shorter logic-第60章
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§141
The empty abstractions； by means of which the one identical content perforce
continues in the two correlatives； suspend themselves in the immediate transition；
the one into the other。 The content is itself nothing but their identity （§138）： and
these abstractions are the seeming of essence； put as seeming。 By the
manifestation of force the inward is put into existence： but this putting is the
mediation by empty abstractions。 In its own self the intermediating process
vanishes to the immediacy； in which the inward and the outward are absolutely
identical and their difference is distinctly no more than assumed and imposed。
This identity is Actuality。
ESSENCE： Second Subdivision of The Logic；
C。 ACTUALITY
Substantiality … Causality … Reciprocity
§ 142
Actuality is the unity； become immediate； of essence with existence； or of inward
with outward。 The utterance of the actual is the actual itself： so that in this
utterance it remains just as essential； and only is essential； in so far as it is
immediate external existence。
We have ere this met Being and Existence as forms of the immediate。 Being is； in
general； unreflected immediacy and transition into another。 Existence is immediate
unity of being and reflection： hence appearance： it comes from the ground； and
falls to the ground。
In actuality this unity is explicitly put； and the two sides of the relation identified。
Hence the actual is exempted from transition； and its externality is its energising。
In that energising it is reflected into itself： its existence is only the manifestation of
itself； not of another。
§ 142n
Exists but not Real
Actuality and thought （or Idea） are often absurdly opposed。 How commonly we hear people
saying that； though no objection can be urged against the truth and correctness of a certain
thought； there is nothing of the kind to be seen in reality； or it cannot be actually carried out！
People who use such language only prove that they have not properly apprehended the nature
either of thought or of actuality。 Thought in such a case is； one the one hand； the synonym for a
subjective conception； plan； intention； or the like； just as actuality； on the other； is made
synonymous with external and sensible existence。 This is all very well in common life； where great
laxity is allowed in the categories and the names given to them； and it may of course happen that；
e。g。； the plan； or so…called idea； say； of a certain method of taxation ； is good and advisable in the
abstract； but that nothing of the sort is found in so…called actuality； or could possibly be carried out
under the given conditions。 But when the abstract understanding gets hold of these categories and
exaggerates the distinction they imply into a hard and fast line of contrast； when it tells us that in
this actual world we must knock ideas out of our heads； it is necessary energetically to protest
against these doctrines； alike in the name of science and of sound reason。 For on the one hand
Ideas are not confined to our heads merely； nor is the Idea； on the whole； so feeble as to leave the
question of its actualisation or non…actualisation dependent on our will。 The Idea is rather the
absolutely active as well as actual。
？
The Actual is Real
And on the other hand actuality is not so bad and irrational； as purblind or wrong…headed and
muddle…brained would…be reformers imagine。 So far is actuality； as distinguished from mere
appearance； and primarily presenting a unity of inward and outward； from being in contrariety with
reason； that it is rather thoroughly reasonable； and everything which is not reasonable must on that
very ground cease to be held actual。 The same view may be traced in the usages of educated
speech； which declines to give the name of real poet or real statesman to a poet or a statesman
who can do nothing really meritorious or reasonable。 Aristotle to that of Plato。 Popular opinion
makes the difference to be as follows。 While Plato recognises the idea and only the idea as the
truth； Aristotle； rejecting the idea； keeps to what is actual； and is on that account to be considered
the founder and chief of empiricism。 On this it may be remarked： that it is not the vulgar actuality of
what is immediately at hand； but the idea as actuality。 Where then lies the controversy of Aristotle
against Plato？ It lies in this： Aristotle calls the Platonic idea a mere dynamis； and establishes in
opposition to Plato that the idea； which both equally recognise to be the only truth； is essentially to
be viewed as an energeia； in other words； as the inward which is quite to the fore； or as unity of
inner and outer； or as actuality； in the emphatic sense here given to the word。
§ 143
Actuality is concrete
Such a concrete category as Actuality includes the characteristics aforesaid and
their difference； and is therefore also the development of them； in such a way
that； as it has them； they are at the same time plainly understood to be a show； to
be assumed or imposed。
Possibility
＇a＇ Viewed as an identity in general； Actuality is first of all Possibility …the
reflection…into…self which； as in contrast with the concrete unity of the actual； is
taken and made an abstract and unessential essentiality。 Possibility is what is
essential to reality； but in such a way that it is at the same time only a possibility。
It was probably the import of Possibility which induced Kant to regard it along
with necessity and actuality as Modalities； 'since these categories do not in the
least increase the notion as object； but only express its relation to the faculty of
knowledge'。 For Possibility is really the bare abstraction of reflection…into…self …
what was formerly called the Inward； only that it is now taken to mean the
external inward； lifted out of reality and with the being of a mere supposition； and
is thus； sure enough； supposed only as a bare modality； an abstraction which
comes short； and； in more concrete terms； belongs only to subjective thought。 It
is otherwise with Actuality and Necessity。 They are anything but a mere sort and
mode for something else： in fact the very reverse of that。 If they are supposed； it
is as the concrete； but not merely suppositions； but intrinsically complete。
As Possibility is； in the first instance； the mere form of identity…with…self （as
compared with the concrete which is actual）； the rule for it merely is that a thing
must not be self…contradictory。 Thus everything is possible； for an act of
abstraction can give any content this form of identity。 Everything however is as
impossible as it is possible。 In every content … which is and must be concrete … the
speciality of its nature may be viewed as a specialised contrariety and in that way
as a contradiction。 Nothing therefore can be more meaningless than to speak of
such possibility and impossibility。
In philosophy in particular； there should never be a word said of showing that 〃It
is possible〃； or 〃There is still another possibility〃； or； to adopt another
phraseology； 〃It is conceivable〃。 The same consideration should warn the writer
of history against employing a category which has now been explained to be on its
own merits； untrue： but the subtlety of the empty understanding finds its chief
pleasure in the fantastic ingenuity of suggesting possibilities and lots of
possibilities。
§ 143n
Possible and Actual
Our picture…thought is at first disposed to see in possibility the richer and more comprehensive； in
actuality the poorer and narrower category。 Everything； it is said； is possible； but everything which
is possible is not on that account actual。 In real truth； however； if we deal with them as thoughts；
actuality is the more comprehensive； because it is the concrete thought which includes po
