shorter logic-第27章
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the idea that the contradiction introduced into the world of Reason by the
categories of Understanding is inevitable and essential was to make one of the
most important steps in the progress of Modern Philosophy。 But the more
important the issue thus raised the more trivial was the solution。 Its only motive
was an excess of tenderness for the things of the world。 The blemish of
contradiction； it seems； could not be allowed to mar the essence of the world； but
there could be no objection to attach it to the thinking Reason； to the essence of
mind。 Probably nobody will feel disposed to deny that the phenomenal world
presents contradictions to the observing mind； meaning by 'phenomenal' the
world as it presents itself to the senses and understanding； to the subjective mind。
But if a comparison is instituted between the essence of the world and the
essence of the mind； it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the
modest dogma has been advanced by one； and repeated by others； that thought or
Reason； and not the World； is the seat of contradiction。 It is no escape to turn
round and explain that Reason falls into contradiction only by applying the
categories。 For this application of the categories is maintained to be necessary；
and Reason is not supposed to be equipped with any other forms but the
categories for the purpose of cognition。 But cognition is determining and
determinate thinking： so that； if Reason be mere empty indeterminate thinking； it
thinks nothing。 And if in the end Reason be reduced to mere identity without
diversity （see next §）； it will in the end also win a happy release from
contradiction at the slight sacrifice of all its facets and contents。
It may also be noted that his failure to make a more thorough study of Antinomy
was one of the reasons why Kant enumerated only four Antinomies。 These four
attracted his notice； because； as may be seen in his discussion of the so…called
Paralogisms of Reason； he assumed the list of the categories as a basis of his
argument。 Employing what has subsequently become a favourite fashion； he
simply put the object under a rubric otherwise ready to hand； instead of deducing
its characteristics from its notion。 Further deficiencies in the treatment of the
Antinomies I have pointed out； as occasion offered； in my Science of Logic。 Here
it will be sufficient to say that the Antinomies are not confined to the four special
objects taken from Cosmology： they appear in all objects of every kind； in all
conceptions； notions； and Ideas。 To be aware of this and to know objects in this
property of theirs makes a vital part in a philosophical theory。 For the property
thus indicated is what we shall afterwards describe as the Dialectical influence in
Logic。
§48n
The principles of the metaphysical philosophy gave rise to the belief that； when cognition lapsed
into contradictions； it was a mere accidental aberration； due to some subjective mistake in
argument and inference。 According to Kant； however； thought has a natural tendency to issue in
contradictions or antinomies； whenever it seeks to apprehend the infinite。 We have in the latter
part of the above paragraph referred to the philosophical importance of the antinomies of reason；
and shown how the recognition of their existence helped largely to get rid of the rigid dogmatism of
the metaphysic of understanding； and to direct attention to the Dialectical movement of thought。
But here too Kant； as we must add； never got beyond the negative result that the thing…in…itself is
unknowable； and never penetrated to the discovery of what the antinomies really and positively
mean。 That true and positive meaning of the antinomies is this： that every actual thing involves a
coexistence of opposed elements。 Consequently to know； or； in other words； to comprehend an
object is equivalent to being conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations。 The
old metaphysic； as we have already seen； when it studied the objects of which it sought a
metaphysical knowledge； went to work by applying categories abstractly and to the exclusion of
their opposites。
Kant； on the other hand； tried to prove that the statements issuing through this method could be
met by other statements of contrary import with equal warrant and equal necessity。 In the
enumeration of these antinomies he narrowed his ground to the cosmology of the old metaphysical
system； and in his discussion made out four antinomies； a number which rests upon the list of the
categories。 The first antinomy is on the question： Whether we are or are not to think the world
limited in space and time。 In the second antinomy we have a discussion of the dilemma： Matter
must be conceived either as endlessly divisible； or as consisting of atoms。 The third antinomy bears
upon the antithesis of freedom and necessity； to such extent as it is embraced in the question；
Whether everything in the world must be supposed subject to the condition of causality； or if we
can also assume free beings； in other words absolute initial points of action； in the world。 Finally；
the fourth antinomy is the dilemma： Either the world as a whole has a cause or it is uncaused。
The method which Kant follows in discussing these antinomies is as follows。 He puts the two
propositions implied in the dilemma over against each other as thesis and antithesis； and seeks to
prove both： that is to say he tries to exhibit them as inevitably issuing from reflection on the
question。 He particularly protests against the charge of being a special pleader and of grounding
his reasoning on illusions。 Speaking honestly； however； the arguments which Kant offers for his
thesis and antithesis are mere shams of demonstration。 The thing to be proved is invariably implied
in the assumption he starts from； and the speciousness of his proofs is only due to his prolix and
apagogic mode of procedure。 Yet it was； and still is； a great achievement for the Critical
Philosophy when it exhibited these antinomies： for in this way it gave some expression （at first
certainly subjective and unexplained） to the actual unity of those categories which are kept
persistently separate by the understanding。 The first of the cosmological antinomies； for example；
implies a recognition of the doctrine that space and time present a discrete as well as a continuous
aspect： whereas the old metaphysic； laying exclusive emphasis on the continuity； had been led to
treat the world as unlimited in space and time。 It is quite correct to say that we can go beyond
every definite space and beyond every definite time： but it is no less correct that space and time
are real and actual only when they are defined or specialised into 'here' and 'now' … a specialisation
which is involved in the very notion of them。 The same observations apply to the rest of the
antinomies。 Take； for example； the antinomy of freedom and necessity。 The main gist of it is that
freedom and necessity as understood by abstract thinkers are not independently real； as these
thinkers suppose； but merely ideal factors （moments） of the true freedom and the true necessity；
and that to abstract and isolate either conception is to make it false。
§ 49
＇c＇ The third object of the Reason is God （§ 36）： he also must be known and
defined in terms of thought。 But in comparison with an unalloyed identity； every
defining term as such seems to the understanding to be only a limit and a
negation： every reality accordingly must be taken as limitless； i。e。 undefined。
Accordingly God； when he is defined to be the sum of all realities； the most real
of beings； turns into a mere abstract。 And the only term under which that most
real of real things can be defined is that of Being itself the height of abstraction。
These are two elements； abstract identity； on one hand； which is spoken of in this
place as the notion； and Being on the other which Reason seeks to unify。 And
their union is the Ideal of Reason。
§ 50
。。。 The organic structures； and the evidence they afford of mutual adaptation；
belong to a
