shorter logic-第63章

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circumstances　and　conditions　there　has；　as　we　say；　proceeded　quite　another　thing；　and　it　is　for　that
reason　that　we　call　this　process　of　necessity　blind。　If　on　the　contrary　we　consider　teleological
action；　we　have　in　the　end　of　action　a　content　which　is　already　foreknown。　This　activity　therefore　is
not　blind　but　seeing。　To　say　that　the　world　is　ruled　by　Providence　implies　that　design；　as　what　has
been　absolutely　predetermined；　is　the　active　principle；　so　that　the　issue　corresponds　to　what　has
been　fore…known　and　forewilled。　

The　theory　however　which　regards　the　world　as　determined　through　necessity　and　the　belief　in　a
divine　providence　are　by　no　means　mutually　excluding　points　of　view。　The　intellectual　principle
underlying　the　idea　of　divine　providence　will　hereafter　be　shown　to　be　the　notion。　But　the　notion　is
the　truth　of　necessity；　which　it　contains　in　suspension　in　itself；　just　as；　conversely；　necessity　is　the
notion　implicit。　Necessity　is　blind　only　so　long　as　it　is　not　understood。　There　is　nothing　therefore
more　mistaken　than　the　charge　of　blind　fatalism　made　against　the　Philosophy　of　History；　when　it
takes　for　its　problem　to　understand　the　necessity　of　every　event。　The　philosophy　of　history　rightly
understood　takes　the　rank　of　a　Thedicee；　and　those；　who　fancy　they　honour　Divine　Providence　by
excluding　necessity　from　it；　are　really　degrading　it　by　this　exclusiveness　to　a　blind　and　irrational
caprice。　In　the　simple　language　of　the　religious　mind　which　speaks　of　God's　eternal　and　immutable
decrees；　there　is　implied　an　express　recognition　that　necessity　forms　part　of　the　essence　of　God。　In
his　difference　from　God；　man；　with　his　own　private　opinion　and　will；　follows　the　call　of　caprice　and
arbitrary　humour；　and　thus　often　finds　his　acts　turn　out　something　quite　different　from　what　he　had
meant　and　willed。　But　God　knows　what　he　wills；　is　determined　in　his　eternal　will　neither　by
accident　from　within　nor　from　without；　and　what　he　wills　he　also　accomplishes；　irresistibly。　

Necessity　gives　a　point　of　view　which　has　important　bearings　upon　our　sentiments　and　behaviour。
When　we　look　upon　events　as　necessary；　our　situation　seems　at　first　sight　to　lack　freedom
completely。　In　the　creed　of　the　ancients；　as　we　know；　necessity　figured　as　Destiny。　The　modern
point　of　view；　on　the　contrary；　is　that　of　Consolation。　And　Consolation　means　that；　if　we　renounce
our　aims　and　interests；　we　do　so　only　in　prospect　of　receiving　compensation。　Destiny；　on　the
contrary；　leaves　no　room　for　Consolation。　But　a　close　examination　of　the　ancient　feeling　about
destiny　will　not　by　any　means　reveal　a　sense　of　bondage　to　its　power　Rather　the　reverse。　This　will
clearly　appear；　if　we　remember　that　the　sense　of　bondage　springs　from　inability　to　surmount　the
antithesis；　and　from　looking　at　what　is；　and　what　happens；　as　contradictory　to　what　ought　to　be
and　happen。　In　the　ancient　mind　the　feeling　was　more　of　the　following　kind：　Because　such　a　thing
is；　it　is；　and　as　it　is；　so　ought　it　to　be。　Here　there　is　no　contrast　to　be　seen；　and　therefore　no　sense
of　bondage；　no　pain；　and　no　sorrow。　True；　indeed；　as　already　remarked；　this　attitude　towards
destiny　is　void　of　consolation。　But　then；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　a　frame　of　mind　which　does　not
need　consolation；　so　long　as　personal　subjectivity　has　not　acquired　its　infinite　significance。　It　is　this
point　on　which　special　stress　should　be　laid　in　comparing　the　ancient　sentiment　with　that　of　the
modern　and　Christian　world。　

By　Subjectivity；　however；　we　may　understand；　in　the　first　place；　only　the　natural　and　finite
subjectivity；　with　its　contingent　and　arbitrary　content　of　private　interests　and　inclinations　—　all；　in
short；　that　we　call　person　as　distinguished　from　thing：　taking　'thing'　in　the　emphatic　sense　of　the
word　（in　which　we　use　the　（correct）　expression　that　it　is　a　question　of　things　and　not　of　persons）。
In　this　sense　of　subjectivity　we　cannot　help　admiring　the　tranquil　resignation　of　the　ancients　to
destiny；　and　feeling　that　it　is　a　much　higher　and　worthier　mood　than　that　of　the　moderns；　who
obstinately　pursue　their　subjective　aims；　and　when　they　find　themselves　constrained　to　resign　the
hope　of　reaching　them；　console　themselves　with　the　prospect　of　a　reward　in　some　other　shape。
But　the　term　subjectivity　is　not　to　be　confined　merely　to　the　bad　and　finite　kind　of　it　which　is
contrasted　with　the　thing　（fact）。　In　its　truth　subjectivity　is　immanent　in　the　fact；　and　as　a　subjectivity
thus　infinite　is　the　very　truth　of　the　fact。　Thus　regarded；　the　doctrine　of　consolation　receives　a
newer　and　a　higher　significance。　It　is　in　this　sense　that　the　Christian　religion　is　to　be　regarded　as　the
religion　of　consolation；　and　even　of　absolute　consolation。　Christianity；　we　know　teaches　that　God
wishes　all　men　to　be　saved。　That　teaching　declares　that　subjectivity　has　an　infinite　value。　And　that
consoling　power　of　Christianity　just　lies　in　the　fact　that　God　himself　is　in　it　known　as　the　absolute
subjectivity；　so　that；　inasmuch　as　subjectivity　involves　the　element　of　particularity；　our　particular
personality　too　is　recognised　not　merely　as　something　to　be　solely　and　simply　nullified；　but　as　at　the
same　time　something　to　be　preserved。　The　gods　of　the　ancient　world　were　also；　it　is　true；　looked
upon　as　personal；　but　the　personality　of　a　Zeus　and　an　Apollo　is　not　a　real　personality：　it　is　only　a
figure　in　the　mind。　In　other　words；　these　gods　are　mere　personifications；　which；　being　such；　do　not
know　themselves；　and　are　only　known。　An　evidence　of　this　defect　and　this　powerlessness　of　the
old　gods　is　found　even　in　the　religious　beliefs　of　antiquity。　In　the　ancient　creeds　not　only　men；　but
even　gods；　were　represented　as　subject　to　destiny；　a　destiny　which　we　must　conceive　as　necessity
not　unveiled；　and　thus　as　something　wholly　impersonal；　selfless；　and　blind。　On　the　other　hand；　the
Christian　God　is　God　not　known　merely　but　also　self…knowing；　he　is　a　personality　not　merely
figured　in　our　minds；　but　rather　absolutely　actual。　

We　must　refer　to　the　Philosophy　of　Religion　for　a　further　discussion　of　the　points　here　touched。
But　we　may　note　in　passing　how　important　it　is　for　any　man　to　meet　everything　that　befalls　him　with
the　spirit　of　the　old　proverb　which　describes　each　man　as　the　architect　of　his　own　fortune　That
means　that　it　is　only　himself　after　all　of　which　a　man　has　the　usufruct。　The　other　way　would　be　to
lay　the　blame　of　whatever　we　experience　upon　other　men；　upon　unfavourable　circumstances；　and
the　like。　And　this　is　a　fresh　example　of　the　language　of　unfreedom；　and　at　the　same　time　the　spring
of　discontent。　If　man　saw；　on　the　contrary；　that　whatever　happens　to　him　is　only　the　outcome　of
himself；　and　that　he　only　bears　his　own　guilt；　he　would　stand　free；　and　in　everything　that　came　upon
him　would　have　the　consciousness　that　he　suffered　no　wrong。　A　man　who　lives　in　dispeace　with
himself　and　his　lot　commits　much　that　is　perverse　and　amiss；　for　no　other　reason　than　because　of
the　false　opinion　that　he　is　wronged　by　others。　No　doubt　too　there　is　a　great　deal　of　chance　in
what　befalls　us。　But　the　chance　has　its　root　in　the　'natural'　man。　So　long　however　as　a　man　is
otherwise　conscious　that　he　is　free；　his　harmony　of　soul　and　peace　of　mind　will　not　be　destroyed
by　the　disagreeables　that　befall　him。　It　is　their　view　of　necessity；　therefore；　which　is　at　the　root　of
the　discontent　of　men；　and　which　in　that　way　determines　their　destiny　itself。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　148
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　Process　of　Necessity

Among　the　three　elements　in　the　process　of　necessity；　the　Condition；　the　Fact；
and　the　Activity：　

＇a＇　The　Condition　is　（a）　what　is　presupposed　or　ante…stated；　i。e。　it　is　not　only
supposed　or　stated；　and　so　only　a　correlative　to　the　fact；　but　also　prior；　and　so
independent；　a　contingent　and　external　circumstance　which　exists　without　respect
to　the　fact。　While　thus　contingent；　however；　this　presupposed　or　ante…stated　term；
in　respect　withal　of　the　fact；　which　is　the　totality；　is　a　complete　circle　of
conditions。　（b）　The　conditions　are　passive；　and　used　as　materials　for　the　fact；　into
the　content　of　which　they　thus　enter。　The