shorter logic-第25章

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perhaps　at　first　sight　be　imagined；　that　objects　would　lose　their　reality　when　their　unity　was
transferred　to　the　subject。　But　neither　we　nor　the　objects　would　have　anything　to　gain　by　the　mere
fact　that　they　possessed　being。　

The　main　point　is　not；　that　they　are；　but　what　they　are；　and　whether　or　not　their　content　is　true。　It
does　no　good　to　the　things　to　say　merely　that　they　have　being。　What　has　being；　will　also　cease　to
be　when　time　creeps　over　it。　It　might　also　be　alleged　that　subjective　idealism　tended　to　promote
self…conceit。　But　surely　if　a　man's　world　be　the　sum　of　his　sensible　perceptions；　he　has　no　reason
to　be　vain　of　such　a　world。　Laying　aside　therefore　as　unimportant　this　distinction　between
subjective　and　objective；　we　are　chiefly　interested　in　knowing　what　a　thing　is：　i。e。　its　content；　which
is　no　more　objective　than　it　is　subjective。　If　mere　existence　be　enough　to　make　objectivity；　even　a
crime　is　objective：　but　it　is　an　existence　which　is　nullity　at　the　core；　as　is　definitely　made　apparent
when　the　day　of　punishment　comes。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　43

The　Categories　may　be　viewed　in　two　aspects。　On　the　one　hand　it　is　by　their
instrumentality　that　the　mere　perception　of　sense　rises　to　objectivity　and
experience。　On　the　other　hand　these　notions　are　unities　in　our　consciousness
merely：　they　are　consequently　conditioned　by　the　material　given　to　them；　and
having　nothing　of　their　own　they　can　be　applied　to　use　only　within　the　range　of
experience。　But　the　other　constituent　of　experience；　the　impressions　of　feeling　and
perception；　is　not　one　whit　less　subjective　than　the　categories。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§43n

To　assert　that　the　categories　taken　by　themselves　are　empty　can　scarcely　be　right；　seeing　that　they
have　a　content；　at　all　events；　in　the　special　stamp　and　significance　which　they　possess。　Of　course
the　content　of　the　categories　is　not　perceptible　to　the　senses；　nor　is　it　in　time　and　space：　but　that　is
rather　a　merit　than　a　defect。　A　glimpse　of　this　meaning　of　content　may　be　observed　to　affect　our
ordinary　thinking。　A　book　or　a　speech　for　example　is　said　to　have　a　great　deal　in　it；　to　be　full　of
content　in　proportion　to　the　greater　number　of　thoughts　and　general　results　to　be　found　in　it：　while；
on　the　contrary；　we　should　never　say　that　any　book；　e。g。　a　novel；　had　much　in　it；　because　it
included　a　great　number　of　single　incidents；　situations；　and　the　like。　Even　the　popular　voice　thus
recognises　that　something　more　than　the　facts　of　sense　is　needed　to　make　a　work　pregnant　with
matter。　And　what　is　this　additional　desideratum　but　thoughts；　or　in　the　first　instance　the　categories？
And　yet　it　is　not　altogether　wrong；　it　should　be　added；　to　call　the　categories　of　themselves　empty；
if　it　be　meant　that　they　and　the　logical　Idea；　of　which　they　are　the　members；　do　not　constitute　the
whole　of　philosophy；　but　necessarily　lead　onwards　in　due　progress　to　the　real　departments　of
Nature　and　Mind。　Only　let　the　progress　not　be　misunderstood。　The　logical　Idea　does　not　thereby
come　into　possession　of　a　content　originally　foreign　to　it：　but　by　its　own　native　action　is　specialised
and　developed　to　Nature　and　Mind。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　44

It　follows　that　the　categories　are　no　fit　terms　to　express　the　Absolute　the　Absolute
not　being　given　in　perception　and　Understanding；　or　knowledge　by　means　of　the
categories；　is　consequently　incapable　of　knowing　the　Things…in…themselves。　

The　Thing…in…itself　（and　under　'thing'　is　embraced　even　Mind　and　God）　expresses
the　object　when　we　leave　out　of　sight　all　that　consciousness　makes　of　it；　all　its
emotional　aspects；　and　all　specific　thoughts　of　it。　It　is　easy　to　see　what　is　left　utter
abstraction；　total　emptiness；　only　described　still　as　an　'other…world'　the　negative　of
every　image；　feeling；　and　definite　thought。　Nor　does　it　require　much　penetration
to　see　that　this　caput　mortuum　is　still　only　a　product　of　thought；　such　as　accrues
when　thought　is　carried　on　to　abstraction　unalloyed：　that　it　is　the　work　of　the
empty　'Ego'；　which　makes　an　object　out　of　this　empty　self…identity　of　its　own。
The　negative　characteristic　which　this　abstract　identity　receives　as　an　object　is
also　enumerated　among　the　categories　of　Kant；　and　is　no　less　familiar　than　the
empty　identity　aforesaid。　Hence　one　can　only　read　with　surprise　the　perpetual
remark　that　we　do　not　know　the　Thing…in…itself。　On　the　contrary　there　is　nothing
we　can　know　so　easily。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　45

It　is　Reason；　the　faculty　of　the　Unconditioned；　which　discovers　the　conditioned
nature　of　the　knowledge　comprised　in　experience。　What　is　thus　called　the　object
of　Reason；　the　Infinite　or　Unconditioned；　is　nothing　but　self…sameness；　or　the
primary　identity　of　the　'Ego'　in　thought　（mentioned　in　§　42）。　Reason　itself　is　the
name　given　to　the　abstract　'Ego'　or　thought；　which　makes　this　pure　identity　its　aim
or　object　（cf。　note　to　the　preceding　§）。　Now　this　identity；　having　no　definite
attribute　at　all；　can　receive　no　illumination　from　the　truths　of　experience；　for　the
reason　that　these　refer　always　to　definite　facts。　Such　is　the　sort　of　Unconditioned
that　is　supposed　to　be　the　absolute　truth　of　Reason　what　is　termed　the　Idea；　while
the　cognitions　of　experience　are　reduced　to　the　level　of　untruth　and　declared　to　be
appearances。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§45n

Kant　was　the　first　definitely　to　signalise　the　distinction　between　Reason　and　Understanding。　The
object　of　the　former；　as　he　applied　the　term；　was　the　infinite　and　unconditioned；　of　the　latter　the
finite　and　conditioned。　Kant　did　valuable　service　when　he　enforced　the　finite　character　of　the
cognitions　of　the　understanding　founded　merely　upon　experience；　and　stamped　their　contents　with
the　name　of　appearance。　But　his　mistake　was　to　stop　at　the　purely　negative　point　of　view；　and　to
limit　the　unconditionality　of　Reason　to　an　abstract　self…sameness　without　any　shade　of　distinction。　It
degrades　Reason　to　a　finite　and　conditioned　thing；　to　identify　it　with　a　mere　stepping　beyond　the
finite　and　conditioned　range　of　understanding。　The　real　infinite；　far　from　being　a　mere
transcendence　of　the　finite；　always　involves　the　absorption　of　the　finite　into　its　own　fuller　nature。　In
the　same　way　Kant　restored　the　Idea　to　its　proper　dignity：　vindicating　it　for　Reason；　as　a　thing
distinct　from　abstract　analytic　determinations　or　from　the　merely　sensible　conceptions　which
usually　appropriate　to　themselves　the　name　of　ideas。　But　as　respects　the　Idea　also；　he　never　got
beyond　its　negative　aspect；　as　what　ought　to　be　but　is　not。　

The　view　that　the　objects　of　immediate　consciousness；　which　constitute　the　body　of　experience；
are　mere　appearances　（phenomena）　was　another　important　result　of　the　Kantian　philosophy。
Common　Sense；　that　mixture　of　sense　and　understanding；　believes　the　objects　of　which　it　has
knowledge　to　be　severally　independent　and　self…supporting；　and　when　it　becomes　evident　that　they
tend　towards　and　limit　one　another；　the　interdependence　of　one　upon　another　is　reckoned
something　foreign　to　them　and　to　their　true　nature。　The　very　opposite　is　the　truth。　The　things
immediately　known　are　mere　appearances　…　in　other　words；　the　ground　of　their　being　is　not　in
themselves　but　in　something　else。　But　then　comes　the　important　step　of　defining　what　this
something　else　is。　According　to　Kant；　the　things　that　we　know　about　are　to　us　appearances　only；
and　we　can　never　know　their　essential　nature；　which　belongs　to　another　world　we　cannot
approach。　

Plain　minds　have　not　unreasonably　taken　exception　to　this　subjective　idealism；　with　its　reduction　of
the　facts　of　consciousness　to　a　purely　personal　world；　created　by　ourselves　alone。　For　the　true
statement　of　the　case　is　rather　as　follows。　The　things　of　which　we　have　direct　consciousness　are
mere　phenomena；　not　for　us　only；　but　in　their　own　nature；　and　the　true　and　proper　case　of　these
things；　finite　as　they　are；　is　to　have　their　existence　founded　not　in　themselves　but　in　the　universal
divine　Idea。　This　view　of　things；　it　is　true；　is　as　idealist　as　Kant's；　but　in　contradistinction　to　the
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