shorter logic-第66章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
one and the same on both sides。 The cause assumed to be first is on account of
its immediacy passive； a dependent being； and an effect。 The distinction of the
causes spoken of as two is accordingly void： and properly speaking there is only
one cause； which； while it suspends itself （as substance） in its effect； also rises in
this operation only to independent existence as a cause。
§ 156
But this unity of the double cause is also ＇b＇ actual。 All this alternation is properly
the cause in act of constituting itself and in such constitution lies its being。 The
nullity of the distinctions is not only potential； or a reflection of ours （§ I55）。
Reciprocal action just means that each characteristic we impose is also to be
suspended and inverted into its opposite； and that in this way the essential nullity
of the 'moments' is explicitly stated。 An effect is introduced into the primariness；
in other words； the primariness is abolished： the action of a cause becomes
reaction and so on。
§ 156n
Reciprocal action realises the causal relation in its complete development。 It is this relation；
therefore； in which reflection usually takes shelter when the conviction grows that things can no
longer be studied satisfactorily from a causal point of view； on account of the infinite progress
already spoken of。 Thus in historical research the question may be raised in a first form； whether
the character and manners of a nation are the cause of its constitution and its laws； or if they are
not rather the effect。 Then； as the second step； the character and manners on one side and the
Constitution and laws on the other are conceived on the principle of reciprocity： and in that case
the cause in the same connection as it is a cause will at the same time be an effect； and vice versa。
The same thing is done in the study of Nature； and especially of living organisms。 There the sexual
organs and functions are similarly seen to stand to each other in the relation of reciprocity。
Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect； and stands； so to
say； on the threshold of the notion； but on that very ground； supposing that our aim is a thoroughly
comprehensive idea； we should not rest content with applying this relation。 If we get no further
than studying a given content under the point of view of reciprocity； we are taking up an attitude
which leaves matters utterly incomprehensible。 We are left with a mere dry fact； and the call for
mediation； which is the chief motive in applying the relation of causality； is still unanswered。 And if
we look more narrowly into the dissatisfaction felt in applying the relation of reciprocity； we shall
see that it consists in the circumstance that this relation； instead of being treated as an equivalent
for the notion； ought； first of all； to be known and understood in its own nature。 And to understand
the relation of action we must not let the two sides rest in their state of mere given facts； but
recognise them； as has been shown in the two paragraphs preceding； for factors of a third and
higher； which is the notion and nothing else。
To make； for example； the manners of the Spartans the cause of their constitution and their
constitution conversely the cause of their manners； may no doubt be in a way correct。 But； as we
have comprehended neither the manners nor the constitution of the nation； the result of such
reflections can never be final or satisfactory。 The satisfactory point will be reached only when
these two； as well as all other； special aspects of Spartan life and Spartan history are seen to be
founded in this notion。
Necessity
§ 157
This pure self…reciprocation is therefore Necessity unveiled or realised。 The link
of necessity qua necessity is identity； as still inward and concealed； because it is
the identity of what are esteemed actual things； although their very
self…subsistence is bound to be necessity。 The circulation of substance through
causality and reciprocity therefore only expressly makes out or states that
self…subsistence is the infinite negative self…relation — a relation negative in
general； for in it the act of distinguishing and intermediating becomes a
primariness of actual things independent one against the other — and infinite
self…relation； because their independence only lies in their identity。
Freedom
§ 158
The truth of necessity is； therefore； Freedom： and the truth of substance is the
Notion … an independence which； though self…repulsive into distinct independent
elements； yet in that repulsion is self…identical； and in the movement of reciprocity
still at home and conversant only with itself。
See Engels on Freedom and Necessity。
Freedom and Necessity
§ 158n
Necessity is often called hard； and rightly so； if we keep to necessity as such； i。e。 to its immediate
shape。 Here we have； first of all； some state or； generally speaking； fact； possessing an
independent subsistence： and necessity primarily implies that there falls upon such a fact something
else by which it is brought low。 This is what is hard and sad in necessity immediate or abstract。
The identity of the two things； which necessity presents as bound to each other and thus bereft of
their independence； is at first only inward； and therefore has no existence for those under the yoke
of necessity。 Freedom too from this point of view is only abstract； and is preserved only by
renouncing all that we immediately are and have。 But； as we have already seen； the process of
necessity is so directed that it overcomes the rigid externality which it first had and reveals its
inward nature。 It then appears that the members； linked to one another； are not really foreign to
each other； but only elements of one whole； each of them； in its connection with the other； being；
as it were； at home； and combining with itself。 In this way； necessity is transfigured into freedom …
not the freedom that consists in abstract negation； but freedom concrete and positive。 From which
we may learn what a mistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive。 Necessity
indeed； qua necessity； is far from being freedom： yet freedom presupposes necessity； and contains
it as an unsubstantial element in itself。
A good man is aware that the tenor of his conduct is essentially obligatory and necessary。 But this
consciousness is so far from making any abatement from his freedom； that without it； real and
reasonable freedom could not be distinguished from arbitrary choice … a freedom which has no
reality and is merely potential。 A criminal； when punished； may look upon his punishment as a
restriction of his freedom。 Really the punishment is not foreign constraint to which he is subjected；
but the manifestation of his own act。 In short； man is most independent when he knows himself to
be determined by the absolute idea throughout。 It was this phase of mind and conduct which
Spinoza called Amor intellectualis Dei。
§159
Thus the Notion is the truth of Being and Essence； inasmuch as the shining or
show of self…reflection is itself at the same time independent immediacy； and this
being of a different actuality is immediately only a shining or show on itself。
The Notion has exhibited itself as the truth of Being and Essence as the ground to
which the regress of both leads。 Conversely it has been developed out of being as
its ground。 The former aspect of the advance may be regarded as a concentration
of being into its depth； thereby disclosing its inner nature： the latter aspect as an
issuing of the more perfect from the less perfect。 When such development is
viewed on the latter side only； it does prejudice to the method of philosophy。 The
special meaning which these superficial thoughts of more imperfect and more
perfect have in this place is to indicate the distinction of b
