shorter logic-第69章

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The　universal　in　its　true　and　comprehensive　meaning　is　a　thought　which；　as　we　know；　cost
thousands　of　years　to　make　it　enter　into　the　consciousness　of　men。　The　thought　did　not　gain　its　full
recognition　till　the　days　of　Christianity。　The　Greeks；　in　other　respects　so　advanced；　knew　neither
God　nor　even　man　in　their　true　universality。　The　gods　of　the　Greeks　were　only　particular　powers
of　the　mind；　and　the　universal　God；　the　God　of　all　nations；　was　to　the　Athenians　still　a　God
concealed。　They　believed　in　the　same　way　that　an　absolute　gulf　separated　themselves　from　the
barbarians。　Man　as　man　was　not　then　recognised　to　be　of　infinite　worth　and　to　have　infinite　rights。
The　question　has　been　asked；　why　slavery　has　vanished　from　modern　Europe。　One　special
circumstance　after　another　has　been　adduced　in　explanation　of　this　phenomenon。　But　the　real
ground　why　there　are　no　more　slaves　in　Christian　Europe　is　only　to　be　found　in　the　very　principle
of　Christianity　itself；　the　religion　of　absolute　freedom。　Only　in　Christendom　is　man　respected　as
man；　in　his　infinitude　and　universality。　What　the　slave　is　without；　is　the　recognition　that　he　is　a
person：　and　the　principle　of　personality　is　universality。　The　master　looks　upon　his　slave　not　as　a
person；　but　as　a　selfless　thing。　The　slave　is　not　himself　reckoned　an　'I'…his　'I'　is　his　master。　

The　distinction　referred　to　above　between　what　is　merely　in　common；　and　what　is　truly　universal；　is
strikingly　expressed　by　Rousseau　in　his　famous　Contrat　social；　when　he　says　that　the　laws　of　a
state　must　spring　from　the　universal　will　（volonte　generale）；　but　need　not　on　that　account　be　the
will　of　all　（volonte　de　tous）。　Rousseau　would　have　made　a　sounder　contribution　towards　a　theory
of　the　state；　if　he　had　always　kept　this　distinction　in　sight。　The　general　will　is　the　notion　of　the　will：
and　the　laws　are　the　special　clauses　of　this　will　and　based　upon　the　notion　of　it。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　163n2

We　add　a　remark　upon　the　account　of　the　origin　and　formation　of　notions　which　is　usually　given　in
the　Logic　of　Understanding。　It　is　not　we　who　frame　the　notions。　The　notion　is　not　something　which
is　originated　at　all。　No　doubt　the　notion　is　not　mere　Being；　or　the　immediate：　it　involves　mediation；
but　the　mediation　lies　in　itself。　In　other　words；　the　notion　is　what　is　mediated　through　itself　and　with
itself。　It　is　a　mistake　to　imagine　that　the　objects　which　form　the　content　of　our　mental　ideas　come
first　and　that　our　subjective　agency　then　supervenes；　and　by　the　aforesaid　operation　of　abstraction；
and　by　colligating　the　points　possessed　in　common　by　the　objects；　frames　notions　of　them。　Rather
the　notion　is　the　genuine　first；　and　things　are　what　they　are　through　the　action　of　the　notion；
immanent　in　them；　and　revealing　itself　in　them。　In　religious　language　we　express　this　by　saying　that
God　created　the　world　out　of　nothing。　In　other　words；　the　world　and　finite　things　have　issued　from
the　fullness　of　the　divine　thoughts　and　the　divine　decrees。　Thus　religion　recognises　thought　and
（more　exactly）　the　notion　to　be　the　infinite　form；　or　the　free　creative　activity；　which　can　realise　itself
without　the　help　of　a　matter　that　exists　outside　it。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　164

The　notion　is　concrete　out　and　out：　because　the　negative　unity　with　itself；　as
characterisation　pure　and　entire；　which　is　individuality；　is　just　what　constitutes　its
self…relation；　its　universality。　The　functions　or　'moments'　of　the　notion　are　to　this
extent　indissoluble。　The　categories　of　'reflection'　are　expected　to　be　severally
apprehended　and　separately　accepted　as　current；　apart　from　their　opposites。　But
in　the　notion；　where　their　identity　is　expressly　assumed；　each　of　its　functions　can
be　immediately　apprehended　only　from　and　with　the　rest。　

Universality；　particularity；　and　individuality　are；　taken　in　the　abstract；　the　same　as
identity；　difference；　and　ground。　But　the　universal　is　the　self…identical；　with　the
express　qualification；　that　it　simultaneously　contains　the　particular　and　the
individual。　Again；　the　particular　is　the　different　or　the　specific　character；　but　with
the　qualification　that　it　is　in　itself　universal　and　is　as　an　individual。　Similarly　the
individual　must　be　understood　to　be　a　subject　or　substratum；　which　involves　the
genus　and　species　in　itself　and　possesses　a　substantial　existence。　Such　is　the
explicit　or　realised　inseparability　of　the　functions　of　the　notion　in　their　difference
（§　160）…what　may　be　called　the　clearness　of　the　notion；　in　which　each　distinction
causes　no　dimness　or　interruption；　but　is　quite　as　much　transparent。　

No　complaint　is　oftener　made　against　the　notion　than　that　it　is　abstract。　Of　course
it　is　abstract；　if　abstract　means　that　the　medium　in　which　the　notion　exists　is
thought　in　general　and　not　the　sensible　thing　in　its　empirical　concreteness。　It　is
abstract　also；　because　the　notion　falls　short　of　the　idea。　To　this　extent　the
subjective　notion　is　still　formal。　This　however　does　not　mean　that　it　ought　to　have
or　receive　another　content　than　its　own。　It　is　itself　the　absolute　form；　and　so　is　all
specific　character；　but　as　that　character　is　in　its　truth。　Although　it　be　abstract
therefore；　it　is　the　concrete；　concrete　altogether；　the　subject　as　such。　The
absolutely　concrete　is　the　mind　（see　end　of　§　159）　…　the　notion　when　it　exists　as
notion　distinguishing　itself　from　its　objectivity；　which　notwithstanding　the
distinction　still　continues　to　be　its　own。　Everything　else　which　is　concrete；
however　rich　it　be；　is　not　so　intensely　identical　with　itself　and　therefore　not　so
concrete　on　its　own　part　…　least　of　all　what　is　commonly　supposed　to　be　concrete；
but　is　only　a　congeries　held　together　by　external　influence。　What　are　called
notions；　and　in　fact　specific　notions；　such　as　man；　house；　animal；　etc。；　are　simply
denotations　and　abstract　representations。　These　abstractions　retain　out　of　all　the
functions　of　the　notion　only　that　of　universality；　they　leave　particularity　and
individuality　out　of　account　and　have　no　development　in　these　directions。　By　so
doing　they　just　miss　the　notion。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　165

It　is　the　element　of　Individuality　which　first　explicitly　differentiates　the　elements
of　the　notion。　Individuality　is　the　negative　reflection　of　the　notion　into　itself；　and　it
is　in　that　way　at　first　the　free　differentiating　of　it　as　the　first　negation；　by　which
the　specific　character　of　the　notion　is　realised；　but　under　the　form　of　particularity。
That　is　to　say；　the　different　elements　are　in　the　first　place　only　qualified　as　the
several　elements　of　the　notion；　and；　secondly；　their　identity　is　no　less　explicitly
stated；　the　one　being　said　to　be　the　other。　This　realised　particularity　of　the　notion
is　the　Judgment。　

The　ordinary　classification　of　notions；　as　clear；　distinct；　and　adequate；　is　no　part
of　the　notion；　it　belongs　to　psychology。　Notions；　in　fact；　are　here　synonymous
with　mental　representations；　a　clear　notion　is　an　abstract　simple　representation：　a
distinct　notion　is　one　where；　in　addition　to　the　simplicity；　there　is　one　'mark'　or
character　emphasised　as　a　sign　for　subjective　cognition。　There　is　no　more　striking
mark　of　the　formalism　and　decay　of　Logic　than　the　favourite　category　of　the
'mark'。　The　adequate　notion　comes　nearer　the　notion　proper；　or　even　the　Idea：
but　after　all　it　expresses　only　the　formal　circumstance　that　a　notion　or
representation　agrees　with　its　object；　that　is；　with　an　external　thing。　The　division
into　what　are　called　subordinate　and　coordinate　notions　implies　a　mechanical
distinction　of　universal　from　particular　which　allows　only　a　mere　correlation　of
them　in　external　comparison。　Again；　an　enumeration　of　such　kinds　as　contrary
and　contradictory；　affirmative　and　negative　notions；　etc。；　is　only　a　chance…directed
gleaning　of　logical　forms　which　properly　belong　to　the　sphere　of　Being　or　Essence
（where　they　have　been　already　examined）　and　which　have　nothing　to　do　with　the
specific　notional　character　as　such。　The　true　distinctions　in　the　notion；　universal；
particular；　and　individual；　may　be　said　also　to　constitute　species　of　it；　but