion
Logic derived from a survey of the whole system
§ 19
Logic is the science of the pure Idea； pure； that is； because the Idea is in the
abstract medium of Thought。
This definition； and the others which occur in these introductory outlines； are
derived from a survey of the whole system； to which accordingly they are
subsequent。 The same remark applies to all prefatory notions whatever about
philosophy。
Logic might have been defined as the science of thought； and of its laws and
characteristic forms。 But thought； as thought； constitutes only the general
medium； or qualifying circumstance； which renders the Idea distinctively logical。
If we identify the Idea with thought； thought must not be taken in the sense of a
method or form； but in the sense of the self…developing totality of its laws and
peculiar terms。 These laws are the work of thought itself； and not a fact which it
finds and must submit to。
From different points of view； Logic Is either the hardest or the easiest of the
sciences。 Logic is hard； because it has to deal not with perceptions； nor； like
geometry； with abstract representations of the senses； but with the pure
abstractions； and because it demands a force and facility of withdrawing into pure
thought； of keeping firm hold on it； and of moving in such an element。 Logic is
easy； because its facts are nothing but our own thought and its familiar forms or
terms： and these are the acme of simplicity； the ABC of everything else。 They are
also what we are best acquainted with： such as 'is' and 'is not'； quality and
magnitude； being potential and being actual； one； many； and so on。 But such an
acquaintance only adds to the difficulties of the study； for while； on the one hand；
we naturally think it is not worth our trouble to occupy ourselves any longer with
things so familiar； on the other hand； the problem is to become acquainted with
them in a new way； quite opposite to that in which we know them already。
The utility of Logic is a matter which concerns its bearings upon the student； and
the training it may give for other purposes。 This logical training consists in the
exercise in thinking which the student has to go through （this science is the
thinking of thinking）： and in the fact that he stores his head with thoughts； in their
native unalloyed character。 It is true that Logic； being the absolute form of truth；
and another name for the very truth itself； is something more than merely useful。
Yet if what is noblest； most liberal； and most independent is also most useful；
Logic has some claim to the latter character。 Its utility must then be estimated at
another rate than exercise in thought for the sake of the exercise。
§ 19n
（1） The first question is： What is the object of our science？ The simplest and most intelligible
answer to this question is that Truth is the object of Logic。 Truth is a noble word； and the thing is
nobler still。 So long as man is sound at heart and in spirit； the search for truth must awake all the
enthusiasm of his nature。 But immediately there steps in the objection … are we able to know truth
？ There seems to be a disproportion between finite beings like ourselves and the truth which is
absolute； and doubts suggest themselves whether there is any bridge between the finite and the
infinite。 God is truth： how shall we know Him ？ Such an undertaking appears to stand in
contradiction with the graces of lowliness and humility。 Others who ask whether we can know the
truth have a different purpose。 They want to justify themselves in living on con
