shorter logic-第82章

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much　not　executed　as　executed；　the　end　in　question　put　as　unessential　as　much　as
essential；　as　actual　and　at　the　same　time　as　merely　possible。　This　contradiction
presents　itself　to　imagination　as　an　endless　progress　in　the　actualising　of　the　Good；
which　is　therefore　set　up　and　fixed　as　a　mere　'ought'；　or　goal　of　perfection。　In
point　of　form　however　this　contradiction　vanishes　when　the　action　supersedes　the
subjectivity　of　the　purpose；　and　along　with　it　the　objectivity；　with　the　contrast
which　makes　both　finite；　abolishing　subjectivity　as　a　whole　and　not　merely　the
one…sidedness　of　this　form　of　it。　（For　another　new　subjectivity　of　the　kind；　that　is；
a　new　generation　of　the　contrast；　is　not　distinct　from　that　which　is　supposed　to　be
past　and　gone。）　This　return　into　itself　is　at　the　same　time　the　content's　own
'recollection'　that　it　is　the　Good　and　the　implicit　identity　of　the　two　sides　…　it　is　a
'recollection'　of　the　presupposition　of　the　theoretical　attitude　of　mind　（§　224）　that
the　objective　world　is　its　own　truth　and　substantiality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　234n

While　Intelligence　merely　proposes　to　take　the　world　as　it　is；　Will　takes　steps　to　make　the　world
what　it　ought　to　be。　Will　looks　upon　the　immediate　and　given　present　not　as　solid　being；　but　as
mere　semblance　without　reality。　It　is　here　that　we　meet　those　contradictions　which　are　so
bewildering　from　the　standpoint　of　abstract　morality。　This　position　in　its　'practical'　bearings　is　the
one　taken　by　the　philosophy　of　Kant；　and　even　by　that　of　Fichte。　The　Good；　say　these　writers；　has
to　be　realised：　we　have　to　work　in　order　to　produce　it：　and　Will　is　only　the　Good　actualising　itself。
If　the　world　then　were　as　it　ought　to　be；　the　action　of　Will　would　be　at　an　end。　The　Will　itself
therefore　requires　that　its　End　should　not　be　realised。　In　these　words；　a　correct　expression　is　given
to　the　finitude　of　Will。　But　finitude　was　not　meant　to　be　the　ultimate　point：　and　it　is　the　process　of
Will　itself　which　abolishes　finitude　and　the　contradiction　it　involves。　

The　reconciliation　is　achieved　when　Will　in　its　result　returns　to　the　presupposition　made　by
cognition。　In　other　words；　it　consists　in　the　unity　of　the　theoretical　and　practical　idea。　Will　knows
the　end　to　be　its　own；　and　Intelligence　apprehends　the　world　as　the　notion　actual。　This　is　the　right
attitude　of　rational　cognition。　Nullity　and　transitoriness　constitute　only　the　superficial　features　and
not　the　real　essence　of　the　world。　That　essence　is　the　notion　in　posse　and　in　esse：　and　thus　the
world　is　itself　the　idea。　All　unsatisfied　endeavour　ceases；　when　we　recognise　that　the　final　purpose
of　the　world　is　accomplished　no　less　than　ever　accomplishing　itself。　Generally　speaking；　this　is　the
man's　way　of　looking；　while　the　young　imagine　that　the　world　is　utterly　sunk　in　wickedness；　and
that　the　first　thing　needful　is　a　thorough　transformation。　The　religious　mind；　on　the　contrary；　views
the　world　as　ruled　by　Divine　Providence；　and　therefore　correspondent　with　what　it　ought　to　be。
But　this　harmony　between　the　'is'　and　the　'ought　to　be'　is　not　torpid　and　rigidly　stationary。　Good；
the　final　end　of　the　world；　has　being；　only　while　it　constantly　produces　itself。　And　the　world　of
spirit　and　the　world　of　nature　continue　to　have　this　distinction；　that　the　latter　moves　only　in　a
recurring　cycle；　while　the　former　certainly　also　makes　progress。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§235

Thus　the　truth　of　the　Good　is　laid　down　as　the　unity　of　the　theoretical　and
practical　idea　in　the　doctrine　that　the　Good　is　radically　and　really　achieved；　that
the　objective　world　is　in　itself　and　for　itself　the　Idea；　just　as　it　at　the　same　time
eternally　lays　itself　down　as　End；　and　by　action　brings　about　its　actuality。　This　life
which　has　returned　to　itself　from　the　bias　and　finitude　of　cognition；　and　which　by
the　activity　of　the　notion　has　become　identical　with　it；　is　the　Speculative　or
Absolute　Idea。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（c）　The　Absolute　Idea
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§236

The　Idea；　as　unity　of　the　Subjective　and　Objective　Idea；　is　the　notion　of　the　Idea
…　a　notion　whose　object　（Gegenstand）　is　the　Idea　as　such；　and　for　which　the
objective　（Objekt）　is　Idea　…　an　Object　which　embraces　all　characteristics　in　its
unity。　This　unity　is　consequently　the　absolute　and　all　truth；　the　Idea　which　thinks
itself　…　and　here　at　least　as　a　thinking　or　Logical　Idea。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　236n

The　Absolute　Idea　is；　in　the　first　place；　the　unity　of　the　theoretical　and　practical　idea；　and　thus　at
the　same　time　the　unity　of　the　idea　of　life　with　the　idea　of　cognition。　In　cognition　we　had　the　idea　in
a　biased；　one…sided　shape。　The　process　of　cognition　has　issued　in　the　overthrow　of　this　bias　and
the　restoration　of　that　unity；　which　as　unity；　and　in　its　immediacy；　is　in　the　first　instance　the　Idea　of
Life。　The　defect　of　life　lies　in　its　being　only　the　idea　implicit　or　natural：　whereas　cognition　is　in　an
equally　one…sided　way　the　merely　conscious　idea；　or　the　idea　for　itself。　The　unity　and　truth　of　these
two　is　the　Absolute　Idea；　which　is　both　in　itself　and　for　itself。　Hitherto　we　have　had　the　idea　in
development　through　its　various　grades　as　our　object；　but　now　the　idea　comes　to　be　its　own
object。　This　is　the　noisis　noiseos　which　Aristotle　long　ago　termed　the　supreme　form　of　the　idea。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　237

Seeing　that　there　is　in　it　no　transition；　or　presupposition；　and　in　general　no　specific
character　other　than　what　is　fluid　and　transparent；　the　Absolute　Idea　is　for　itself
the　pure　form　of　the　notion；　which　contemplates　its　contents　as　its　own　self。　It　is
its　own　content；　in　so　far　as　it　ideally　distinguishes　itself　from　itself；　and　the　one
of　the　two　things　distinguished　is　a　self…identity　in　which　however　is　contained　the
totality　of　the　form　as　the　system　of　terms　describing　its　content。　This　content　is
the　system　of　Logic。　All　that　is　at　this　stage　left　as　form　for　the　idea　is　the　Method
of　this　content　…　the　specific　consciousness　of　the　value　and　currency　of　the
'moments'　in　its　development。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　237n

To　speak　of　the　absolute　idea　may　suggest　the　conception　that　we　are　at　length　reaching　the　right
thing　and　the　sum　of　the　whole　matter。　It　is　certainly　possible　to　indulge　in　a　vast　amount　of
senseless　declamation　about　the　idea　absolute。　But　its　true　content　is　only　the　whole　system　of
which　we　have　been　hitherto　studying　the　development。　It　may　also　be　said　in　this　strain　that　the
absolute　idea　is　the　universal；　but　the　universal　not　merely　as　an　abstract　form　to　which　the
particular　content　is　a　stranger；　but　as　the　absolute　form；　into　which　all　the　categories；　the　whole
fullness　of　the　content　it　has　given　being　to；　have　retired。　The　absolute　idea　may　in　this　respect　be
compared　to　the　old　man　who　utters　the　same　creed　as　the　child；　but　for　whom　it　is　pregnant　with
the　significance　of　a　lifetime。　Even　if　the　child　understands　the　truths　of　religion；　he　cannot　but
imagine　them　to　be　something　outside　of　which　lies　the　whole　of　life　and　the　whole　of　the　world。
The　same　may　be　said　to　be　the　case　with　human　life　as　a　whole　and　the　occurrences　with　which　it
is　fraught。　All　work　is　directed　only　to　the　aim　or　end；　and　when　it　is　attained；　people　are　surprised
to　find　nothing　else　but　just　the　very　thing　which　they　had　wished　for。　The　interest　lies　in　the　whole
movement。　When　a　man　traces　up　the　steps　of　his　life；　the　end　may　appear　to　him　very　restricted：
but　in　it　the　whole　decursus　vitae　is　comprehended。　So；　too；　the　content　of　the　absolute　idea　is
the　whole　breadth　of　ground　which　has　passed　under　our　view　up　to　this　point。　Last　of　all　comes
the　discovery　that　the　whole　evolution　is　what　constitutes　the　content　and　the　interest。　It　is　indeed
the　prerogative　of　the　philosopher　to　see　that　everything；　which；　taken　apart；　is　narrow　and
restricted；　receives　its　value　by　its　connection　with　the　whole；　and　by　forming　an　organic　element
of　the　idea。　Thus　it　is　that　we　have　had　the　content　already；　and　what　we　have　now　is　the
knowledge　that　the　content　is　the　l