shorter logic-第37章

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we　see；　for　example；　the　developed　animal　organism　provided　with　separate　organs　for　the
functions　of　sensation；　motion；　digestion；　&c。　

The　previous　course　of　the　discussion　may　serve　to　show　that　understanding　is　indispensable　even
in　those　spheres　and　regions　of　action　which　the　popular　fancy　would　deem　furthest　from　it；　and
that　in　proportion　as　understanding　is　absent　from　them；　imperfection　is　the　result。　This　particularly
holds　good　of　Art；　Religion；　and　Philosophy。　In　Art；　for　example；　understanding　is　visible　where
the　forms　of　beauty；　which　differ　in　principle；　are　kept　distinct　and　exhibited　in　their　purity。　The
same　thing　holds　good　also　of　single　works　of　art。　It　is　part　of　the　beauty　and　perfection　of　a
dramatic　poem　that　the　characters　of　the　several　persons　should　be　closely　and　faithfully
maintained；　and　that　the　different　aims　and　interests　involved　should　be　plainly　and　decidedly
exhibited。　Or　again；　take　the　province　of　Religion。　The　superiority　of　Greek　over　Northern
mythology　（apart　from　other　differences　of　subject…matter　and　conception）　mainly　consists　in　this：
that　in　the　former　the　individual　gods　are　fashioned　into　forms　of　sculpture…like　distinctness　of
outline；　while　in　the　latter　the　figures　fade　away　vaguely　and　hazily　into　one　another。　Lastly　comes
Philosophy。　That　Philosophy　never　can　get　on　without　the　understanding　hardly　calls　for　special
remark　after　what　has　been　said。　Its　foremost　requirement　is　that　every　thought　shall　be　grasped　in
its　full　precision；　and　nothing　allowed　to　remain　vague　and　indefinite。　

It　is　usually　added　that　understanding　must　not　go　too　far。　Which　is　so　far　correct；　that
understanding　is　not　an　ultimate；　but　on　the　contrary　finite；　and　so　constituted　that　when　carried　to
extremes　it　veers　round　to　its　opposite。　It　is　the　fashion　of　youth　to　dash　about　in　abstractions　—
but　the　man　who　has　learnt　to　know　life　steers　clear　of　the　abstract　'either　—　or'；　and　keeps　to　the
concrete。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　81

＇b＇　In　the　Dialectical　stage　these　finite　characterisations　or　formulae　supersede
themselves；　and　pass　into　their　opposites。　

（1）　But　when　the　Dialectical　principle　is　employed　by　the　understanding
separately　and　independently　—　especially　as　seen　in　its　application　to
philosophical　theories　—　Dialectic　becomes　Scepticism；　in　which　the　result　that
ensues　from　its　action　is　presented　as　a　mere　negation。　

（2）　It　is　customary　to　treat　Dialectic　as　an　adventitious　art；　which　for　very
wantonness　introduces　confusion　and　a　mere　semblance　of　contradiction　into
definite　notions。　And　in　that　light；　the　semblance　is　the　nonentity；　while　the　true
reality　is　supposed　to　belong　to　the　original　dicta　of　understanding。　Often；　indeed；
Dialectic　is　nothing　more　than　a　subjective　seesaw　of　arguments　pro　and　con；
where　the　absence　of　sterling　thought　is　disguised　by　the　subtlety　which　gives
birth　to　such　arguments。　But　in　its　true　and　proper　character；　Dialectic　is　the　very
nature　and　essence　of　everything　predicated　by　mere　understanding　—　the　law　of
things　and　of　the　finite　as　a　whole。　Dialectic　is　different　from　'Reflection'。　In　the
first　instance；　Reflection　is　that　movement　out　beyond　the　isolated　predicate　of　a
thing　which　gives　it　some　reference；　and　brings　out　its　relativity；　while　still　in　other
respects　leaving　it　its　isolated　validity。　But　by　Dialectic　is　meant　the　indwelling
tendency　outwards　by　which　the　one…sidedness　and　limitation　of　the　predicates　of
understanding　is　seen　in　its　true　light；　and　shown　to　be　the　negation　of　them。　For
anything　to　be　finite　is　just　to　suppress　itself　and　put　itself　aside。　Thus　understood
the　Dialectical　principle　constitutes　the　life　and　soul　of　scientific　progress；　the
dynamic　which　alone　gives　immanent　connection　and　necessity　to　the　body　of
science；　and；　in　a　word；　is　seen　to　constitute　the　real　and　true；　as　opposed　to　the
external；　exaltation　above　the　finite。　




。。。The　Logic　Further　Defined　and　Divided


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　81n1

It　is　of　the　highest　importance　to　ascertain　and　understand　rightly　the　nature　of　Dialectics。
Wherever　there　is　movement；　wherever　there　is　life；　wherever　anything　is　carried　into　effect　in　the
actual　world；　there　Dialectic　is　at　work。　It　is　also　the　soul　of　all　knowledge　which　is　truly　scientific。
In　the　popular　way　of　looking　at　things；　the　refusal　to　be　bound　by　the　abstract　deliverances　of
understanding　appears　as　fairness；　which；　according　to　the　proverb：　〃Live　and　let　live〃；　demands
that　each　should　have　its　turn；　we　admit　one；　but　we　admit　the　other　also。　

But　when　we　look　more　closely；　we　find　that　the　limitations　of　the　finite　do　not　merely　come　from
without；　that　its　own　nature　is　the　cause　of　its　abrogation；　and　that　by　its　own　nature　is　the　cause　of
its　abrogation；　and　that　man　is　mortal；　and　seem　to　think　that　the　ground　of　his　death　is　in　external
circumstances　only；　so　that　if　this　way　of　looking　were　correct；　man　would　have　two　special
properties；　vitality　and　…　also　…　mortality。　But　the　true　view　of　the　matter　is　that　life　as　life；　involves
the　germ　of　death；　and　that　the　finite；　being　radically　self…contradictory；　involves　its　own
self…suppression。　

Nor；　again；　is　Dialectic　to　be　confounded　with　mere　Sophistry。　The　essence　of　Sophistry　lies　in
giving　authority　to　a　partial　and　abstract　principle；　in　its　isolation；　as　may　suit　the　interest　and
particular　situation　of　the　individual　at　the　time。　For　example；　a　regard　to　my　existence；　and　my
having　the　means　of　existence；　is　a　vital　motive　of　conduct；　but　if　I　exclusively　emphasise　this
consideration　or　motive　of　my　welfare；　and　draw　the　conclusion　that　I　may　steal　or　betray　my
country；　we　have　a　case　of　Sophistry。　

Similarly；　it　is　a　vital　principle　in　conduct　that　I　should　be　subjectively　free；　that　is　to　say；　that　I
should　have　an　insight　into　what　I　am　doing；　and　a　conviction　that　it　is　right。　But　if　my　pleading
insists　on　this　principle　alone　I　fall　into　Sophistry；　such　as　would　overthrow　all　the　principles　of
morality。　From　this　sort　of　party…pleading；　Dialectic　is　wholly　different；　its　purpose　is　to　study
things　in　their　own　being　and　movement　and　thus　to　demonstrate　the　finitude　of　the　partial
categories　of　understanding。　

Dialectic；　it　may　be　added；　is　no　novelty　in　philosophy。　Among　the　ancients　Plato　is　termed　the
inventor　of　Dialectic；　and　his　right　to　the　name　rests　on　the　fact　that　the　Platonic　philosophy　first
gave　the　free　scientific；　and　thus　at　the　same　time　the　objective；　form　to　Dialectic。　Socrates；　as　we
should　expect　from　the　general　character　of　his　philosophising；　has　the　dialectical　element　in　a
predominantly　subjective　shape；　that　of　Irony。　He　used　to　turn　Dialectic；　first　against　ordinary
consciousness；　and　then　especially　against　the　Sophists。　In　his　conversations　he　used　to　simulate
the　wish　for　some　clearer　knowledge　about　the　subject　under　discussion；　and　after　putting　all　sorts
of　questions　with　that　intent；　he　drew　those　with　whom　he　conversed　to　the　opposite　of　what　their
first　impressions　had　pronounced　correct。　

If；　for　instance；　the　Sophists　claimed　to　be　teachers；　Socrates　by　a　series　of　questions　forced　the
Sophist　Protagoras　to　confess　that　all　learning　is　only　recollection。　In　his　more　strictly　scientific
dialogues；　Plato　employs　the　dialectical　method　to　show　the　finitude　of　all　hard　and　fast　terms　of
understanding。　Thus　in　the　Parmenides　he　deduces　the　many　from　the　one。　In　this　grand　style　did
Plato　treat　Dialectic。　In　modern　times　it　was；　more　than　any　other；　Kant　who　resuscitated　the
name　of　Dialectic；　and　restored　it　to　its　post　of　honour。　He　did　it；　as　we　have　seen；　by　working　out
the　Antinomies　of　the　reason。　The　problem　of　these　Antinomies　is　no　mere　subjective　piece　of
work　oscillating　between　one　set　of　grounds　and　another；　it　really　serves　to　show　that　every
abstract　proposition　of　understanding；　taken　precisely　as　it　is　given；　naturally　veers　round　to　its
opposite。　

However　reluctant　Understanding　may　be　to　admit　the　action　of　Dialectic；　we　must　not　suppose
that　the　recognition　of　its　existence　is　peculiarly　confined　to　the　philosopher。