shorter logic-第4章
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must be distinguished from the form of thought proper。
According to an old preconceived idea； which has passed into a trivial proposition；
it is thought which marks the man off from the animals。 Yet trivial as this old
belief may seem； it must； strangely enough； be recalled to mind in presence of
certain preconceived ideas of the present day。 These ideas would put feeling and
thought so far apart as to make them opposites； and would represent them as so
antagonistic； that feeling； particularly religious feeling； is supposed to be
contaminated； perverted； and even annihilated by thought。 They also emphatically
hold that religion and piety grow out of； and rest upon something else； and not on
thought。 But those who make this separation forget meanwhile that only man has
the capacity for religion； and that animals no more have religion than they have
law and morality。
Those who insist on this separation of religion from thinking usually have before
their minds the sort of thought that may be styled after…thought。 They mean
'reflective' thinking； which has to deal with thoughts as thoughts； and brings them
into consciousness。 Slackness to perceive and keep in view this distinction which
philosophy definitely draws in respect of thinking is the source of the crudest
objections and reproaches against philosophy。 Man … and that just because it is his
nature to think … is the only being that possesses law； religion； and morality。 In
these spheres of human life； therefore； thinking； under the guise of feeling； faith；
or generalised image； has not been inactive： its action and its productions are there
present and therein contained。 But it is one thing to have such feelings and
generalised images that have been moulded and permeated by thought； and
another thing to have thoughts about them。 The thoughts； to which after…thought
upon those modes of consciousness gives rise； are what is comprised under
reflection； general reasoning； and the like； as well as under philosophy itself。
The neglect of this distinction between thought in general and the reflective
thought of philosophy has also led to another and more frequent
misunderstanding。 Reflection of this kind has been often maintained to be the
condition； or even the only way； of attaining a consciousness and certitude of the
Eternal and True。 The （now somewhat antiquated） metaphysical proofs of God's
existence； for example； have been treated； as if a knowledge of them and a
conviction of their truth were the only and essential means of producing a belief
and conviction that there is a God。 Such a doctrine would find its parallel； if we
said that eating was impossible before we had acquired a knowledge of the
chemical； botanical； and zoological characters of our food； and that we must
delay digestion till we had finished the study of anatomy and physiology。 Were it
so； these sciences in their field； like philosophy in its； would gain greatly in point
of utility； in fact； their utility would rise to the height of absolute and universal
indispensableness。 Or rather； instead of being indispensable； they would not exist
at all。
§3
The Content； of whatever kind it be； with which our consciousness is taken up； is
what constitutes the qualitative character of our feelings； perceptions； fancies； and
ideas； of our aims and duties； and of our thoughts and notions。 From this point of
view； feeling； perception； etc。； are the forms assumed by these contents。 The
contents remain one and the same； whether they are felt； seen； represented； or
willed； and whether they are merely felt； or felt with an admixture of thoughts； or
merely and simply thought。 In any one of these forms； or in the admixture of
several； the contents confront consciousness； or are its object。 But when they are
thus objects of consciousness； the modes of the several forms ally themselves
with the contents； and each form of them appears in consequence to give rise to a
special object。 Thus what is the same at bottom may look like a different sort of
fact。
The several modes of feeling； perception； desire； and will； so far as we are aware
of them； are in general called ideas （mental representations）： and it may be
roughly said that philosophy puts thoughts； categories； or； in more precise
language； adequate notions； in the place of the generalised images we ordinarily
call ideas。 Mental impressions such as these may be regarded as the metaphors of
thoughts and notions。 But to have these figurate conceptions does not imply that
we appreciate their intellectual significance； the thoughts and rational notions to
which they correspond。 Conversely； it is one thing to have thoughts and intelligent
notions； and another to know what impressions； perceptions； and feelings
correspond to them。
This difference will to some extent explain what people call the unintelligibility of
philosophy。 Their difficulty lies partly in an incapacity … which in itself is nothing
but want of habit … for abstract thinking； i。e。 in an inability to get hold of pure
thoughts and move about in them。 In our ordinary state of mind； the thoughts are
clothed upon and made one with the sensuous or spiritual material of the hour；
and in reflection； meditation； and general reasoning； we introduce a blend of
thoughts into feelings； percepts； and mental images。 （Thus； in propositions where
the subject…matter is due to the senses … e。g。 'This leaf is green' … we have such
categories introduced； as being and individuality。） But it is a very different thing to
make the thoughts pure and simple our object。
But their complaint that philosophy is unintelligible is as much due to another
reason； and that is an impatient wish to have before them as a mental picture that
which is in the mind as a thought or notion。 When people are asked to apprehend
some notion； they often complain that they do not know what they have to think。
But the fact is that in a notion there is nothing further to be thought than the
notion itself。 What the phrase reveals is a hankering after an image with which we
are already familiar。 The mind； denied the use of its familiar ideas； feels the
ground where it once stood firm and at home taken away from beneath it； and；
when transported into the region of pure thought； cannot tell where in the world it
is。
One consequence of this weakness is that authors； preachers； and orators are
found most intelligible； when they speak of things which their readers or hearers
already know by rote … things which the latter are conversant with； and which
require no explanation。
§4
The philosopher then has to reckon with popular modes of thought； and with the
objects of religion。 In dealing with the ordinary modes of mind； he will first of all；
as we saw； have to prove and almost to awaken the need for his peculiar method
of knowledge。 In dealing with the objects of religion； and with truth as a whole；
he will have to show that philosophy is capable of apprehending them from its
own resources； and should a difference from religious conceptions come to light；
he will have to justify the points in which it diverges。
§5
To give the reader a preliminary explanation of the distinction thus made； and to
let him see at the same moment that the real import of our consciousness is
retained； and even for the first time put in its proper light； when translated into the
form of thought and the notion of reason； it may be well to recall another of these
old unreasoned beliefs。 And that is the conviction that to get at the truth of any
object or event； even of feelings； perceptions； opinions； and mental ideas； we
must think it over。 Now in any case to think things over is at least to transform
feelings； ordinary ideas； etc。 into thoughts。
Nature has given every one a faculty of thought。 But thought is all that philosophy
claims as the form proper to her business： and thus the inadequate view which
ignores the distinction stated in §3 leads to a new delusion； the reverse of the
complaint previously mentioned about the unintelligibility of philosop
