shorter logic-第8章

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be　at　the　same　time　raised　above　it；　and　so　to　reach　a　higher　stage　of　its　own
being。　The　different　systems　which　the　history　of　philosophy　presents　are
therefore　not　irreconcilable　with　unity。　

We　may　either　say；　that　it　is　one　philosophy　at　different　degrees　of　maturity：　or
that　the　particular　principle；　which　is　the　groundwork　of　each　system；　is　but　a
branch　of　one　and　the　same　universe　of　thought。　In　philosophy　the　latest　birth　of
time　is　the　result　of　all　the　systems　that　have　preceded　it；　and　must　include　their
principles；　and　so；　if；　on　other　grounds；　it　deserve　the　title　of　philosophy；　will　be
the　fullest；　most　comprehensive；　and　most　adequate　system　of　all。　

The　spectacle　of　so　many　and　so　various　systems　of　philosophy　suggests　the
necessity　of　defining　more　exactly　the　relation　of　Universal　to　Particular。　When
the　universal　is　made　a　mere　form　and　co…ordinated　with　the　particular；　as　if　it
were　on　the　same　level；　it　sinks　into　a　particular　itself。　Even　common　sense　in
everyday　matters　is　above　the　absurdity　of　setting　a　universal　beside　the
particulars。　Would　any　one；　who　wished　for　fruit；　reject　cherries；　pears；　and
grapes；　on　the　ground　that　they　were　cherries；　pears；　or　grapes；　and　not　fruit？　But
when　philosophy　is　in　question；　the　excuse　of　many　is　that　philosophies　are　so
different；　and　none　of　them　is　the　philosophy　…　that　each　is　only　a　philosophy。
Such　a　plea　is　assumed　to　justify　any　amount　of　contempt　for　philosophy。　And
yet　cherries　too　are　fruit。　Often；　too；　a　system；　of　which　the　principle　is　the
universal；　is　put　on　a　level　with　another　of　which　the　principle　is　a　particular；　and
with　theories　which　deny　the　existence　of　philosophy　altogether。　Such　systems　are
said　to　be　only　different　views　of　philosophy。　With　equal　justice；　light　and
darkness　might　be　styled　different　kinds　of　light。　

§14

The　same　evolution　of　thought　which　is　exhibited　in　the　history　of　philosophy　is
presented　in　the　System　of　Philosophy　itself。　Here；　instead　of　surveying　the
process；　as　we　do　in　history；　from　the　outside；　we　see　the　movement　of　thought
clearly　defined　in　its　native　medium。　The　thought；　which　is　genuine　and
self…supporting；　must　be　intrinsically　concrete；　it　must　be　an　Idea；　and　when　it　is
viewed　in　the　whole　of　its　universality；　it　is　the　Idea；　or　the　Absolute。　The　science
of　this　Idea　must　form　a　system。　For　the　truth　is　concrete；　that　is；　while　it　gives　a
bond　and　principle　of　unity；　it　also　possesses　an　internal　source　of　development。
Truth；　then；　is　only　possible　as　a　universe　or　totality　of　thought；　and　the　freedom
of　the　whole；　as　well　as　the　necessity　of　the　several　sub…divisions；　which　it
implies；　are　only　possible　when　these　are　discriminated　and　defined。　

Unless　it　is　a　system；　a　philosophy　is　not　a　scientific　production。　Unsystematic
philosophising　can　only　be　expected　to　give　expression　to　personal　peculiarities　of
mind；　and　has　no　principle　for　the　regulation　of　its　contents。　Apart　from　their
interdependence　and　organic　union；　the　truths　of　philosophy　are　valueless；　and
must　then　be　treated　as　baseless　hypotheses；　or　personal　convictions。　Yet　many
philosophical　treatises　confine　themselves　to　such　an　exposition　of　the　opinions
and　sentiments　of　the　author。　

The　term　system　is　often　misunderstood。　It　does　not　denote　a　philosophy；　the
principle　of　which　is　narrow　and　to　be　distinguished　from　others。　On　the　contrary；
a　genuine　philosophy　makes　it　a　principle　to　include　every　particular　principle。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§15

Each　of　the　parts　of　philosophy　is　a　philosophical　whole；　a　circle　rounded　and
complete　in　itself。　In　each　of　these　parts；　however；　the　philosophical　Idea　is　found
in　a　particular　specificality　or　medium。　The　single　circle；　because　it　is　a　real
totality；　bursts　through　the　limits　imposed　by　its　special　medium；　and　gives　rise　to
a　wider　circle。　The　whole　of　philosophy　in　this　way　resembles　a　circle　of　circles。
The　Idea　appears　in　each　single　circle；　but；　at　the　same　time；　the　whole　Idea　is
constituted　by　the　system　of　these　peculiar　phases；　and　each　is　a　necessary
member　of　the　organisation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§16

In　the　form　of　an　Encyclopaedia；　the　science　has　no　room　for　a　detailed
exposition　of　particulars；　and　must　be　limited　to　setting　forth　the　commencement
of　the　special　sciences　and　the　notions　of　cardinal　importance　in　them。　

How　much　of　the　particular　parts　is　requisite　to　constitute　a　particular　branch　of
knowledge　is　so　far　indeterminate；　that　the　part；　if　it　is　to　be　something　true；　must
be　not　an　isolated　member　merely；　but　itself　an　organic　whole。　The　entire　field　of
philosophy　therefore　really　forms　a　single　science；　but　it　may　also　be　viewed　as　a
total；　composed　of　several　particular　sciences。　

The　encyclopaedia　of　philosophy　must　not　be　confounded　with　ordinary
encyclopaedias。　An　ordinary　encyclopaedia　does　not　pretend　to　be　more　than　an
aggregation　of　sciences；　regulated　by　no　principle；　and　merely　as　experience　offers
them。　Sometimes　it　even　includes　what　merely　bear　the　name　of　sciences；　while
they　are　nothing　more　than　a　collection　of　bits　of　information。　In　an　aggregate　like
this；　the　several　branches　of　knowledge　owe　their　place　in　the　encyclopaedia　to
extrinsic　reasons；　and　their　unity　is　therefore　artificial：　they　are　arranged；　but　we
cannot　say　they　form　a　system。　For　the　same　reason；　especially　as　the　materials
to　be　combined　also　depend　upon　no　one　rule　or　principle；　the　arrangement　is　at
best　an　experiment；　and　will　always　exhibit　inequalities。　

An　encyclopaedia　of　philosophy　excludes　three　kinds　of　partial　science。　I。　It
excludes　mere　aggregates　of　bits　of　information。　Philology　in　its　prima　facie　aspect
belongs　to　this　class。　II。　It　rejects　the　quasi…sciences；　which　are　founded　on　an　act
of　arbitrary　will　alone；　such　as　Heraldry。　Sciences　of　this　class　are　positive　from
beginning　to　end。　III。　In　another　class　of　sciences；　also　styled　positive；　but　which
have　a　rational　basis　and　a　rational　beginning；　philosophy　claims　that　constituent
as　its　own。　The　positive　features　remain　the　property　of　the　sciences　themselves。　

The　positive　element　in　the　last　class　of　sciences　is　of　different　sorts。　（i）　Their
commencement；　though　rational　at　bottom；　yields　to　the　influence　of
fortuitousness；　when　they　have　to　bring　their　universal　truth　into　contact　with
actual　facts　and　the　single　phenomena　of　experience。　In　this　region　of　chance　and
change；　the　adequate　notion　of　science　must　yield　its　place　to　reasons　or　grounds
of　explanation。　Thus；　e。g。　in　the　science　of　jurisprudence；　or　in　the　system　of
direct　and　indirect　taxation；　it　is　necessary　to　have　certain　points　precisely　and
definitively　settled　which　lie　beyond　the　competence　of　the　absolute　lines　laid
down　by　the　pure　notion。　A　certain　latitude　of　settlement　accordingly　is　left；　and
each　point　may　be　determined　in　one　way　on　one　principle；　in　another　way　on
another；　and　admits　of　no　definitive　certainty。　Similarly　the　Idea　of　Nature；　when
parcelled　out　in　detail；　is　dissipated　into　contingencies。　Natural　history；　geography；
and　medicine　stumble　upon　descriptions　of　existence；　upon　kinds　and　distinctions；
which　are　not　determined　by　reason；　but　by　sport　and　adventitious　incidents。
Even　history　comes　under　the　same　category。　The　Idea　is　its　essence　and　inner
nature；　but；　as　it　appears；　everything　is　under　contingency　and　in　the　field　of
voluntary　action。　（ii）　These　sciences　are　positive　also　in　failing　to　recognise　the
finite　nature　of　what　they　predicate；　and　to　point　out　how　these　categories　and
their　whole　sphere　pass　into　a　higher。　They　assume　their　statements　to　possess　an
authority　beyond　appeal。　Here　the　fault　lies　in　the　finitude　of　the　form；　as　in　the
previous　instance　it　lay　in　the　matter。　（iii）　In　close　sequel　to　this；　sciences　are
positive　in　consequence　of　the　inadequate　grounds　on　which　their　conclusions
rest：　based　as　these　are　on　detached　and　casual　inference；　upon　feeling；　faith；　and
authority；　and；　generally　speaking；　upon　the　deliverances　of　inward　and　outward
perception。　Under　this　head　we　must　also　class　the　philosophy　which　proposes　to
b