shorter logic-第32章
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significance。 And when the individuals； or in other words personality； is under
discussion…not the 'I' of experience； or a single private person — above all； when
the personality of God is before us'； we are speaking of personality unalloyed —
of a personality in its own nature universal。 Such personality is a thought； and
falls within the province of thought only。 More than this。 Pure and simple
intuition is completely the same as pure and simple thought。 Intuition and belief；
in the first instance； denote the definite conceptions we attach to these words in
our ordinary employment of them： and to this extent they differ from thought in
certain points which nearly every one can understand。 But here they are taken in
a higher sense； and must be interpreted to mean a belief in God； or an intellectual
intuition of God； in short； we must put aside all that especially distinguishes
thought on the one side from belief and intuition on the other。 How belief and
intuition； when transferred to these higher regions； differ from thought； it is
impossible for any one to say。 And yet； such are the barren distinctions of words；
with which men fancy that they assert an important truth； even while the
formulae they maintain are identical with those which they impugn。
The term Faith brings with it the special advantage of suggesting the faith of the
Christian religion； it seems to include Christian faith； or perhaps even to coincide
with it； and thus the Philosophy of Faith has a thoroughly orthodox and Christian
look； on the strength of which it takes the liberty of uttering its arbitrary dicta with
greater pretension and authority。 But we must not let ourselves be deceived by
the semblance surreptitiously secured by a merely verbal similarity。 The two
things are radically distinct。 Firstly； the Christian faith comprises in it an authority
of the Church： but the faith of Jacobi's philosophy has no other authority than
that of a personal revelation。 And； secondly； the Christian faith is a copious body
of objective truth； a system of knowledge and doctrine： while the scope of the
philosophic faith is so utterly indefinite； that； while it has room for the faith of the
Christian； it equally admits a belief in the divinity of the Dalai Lama； the ox； or
the monkey…thus； so far as it goes； narrowing Deity down to its simplest terms； a
'Supreme Being'。 Faith itself； taken in this professedly philosophical sense； is
nothing but the sapless abstract of immediate knowledge — a purely formal
category applicable to very different facts； and it ought never to be confused or
identified with the spiritual fullness of Christian faith； whether we look at that
faith in the heart of the believer and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit； or in the
system of theological doctrine。
With what is here called faith or immediate knowledge must also be identified
inspiration； the heart's revelations； the truths implanted in man by nature； and also
in particular； healthy reason or Common Sense； as it is called。 All these forms
agree in adopting as their leading principle the immediacy； or self…evident way； in
which a fact or body of truths is presented in consciousness。
§64
This immediate knowledge； consists in knowing that the Infinite； the Eternal； the
God which is in our Idea； really is： or； it asserts that in our consciousness there is
immediately and inseparably bound up with this idea the certainty of its actual
being。
To seek to controvert these maxims of immediate knowledge is the last thing
philosophers would think of。 They may rather find occasion for self…gratulation
when these ancient doctrines； expressing as they do the general tenor of
philosophic teaching； have； even in this unphilosophical fashion； become to some
extent universal convictions of the age。 The true marvel rather is that any one
could suppose that these principles were opposed to philosophy…the maxims； viz。；
that whatever is held to be true is immanent in the mind； and that there is truth
for the mind （§ 63）。 From a formal point of view； there is a peculiar interest in
the maxim that the being of God is immediately and inseparably bound up with
the thought of God； that objectivity is bound up with the subjectivity which the
thought originally presents。 Not content with that； the philosophy of immediate
knowledge goes so far in its one…sided view； as to affirm that the attribute of
existence； even in perception； is quite as inseparably connected with the
conception we have of our own bodies and of external things； as it is with the
thought of God。 Now it is the endeavour of philosophy to prove such a unity； to
show that it lies in the very nature of thought and subjectivity； to be inseparable
from being and objectivity。 In these circumstances therefore； philosophy；
whatever estimate may be formed of the character of these proofs； must in any
case be glad to see it shown and maintained that its maxims are facts of
consciousness； and thus in harmony with experience。 The difference between
philosophy and the asseverations of immediate knowledge rather centres in the
exclusive attitude which immediate knowledge adopts； when it sets itself up
against philosophy。
And yet it was as a self…evident or immediate truth that the cogito； ergo sum of
Descartes； the maxim on which may be said to hinge the whole interest of
Modern Philosophy； was first stated by its author。 The man who calls this a
syllogism； must know little more about a syllogism than that the word 'ergo'
occurs in it。 Where shall we look for the middle term？ And a middle term is a
much more essential point of a syllogism than the word 'ergo'。 If we try to justify
the name； by calling the combination of ideas in Descartes an 'immediate'
syllogism； this superfluous variety of syllogism is a mere name for an utterly
unmediated synthesis of distinct terms of thought。 That being so； the synthesis of
being with our ideas； as stated in the maxim of immediate knowledge； has no
more and no less claim to the title of syllogism than the axiom of Descartes has。
From Hotho's 'Dissertation on the Cartesian Philosophy' （published 1826）； I
borrow the quotation in which Descartes himself distinctly declares that the
maxim cogito； ergo sum is no syllogism。 The passages are Respons。 ad II
Object。； De Methodo iv； Ep。 i。 118。 From the first passage I quote the words
more immediately to the point。 Descartes says： 'That we are thinking beings is a
certain primary notion； which is deduced from no syllogism'； and goes on： 'nor；
when one says； I think； therefore I am or exist； does he deduce existence from
thought by means of a syllogism'。 Descartes knew what it implied in a syllogism；
and so he adds that； in order to make the maxim admit of a deduction by
syllogism； we should have to add the major premise： 'Everything which thinks； is
or exists'。 Of course； he remarks； this major premise itself has to be deduced
from the original statement。
The language of Descartes on the maxim that the 'I' which thinks must also at the
same time be； his saying that this connection is given and implied in the simple
perception of consciousness that this connection is the absolute first； the principle；
the most certain and evident of all things； so that no scepticism can be conceived
so monstrous as not to admit it…all this language is so vivid and distinct； that the
modern statements of Jacobi and others on this immediate connection can only
pass for needless repetitions。
§65
The theory of which we are speaking is not satisfied when it has shown that
mediate knowledge taken separately is an adequate vehicle of truth。 Its distinctive
doctrine is that immediate knowledge alone； to the total exclusion of mediation；
can possess a content which is true。 This exclusiveness is enough to show that the
theory is a relapse into the metaphysical understanding； with its pass…words
'either…or'。 And thus it is really a relapse into the habit of external mediation； the
gist of which consists in clinging to those narrow and one…sided categories of the
finite； which it falsely imagined itself t
