shorter logic-第36章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
method and thus； as it knows no other； it rejects all methods。 It abandons itself to
wild vagaries of imagination and assertion； to a moral priggishness and sentimental
arrogance； or to a reckless dogmatising and lust of argument； which is loudest
against philosophy and philosophic doctrines。 Philosophy of course tolerates no
mere assertions or conceits； and checks the free play of argumentative see…saw。
§78
We must then reject the opposition between an independent immediacy in the
contents or facts of consciousness and an equally independent mediation；
supposed incompatible with the former。 The incompatibility is a mere assumption；
an arbitrary assertion。 All other assumptions and postulates must in like manner
be left behind at the entrance to philosophy； whether they are derived from the
intellect or the imagination。 For philosophy is the science in which every such
proposition must first be scrutinised and its meaning and oppositions be
ascertained。
Scepticism； made a negative science and systematically applied to all forms of
knowledge； might seem a suitable introduction； as pointing out the nullity of such
assumptions。 But a sceptical introduction would be not only an ungrateful but also
a useless course； and that because Dialectic； as we shall soon make appear； is
itself an essential element of affirmative science。
Scepticism； besides； could only get hold of the finite forms as they were
suggested by experience； taking them as given； instead of deducing them
scientifically。 To require such a scepticism accomplished is the same as to insist
on science being preceded by universal doubt； or a total absence of
presupposition。 Strictly speaking； in the resolve that wills pure thought； this
requirement is accomplished by freedom which； abstracting from everything；
grasps its pure abstraction； the simplicity of thought。
VI。 Logic further Defined & Divided
§79
In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides： ＇a＇ the Abstract side； or that of
understanding； ＇b＇ the Dialectical； or that of negative reason； ＇c＇ the Speculative；
or that of positive reason。
These three sides do not make three parts of logic； but are stages or 'moments' in
every logical entity； that is； of every notion and truth whatever。 They may all be
put under the first stage； that of understanding； and so kept isolated from each
other； but this would give an inadequate conception of them。 The statement of
the dividing lines and the characteristic aspects of logic is at this point no more
than historical and anticipatory。
§80
＇a＇ Thought； as Understanding； sticks to fixity of characters and their
distinctness from one another： every such limited abstract it treats as having a
subsistence and being of its own。
§80n
In our ordinary usage of the term thought and even notion； we often have before our eyes nothing
more than the operation of Understanding。 And no doubt thought is primarily an exercise of
Understanding； only it goes further； and the notion is not a function of Understanding merely。 The
action of Understanding may be in general described as investing its subject…matter with the form
of universality。 But this universal is an abstract universal： that is to say； its opposition to the
particular is so rigorously maintained； that it is at the same time also reduced to the character of a
particular again。 In this separating and abstracting attitude towards its objects； Understanding is
the reverse of immediate perception and sensation； which； as such； keep completely to their native
sphere of action in the concrete。
It is by referring to this opposition of Understanding to sensation or feeling that we must explain
the frequent attacks made upon thought for being hard and narrow； and for leading； if consistently
developed； to ruinous and pernicious results。 The answer to these charges； in so far as they are
warranted by the facts； is that they do not touch thinking in general； certainly not the thinking of
Reason； but only the exercise of Understanding。 It must be added； however； that the merit and
rights of the mere Understanding should unhesitatingly be admitted。 And that merit lies in the fact
that apart from Understanding there is no fixity or accuracy in the region of theory or of practice。
Thus； in theory； knowledge begins by apprehending existing objects in their specific differences。 In
the study of nature； for example； we distinguish matters； forces； genera； and the like； and
stereotype each in its isolation。 Thought is here acting in its analytic capacity； where its canon is
identity； a simple reference of each attribute to itself。 It is under the guidance of the same identity
that the process in knowledge is effected from one scientific truth to another。 Thus； for example； in
mathematics magnitude is the feature which； to the neglect of any other； determines our advance。
Hence in geometry we compare one figure with another； so as to bring out their identity。 Similarly
in other fields of knowledge； such as jurisprudence； the advance is primarily regulated by identity。
In it we argue from one specific law or precedent to another： and what is this but to proceed on
the principle of identity？
But Understanding is as indispensable in practice as it is in theory。 Character is an essential in
conduct； and a man of character is an understanding man； who in that capacity has definite ends in
view and undeviatingly pursues them。 The man who will do something great must learn； as Goethe
says； to limit himself。 The man who； on the contrary； would do everything； really would do nothing；
and fails。 There is a host of interesting things in the world： Spanish poetry； chemistry； politics； and
music are all very interesting； and if any one takes an interest in them we need not find fault。 But
for a person in a given situation to accomplish anything； he must stick to one definite point； and not
dissipate his forces in many directions。 In every calling； too； the great thing is to pursue it with
understanding。 Thus the judge must stick to the law； and give his verdict in accordance with it；
undeterred by one motive or another； allowing no excuses； and looking neither left nor right。
Understanding； too； is always an element in thorough training。 The trained intellect is not satisfied
with cloudy and indefinite impressions； but grasps the objects in their fixed character： whereas the
uncultivated man wavers unsettled； and it often costs a deal of trouble to come to an understanding
with him on the matter under discussion； and to bring him to fix his eye on the definite point in
question。
It has been already explained that the Logical principle in general； far from being merely a
subjective action in our minds； is rather the very universal； which as such is also objective。 This
doctrine is illustrated in the case of understanding； the first form of logical truths。 Understanding in
this larger sense corresponds to what we call the goodness of God； so far as that means that finite
things are and subsist。 In nature； for example； we recognise the goodness of God in the fact that
the various classes or species of animals and plants are provided with whatever they need for their
preservation and welfare。 Nor is man excepted； who； both as an individual and as a nation；
possesses partly in the given circumstances of climate； or quality and products of soil； and partly in
his natural parts or talents； all that is required for his maintenance and development。 Under this
shape Understanding is visible in every department of the objective world； and no object in that
world can ever be wholly perfect which does not give full satisfaction to the canons of
understanding。 A state； for example； is imperfect； so long as it has not reached a clear
differentiation of orders and callings； and so long as those functions of politics and government；
which are different in principle； have not evolved for themselves special organs； in the same way as
we see； for example； the developed animal organism provided with s
