shorter logic-第7章
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renders thought its object。 In the best meaning of the phrase； it comes to itself；
for thought is its principle； and its very unadulterated self。 But while thus
occupied； thought entangles itself in contradictions； i。e。 loses itself in the hard
and…fast non…identity of its thoughts； and so； instead of reaching itself； is caught
and held in its counterpart。 This result； to which honest but narrow thinking leads
the mere understanding； is resisted by the loftier craving of which we have
spoken。 That craving expresses the perseverance of thought； which continues true
to itself； even in this conscious loss of its native rest and independence； 'that it
may overcome' and work out in itself the solution of its own contradictions。
To see that thought in its very nature is dialectical； and that； as understanding； it
must fall into contradiction … the negative of itself … will form one of the main
lessons of logic。 When thought grows hopeless of ever achieving； by its own
means； the solution of the contradiction which it has by its own action brought
upon itself； it turns back to those solutions of the question with which the mind
had learned to pacify itself in some of its other modes and forms。 Unfortunately；
however； the retreat of thought has led it； as Plato noticed even in his time； to a
very uncalled…for hatred of reason （misology）； and it then takes up against its own
endeavours that hostile attitude of which an example is seen in the doctrine that
'immediate' knowledge； as it is called； is the exclusive form in which we become
cognisant of truth。
§12
The rise of philosophy is due to these cravings of thought。 Its point of departure
is Experience； including under that name both our immediate consciousness and
the inductions from it。 Awakened； as it were； by this stimulus； thought is vitally
characterised by raising itself above the natural state of mind； above the senses
and inferences from the senses into its own unadulterated element； and by
assuming； accordingly； at first a stand…aloof and negative attitude towards the
point from which it started。 Through this state of antagonism to the phenomena
of sense its first satisfaction is found in itself； in the Idea of the universal essence
of these phenomena： an Idea （the Absolute； or God） which may be more or less
abstract。 Meanwhile； on the other hand； the sciences； based on experience； exert
upon the mind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents are
presented； and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary truth。 For the
facts of science have the aspect of a vast conglomerate； one thing coming side by
side with another； as if they were merely given and presented … as in short devoid
of all essential or necessary connection In consequence of this stimulus thought is
dragged out of its unrealised universality and its fancied or merely possible
satisfaction； and impelled onwards to a development from itself。 On one hand this
development only means that thought incorporates the contents of science； in all
their speciality of detail as submitted。 On the other it makes these contents imitate
the action of the original creative thought； and present the aspect of a free
evolution determined by the logic of the fact alone。
On the relation between 'immediacy' and 'mediation' in consciousness we shall
speak later； expressly and with more detail。 Here it may be sufficient to premise
that； though the two 'moments' or factors present themselves as distinct； still
neither of them can be absent； nor can one exist apart from the other。 Thus the
knowledge of God； as of every supersensible reality； is in its true character an
exaltation above sensations or perceptions： it consequently involves a negative
attitude to the initial data of sense； and to that extent implies mediation。 For to
mediate is to take something as a beginning and to go onward to a second thing；
so that the existence of this second thing depends on our having reached it from
something else contradistinguished from it。 In spite of this； the knowledge of God
is no mere sequel； dependent on the empirical phase of consciousness： in fact； its
independence is essentially secured through this negation and exaltation。 No
doubt； if we attach an unfair prominence to the fact of mediation； and represent it
as implying a state of conditionedness； it may be said … not that the remark would
mean much … that philosophy is the child of experience； and owes its rise to a
posteriori fact。 （As a matter of fact； thinking is always the negation of what we
have immediately before us。） With as much truth however we may be said to
owe eating to the means of nourishment； so long as we can have no eating
without them。 If we take this view； eating is certainly represented as ungrateful： it
devours that to which it owes itself。 Thinking； upon this view of its action； is
equally ungrateful。
But there is also an a priori aspect of thought； where by a mediation； not made
by anything external but by a reflection into self； we have that immediacy which
is universality； the selfcomplacency of thought which is so much at home with
itself that it feels an innate indifference to descend to particulars； and in that way
to the development of its own nature。 It is thus also with religion； which whether
it be rude or elaborate； whether it be invested with scientific precision of detail or
confined to the simple faith of the heart； possesses； throughout； the same
intensive nature of contentment and felicity。 But if thought never gets further than
the universality of the Ideas； as was perforce the case in the first philosophies
（when the Eleatics never got beyond Being； or Heraclitus beyond Becoming）； it is
justly open to the charge of formalism。 Even in a more advanced phase of
philosophy； we may often find a doctrine which has mastered merely certain
abstract propositions or formulae； such as； 'In the absolute all is one'；
'Subject and object are identical' … and only repeating the same thing when it
comes to particulars。 Bearing in mind this first period of thought； the period of
mere generality； we may safely say that experience is the real author of growth
and advance in philosophy。 For； firstly； the empirical sciences do not stop short at
the mere observation of the individual features of a phenomenon。 By the aid of
thought； they are able to meet philosophy with materials prepared for it； in the
shape of general uniformities； i。e。 laws； and classifications of the phenomena。
When this is done； the particular facts which they contain are ready to be
received into philosophy。 This； secondly； implies a certain compulsion on thought
itself to proceed to these concrete specific truths。 The reception into philosophy
of these scientific materials； now that thought has removed their immediacy and
made them cease to be mere data； forms at the same time a development of
thought out of itself。 Philosophy； then； owes its development to the empirical
sciences。 In return it gives their contents what is so vital to them； the freedom of
thought … gives them； in short； an a priori character。 These contents are now
warranted necessary； and no longer depend on the evidence of facts merely； that
they were so found and so experienced。 The fact as experienced thus becomes an
illustration and a copy of the original and completely self…supporting activity of
thought。
§13
Stated in exact terms； such is the origin and development of philosophy。 But the
History of Philosophy gives us the same process from a historical and external
point of view。 The stages in the evolution of the Idea there seem to follow each
other by accident； and to present merely a number of different and unconnected
principles； which the several systems of philosophy carry out in their own way。
But it is not so。 For these thousands of years the same Architect has directed the
work： and that Architect is the one living Mind whose nature is to think； to bring
to selfconsciousness what it is； and； with its being thus set as object before it； to
be at the same time raised above it； and so to reach a higher
