shorter logic-第77章

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actuality；　accomplished。　This　is　the　illusion　under　which　we　live。　It　alone　supplies　at　the　same　time
the　actualising　force　on　which　the　interest　in　the　world　reposes。　

In　the　course　of　its　process　the　Idea　creates　that　illusion；　by　setting　an　antithesis　to　confront　it；　and
its　action　consists　in　getting　rid　of　the　illusion　which　it　has　created。　Only　out　of　this　error　does　the
truth　arise。　In　this　fact　lies　the　reconciliation　with　error　and　with　finitude。　Error　or　other…being；
when　superseded；　is　still　a　necessary　dynamic　element　of　truth：　for　truth　can　only　be　where　it
makes　itself　its　own　result。　




Third　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；　The　Doctrine　of　the　Notion
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　C。　THE　IDEA



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Development　of　The　Idea
　　　　　　　　　　　　　＇Life＇　…　＇Cognition＇　…　＇Absolute　Idea＇



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§213

The　Idea　is　truth　in　itself　and　for　itself　—　the　absolute　unity　of　the　notion　and
objectivity。　Its　'ideal'　content　is　nothing　but　the　notion　in　its　detailed　terms：　its
'real'　content　is　only　the　exhibition　which　the　notion　gives　itself　in　the　form　of
external　existence；　while　yet；　by　enclosing　this　shape　in　its　ideality；　it　keeps　it　in　its
power；　and　so　keeps　itself　in　it。　

The　definition；　which　declares　the　Absolute　to　be　the　Idea；　is　itself　absolute。　All
former　definitions　come　back　to　this。　The　Idea　is　the　And　yet；　again；　everything
actual；　in　so　far　as　it　is　true；　is　the　Idea；　and　has　its　truth　by　and　in　virtue　of　the
Idea　alone。　Every　individual　being　is　some　one　aspect　of　the　Idea：　for　which；
therefore；　yet　other　actualities　are　needed；　which　in　their　turn　appear　to　have　a
self…subsistence　of　their　own。　It　is　only　in　them　altogether　and　in　their　relation　that
the　notion　is　realised。　

The　individual　by　itself　does　not　correspond　to　its　notion。　It　is　this　limitation　of　its
existence　which　constitutes　the　finitude　and　the　ruin　of　the　individual。　

The　Idea　itself　is　not　to　be　taken　as　an　idea　of　something　or　other；　any　more　than
the　notion　is　to　be　taken　as　merely　a　specific　notion。　The　Absolute　is　the　universal
and　one　idea；　which；　by　an　act　of　'judgement'；　particularises　itself　to　the　system
of　specific　ideas；　which　after　all　are　constrained　by　their　nature　to　come　back　to
the　one　idea　where　their　truth　lies。　As　issued　out　of　this　'judgement'　the　Idea　is　in
the　first　place　only　the　one　universal　substance：　but　its　developed　and　genuine
actuality　is　to　be　as　a　subject　and　in　that　way　as　mind。　

Because　it　has　no　existence　for　starting…point　and　point　d'appui；　the　Idea　is
frequently　treated　as　a　mere　logical　form。　Such　a　view　must　be　abandoned　to
those　theories　which　ascribe　so…called　reality　and　genuine　actuality　to　the　existent
thing　and　all　the　other　categories　which　have　not　yet　penetrated　as　far　as　the　Idea。
It　is　no　less　false　to　imagine　the　Idea　to　be　mere　abstraction。　It　is　abstract
certainly；　in　so　far　as　everything　untrue　is　consumed　in　it：　but　in　its　own　self　it　is
essentially　concrete；　because　it　is　the　free　notion　giving　character　to　itself；　and　that
character；　reality。　It　would　be　an　abstract　form；　only　if　the　notion；　which　is　its
principle；　were　taken　as　an　abstract　unity；　and　not　as　the　negative　return　of　it　into
self　and　as　the　subjectivity　which　it　really　is。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§213n
Truth　is　at　first　taken　to　mean　that　I　know　how　something　is。　This　is　truth；　however；　only　in
reference　to　consciousness；　it　is　formal　truth；　bare　correctness。　Truth　in　the　deeper　sense　consists
in　the　identity　between　objectivity　and　the　notion。　It　is　in　this　deeper　sense　of　truth　that　we　speak
of　a　true　state；　or　of　a　true　work　of　art。　These　objects　are　true；　if　they　are　as　they　ought　to　be；　i。e。
if　their　reality　corresponds　to　their　notion。　When　thus　viewed；　to　be　untrue　means　much　the　same
as　to　be　bad。　A　bad　man　is　an　untrue　man；　a　man　who　does　not　behave　as　his　notion　or　his
vocation　requires。　Nothing　however　can　subsist；　if　it　be　wholly　devoid　of　identity　between　the
notion　and　reality。　Even　bad　and　untrue　things　have　being；　in　so　far　as　their　reality　still；　somehow；
conforms　to　their　notion。　Whatever　is　thoroughly　bad　or　contrary　to　the　notion　is　for　that　very
reason　on　the　way　to　ruin。　It　is　by　the　notion　alone　that　the　things　in　the　world　have　their
subsistence；　or；　as　it　is　expressed　in　the　language　of　religious　conception；　things　are　what　they　are；
only　in　virtue　of　the　divine　and　thereby　Creative　thought　which　dwells　within　them。　

When　we　hear　the　Idea　spoken　of；　we　need　not　imagine　something　far　away　beyond　this　mortal
sphere。　The　Idea　is　rather　what　is　completely　present：　and　it　is　found；　however　confused　and
degenerated；　in　every　consciousness。　We　conceive　the　works　to　ourselves　as　a　great　totality　which
is　created　by　God；　and　so　created　that　in　it　God　has　manifested　himself　to　us。　We　regard　the
world　also　as　ruled　by　Divine　Providence：　implying　that　the　scattered　and　divided　parts　of　the
world　are　continually　brought　back；　and　made　conformable；　to　the　unity　from　which　they　have
issued。　

The　purpose　of　philosophy　has　always　been　the　intellectual　ascertainment　of　the　Ideal；　and
everything　deserving　the　name　of　philosophy　has　constantly　been　based　on　the　consciousness　of　an
absolute　unity　where　the　understanding　sees　and　accepts　only　separation。　It　is　too　late　now　to　ask
for　proof　that　the　Idea　is　the　truth。　The　proof　of　that　is　contained　in　the　whole　deduction　and
development　of　thought　up　to　this　point。　The　Idea　is　the　result　of　this　course　of　dialectic。　Not　that　it
is　to　he　supposed　that　the　idea　is　mediate　only；　i。e。　mediated　through　something　else　than　itself。　It　is
rather　its　own　result；　and　being　so；　is　no　less　immediate　than　mediate。　

The　stages　hitherto　considered；　viz。　those　of　Being　and　Essence；　as　well　as　those　of　Notion　and　of
Objectivity；　are　not；　when　so　distinguished；　something　permanent；　resting　upon　themselves。　They
have　proved　to　be　dialectical；　and　their　only　truth　is　that　they　are　dynamic　elements　of　the　idea。　
？　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　214

The　Idea　may　be　described　in　many　ways。　It　may　be　called　reason；　（and　this　is
the　proper　philosophical　signification　of　reason）；　subject…object；　the　unity　of　the
ideal　and　the　real；　of　the　finite　and　the　infinite；　of　soul　and　body；　the　possibility
which　has　its　actuality　in　its　own　self；　that　of　which　the　nature　can　be　thought
only　as　existent；　etc。　All　these　descriptions　apply；　because　the　Idea　contains　all　the
relations　of　understanding；　but　contains　them　in　their　infinite　self…return　and
self…identity。　

It　is　easy　work　for　the　understanding　to　show　that　everything　said　of　the　Idea　is
self…contradictory。　But　that　can　quite　as　well　be　retaliated；　or　rather　in　the　Idea　the
retaliation　is　actually　made。　And　this　work；　which　is　the　work　of　reason；　is
certainly　not　so　easy　as　that　of　the　understanding。　Understanding　may
demonstrate　that　the　Idea　is　self…contradictory：　because　the　subjective　is
subjective　only　and　is　always　confronted　by　the　objective；　because　being　is
different　from　notion　and　therefore　cannot　be　picked　out　of　it；　because　the　finite
is　finite　only；　the　exact　antithesis　of　the　infinite；　and　therefore　not　identical　with　it；
and　so　on　with　every　term　of　the　description。　The　reverse　of　all　this　however　is
the　doctrine　of　Logic。　Logic　shows　that　the　subjective　which　is　to　be　subjective
only；　the　finite　which　would　be　finite　only；　the　infinite　which　would　be　infinite
only；　and　so　on；　have　no　truth；　but　contradict　themselves；　and　pass　over　into　their
opposites。　Hence　this　transition；　and　the　unity　in　which　the　extremes　are　merged
and　become　factors；　each　with　a　merely　reflected　existence；　reveals　itself　as　their
truth。　

The　understanding；　which　addresses　itself　to　deal　with　the　Idea；　commits　a　double
misunderstanding。　It　takes　first　the　extremes　of　the　Idea　（be　they　expressed　as
they　will；　so　long　as　they　are　in　their　unity）；　not　as　they　are　understood　when
stamped　with　this　concrete　unity；　but　as　if　they　remained　abstractions　outside　of
it。　It　no　less　mistakes　the　relation　between　them；　even　when　it　has　been　expressly
stated。　Thus；　for　example；