shorter logic-第67章
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special meaning which these superficial thoughts of more imperfect and more
perfect have in this place is to indicate the distinction of being； as an immediate
unity with itself； from the notion； as free mediation with itself。 Since being has
shown that it is an element in the notion； the latter has thus exhibited itself as the
truth of being。 As this its reflection in itself and as an absorption of the mediation；
the notion is the pre…supposition of the immediate — a presupposition which is
identical with the return to self； and in this identity lie freedom and the notion。 If
the partial element therefore be called the imperfect； then the notion； or the
perfect； is certainly a development from the imperfect； since its very nature is
thus to suspend its pre…supposition。 At the same time it is the notion alone which；
in the act of supposing itself； makes its presupposition； as has been made
apparent in causality in general and especially in reciprocal action。
Thus in reference to Being and Essence the Notion is defined as Essence reverted
to the simple immediacy of Being — the shining or show of Essence thereby
having actuality； and its actuality being at the same time a free shining or show in
itself。 In this manner the notion has being as its simple self…relation； or as the
immediacy of its immanent unity。 Being is so poor a category that It is the least
thing which can be shown to be found in the notion。 The passage from necessity
to freedom； or from actuality into the notion； is the very hardest； because it
proposes that independent actuality shall be thought as having all its substantiality
in the passing over and identity with the other independent actuality。 The notion；
too； is extremely hard； because it is itself just this very identity。 But the actual
substance as such； the cause； which in its exclusiveness resists all invasion； is ipso
facto subjected to necessity or the destiny of passing into dependency： and it is
this subjection rather where the chief hardness lies。 To think necessity； on the
contrary； rather tends to melt that hardness。 For thinking means that； in the other；
one meets with one's self。 It means a liberation； which is not the flight of
abstraction； but consists in that which is actual having itself not as something else；
but as its own being and creation； in the other actuality with which it is bound up
by the force of necessity。 As existing in an individual form； this liberation is called
I： as developed to its totality； it is free Spirit； as feeling； it is Love； and as
enjoyment； it is Blessedness。 The great vision of substance in Spinoza is only a
potential liberation from finite exclusiveness and egotism： but the notion itself
realises for its own both the power of necessity and actual freedom。
§ 159n
When； as now； the notion is called the truth of Being and Essence； we must expect to be asked；
why do we not begin with the notion？ The answer is that； where knowledge by thought is our aim；
we cannot begin with the truth； because the truth； when it forms the beginning； must rest on mere
assertion。 The truth when it is thought must as such verify itself to thought。 If the notion were put at
the head of Logic； and defined； quite correctly in point of content； as the unity of Being and
Essence； the following question would come up： What are we to think under the terms 'Being' and
'Essence'； and how do they come to be embraced in the unity of the Notion？ But if we answered
these questions； then our beginning with the notion would merely be nominal。 The real start would
be made with Being； as we have here done： with this difference； that the characteristics of Being as
well as those of Essence would have to be accepted uncritically from figurate conception； whereas
we have observed Being and Essence in their own dialectical development and learnt how they
lose themselves in the unity of the notion。
Third Subdivision of The Logic；
IX。 NOTION
§ 160
The Notion is the principle of freedom； the power of substance self…realised。 It is
a systematic whole； in which each of its constituent functions is the very total
which the notion is； and is put as indissolubly one with it。 Thus in its self…identity
it has original and complete determinateness。
§ 160n
The position taken up by the notion is that of absolute idealism。 Philosophy is a knowledge through
notions because it sees that what on other grades of consciousness is taken to have Being； and to
be naturally or immediately independent； is but a constituent stage in the Idea。 In the logic of
understanding； the notion is generally reckoned a mere form of thought； and treated as a general
conception。 It is to this inferior view of the notion that the assertion refers； so often urged on behalf
of the heart and sentiment； that notions as such are something dead； empty； and abstract。 The case
is really quite the reverse。
The notion is； on the contrary； the principle of all life； and thus possesses at the same time a
character of thorough concreteness。 That it is so follows from the whole logical movement up to
this point； and need not be here proved。 The contrast between form and content； which is thus
used to criticise the notion when it is alleged to be merely formal； has； like all the other contrasts
upheld by reflection； been already left behind and overcome dialectically or through itself。 The
notion； in short； is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it。 It certainly is a
form； but an infinite and creative form which includes； but at the same time releases from itself； the
fullness of all content。 And so too the notion may； if it be wished； be styled abstract； if the name
concrete is restricted to the concrete facts of sense or of immediate perception。 For the notion is
not palpable to the touch； and when we are engaged with it； hearing and seeing must quite fail us。
And yet； as it was before remarked； the notion is a true concrete； for the reason that it involves
Being and Essence； and the total wealth of these two spheres with them； merged in the unity of
thought。
？
If； as was said at an earlier point； the different stages of the logical idea are to be treated as a
series of definitions of the Absolute； the definition which now results for us is that the Absolute is
the Notion。 That necessitates a higher estimate of the notion； however； than is found in formal
conceptualist Logic； where the notion is a mere form of our subjective thought； with no original
content of its own。 But if Speculative Logic thus attaches a meaning to the term notion so very
different from that usually given； it may be asked why the same word should be employed in two
contrary acceptations； and an occasion thus given for confusion and misconception。 The answer is
that； great as the interval is between the speculative notion and the notion of Formal Logic； a
closer examination shows that the deeper meaning is not so foreign to the general usages of
language as it seems at first sight。 We speak of the deduction of a content from the notion； e。g。 of
the specific provisions of the law of property from the notion of property； and so again we speak
of tracing back these material details to the notion。 We thus recognise that the notion is no mere
form without a content of its own： for if it were； there would be in the one case nothing to deduce
from such a form； and in the other case to trace a given body of fact back to the empty form of the
notion would only rob the fact of its specific character； without making it understood。
§ 161
Development
The onward movement of the notion is no longer either a transition into； or a
reflection on something else； but Development。 For in the notion； the elements
distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with
one another and with the whole； and the specific character of each is a free being
of the whole notion。
§ 161n
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