shorter logic-第61章

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actuality　is　the　more　comprehensive；　because　it　is　the　concrete　thought　which　includes　possibility
as　an　abstract　element。　And　that　superiority　is　to　some　extent　expressed　in　our　ordinary　mode　of
thought　when　we　speak　of　the　possible；　in　distinction　from　the　actual；　as　only　possible。　Possibility
is　often　said　to　consist　in　a　thing's　being　thinkable。　

'Think'　however；　in　this　use　of　the　word；　only　means　to　conceive　any　content　under　the　form　of　an
abstract　identity。　Now；　every　content　can　be　brought　under　this　form；　since　nothing　is　required
except　to　separate　it　from　the　relation　in　which　it　stands。　Hence；　any　content；　however　absurd　and
nonsensical；　can　be　viewed　as　possible。　It　is　possible　that　the　moon　may　fall　upon　the　Earth
tonight；　for　the　moon　is　a　body　separate　from　the　Earth　and　may　as　well　fall　down　upon　it　as　a
stone　thrown　into　the　air　does。　。　。　。　In　language　like　this　about　possibilities；　it　is　chiefly　the　law　of
sufficient　ground　or　reason　which　is　manipulated　in　the　style　already　explained。　Everything；　it　is
said；　is　possible；　for　which　you　can　state　some　ground。　The　less　education　a　man　has；　or　in　other
words；　the　less　he　knows　of　the　specific　connection　of　the　objects　to　which　he　directs　his
observations；　the　greater　is　his　tendency　to　launch　out　into　all　sorts　of　empty　possibilities。　An
instance　of　this　habit　in　the　political　sphere　is　seen　in　the　pot…house　politician。　In　practical　life　too　it
is　no　uncommon　thing　to　see　ill　will　and　indolence　slink　behind　the　category　of　possibility；　in　order
to　escape　definite　obligations。　To　such　conduct　the　same　remarks　apply　as　were　made　in
connection　with　the　law　of　sufficient　ground。　Reasonable　and　practical　men　refused　to　be　imposed
upon　by　the　possible；　for　the　simple　ground　that　it　is　possible　only。　They　stick　to　the　actual　（not
meaning　by　that　word　merely　whatever　immediately　is　now　and　here）。　Many　of　the　proverbs　of
common　life　express　the　same　contempt　for　what　is　abstractly　possible。　'A　bird　in　the　hand　is
worth　two　in　the　bush'。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Everything　is　Possible　？

After　all；　there　is　as　good　reason　for　taking　everything　to　be　impossible　as　to　be　possible：　for　every
content　（a　content　is　always　concrete）　includes　not　only　diverse　but　even　opposite　characteristics。
Nothing　is　so　impossible　for　instance；　as　this；　that　I　am：　for　'I'　is　at　the　same　time　simple
self…relation　and；　as　undoubtedly；　relation　to　something　else。　The　same　may　be　seen　in　every　other
fact　in　the　natural　or　spiritual　world。　Matter；　it　may　be　said；　is　impossible：　for　it　is　the　unity　of
attraction　and　repulsion。　The　same　is　true　of　life；　law；　freedom　。　。　。　

Generally　speaking；　it　is　the　empty　understanding　which　haunts　these　empty　forms：　and　the
business　of　philosophy　in　the　matter　is　to　show　how　null　and　meaningless　they　are。　Whether　a　thing
is　possible　or　impossible；　depends　altogether　on　the　subject…matter：　that　is；　on　the　sum　total　of　the
elements　in　actuality；　which；　as　it　opens　itself　out；　discloses　itself　to　be　necessity。　
？　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　144
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＇b＇　Contingency　（accidents）

But　the　Actual　in　its　distinction　from　possibility　（which　is　reflection…into…self）　is
only　the　outward　concrete；　the　unessential　immediate。　In　other　words；　to　such
extent　as　the　actual　is　primarily　the　simple　merely　immediate　unity　of　Inward　and
Outward；　it　is　obviously　made　an　unessential　outward；　and　thus　at　the　same　time
it　is　merely　inward；　the　abstraction　of　reflection…into…self。　Hence　it　is　itself
characterised　as　a　merely　possible。　When　thus　valued　at　the　rate　of　a　mere
possibility；　the　actual　is　a　Contingent　or　Accidental；　and；　conversely；　possibility
is　mere　Accident　itself　or　Chance。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　145
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Possibility　and　Contingency

Possibility　and　Contingency　are　the　two　factors　of　Actuality　…　Inward　and
Outward；　put　as　mere　forms　which　constitute　the　externality　of　the　actual。　They
have　their　reflection…into…self　on　the　body　of　actual　fact；　or　content；　with　its
intrinsic　definitiveness　which　gives　essential　ground　of　their　characterisation。　The
finitude　of　the　contingent　and　the　possible　lies；　therefore；　as　we　now　see；　in　the
distinction　of　the　form…determination　from　the　content：　and；　therefore；　it　depends
on　the　content　alone　whether　anything　is　contingent　and　possible。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　145n
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Free　Will

As　possibility　is　the　mere　inside　of　actuality；　it　is　for　that　reason　a　mere　outside　actuality；　in　other
words；　Contingency。　The　contingent；　roughly　speaking；　is　what　has　the　ground　of　its　being　not　in
itself　but　in　somewhat　else。　Such　is　the　aspect　under　which　actuality　first　comes　before
consciousness；　and　which　is　often　mistaken　for　actuality　itself。　But　the　contingent　is　only　one　side
of　the　actual　…　the　side　namely；　of　reflection　on　somewhat　else。　It　is　the　actual；　in　the　signification　of
something　merely　possible。　Accordingly　we　consider　the　contingent　to　be　what　may　or　may　not
be；　what　may　be　in　one　way　or　another；　whose　being　or　not…being；　and　whose　being　in　this　way　or
otherwise；　depends　not　upon　itself　but　on　something　else。　

To　overcome　this　contingency　is；　roughly　speaking；　the　problem　of　science　on　the　one　hand；　as　in
the　range　of　practice；　on　the　other；　the　end　of　action　is　to　rise　above　the　contingency　of　the　will；　or
above　caprice。　It　has　however　often　happened；　most　of　all　in　modern　times；　that　contingency　has
been　unwarrantably　elevated；　and　has　a　value　attached　to　it；　both　in　nature　and　in　the　world　of　the
mind；　to　which　it　has　no　just　claim。　Frequently；　Nature；　to　take　it　first；　has　been　chiefly　admired　for
the　richness　and　variety　of　its　structures。　Apart　however　from　what　disclosure　it　contains　of　the
Idea；　this　richness　gratifies　none　of　the　higher　interests　of　Reason；　and　its　vast　variety　of　structures；
organic　and　inorganic；　affords　us　only　the　spectacle　of　a　contingency　losing　itself　in　vagueness。　At
any　rate；　the　chequered　scene　presented　by　the　several　varieties　of　animals　and　plants；　conditioned
as　it　is　by　outward　circumstances　…　the　complex　changes　in　configuration　and　grouping　of　clouds；
and　the　like　…　ought　not　to　be　ranked　higher　than　the　equally　casual　fancies　of　the　mind　which
surrenders　itself　to　its　own　caprices。　The　wonderment　with　which　such　phenomena　are　welcomed
is　a　most　abstract　frame　of　mind；　from　which　one　should　advance　to　a　closer　insight　into　the　inner
harmony　and　uniformity　of　nature。　

？　

Of　contingency　in　respect　of　the　Will　it　is　especially　important　to　form　a　proper　estimate。　The
Freedom　of　the　Will　is　an　expression　that　often　means　mere　free　choice；　or　the　will　in　the　form　of
contingency。　Freedom　of　choice；　or　the　capacity　for　determining　ourselves　towards　one　thing　or
another；　or　is　undoubtedly　a　vital　element　in　the　will　（which　is　in　its　very　notion　free）；　but　instead　of
being　freedom　itself；　it　is　it　is　only　in　the　first　instance　a　freedom　in　form。　The　genuinely　free　will；
which　includes　free　choice　as　suspended；　is　conscious　to　itself　that　its　content　is　intrinsically　firm
and　fast；　and　knows　it　at　the　same　time　to　be　thoroughly　its　own。　A　will；　on　the　contrary；　which
remains　standing　on　the　grade　of　option；　even　supposing　it　does　decide　in　favour　of　what　is　in
import　right　and　true；　is　always　haunted　by　the　conceit　that　it　might；　if　it　had　so　pleased；　have
decided　in　favour　of　the　reverse　course。　When　more　narrowly　examined；　free　choice　is　seen　to　be
a　contradiction；　to　this　extent；　that　its　form　and　content　stand　in　antithesis。　The　matter　of　choice　is
given；　and　known　as　a　content　dependent　not　on　the　will　itself；　but　on　outward　circumstances。　In
reference　to　such　a　given　content；　freedom　lies　only　in　the　form　of　choosing；　which；　as　it　is　only　a
freedom　in　form；　may　consequently　be　regarded　as　freedom　only　in　supposition。　On　an　ultimate
analysis　it　will　be　seen　that　the　same　outwardness　of　circumstances；　on　which　is　founded　the
content　that　the　will　finds　to　its　hand；　can　alone　account　for　the　will　giving　its　decision　for　the　one
and　not　the　other　of　the　two　alternatives。