shorter logic-第24章

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thing；　as　it　exists　apart　from　our　knowledge。　But　the　true　objectivity　of　thinking
means　that　the　thoughts；　far　from　being　merely　ours；　must　at　the　same　time　be
the　real　essence　of　the　things；　and　of　whatever　is　an　object　to　us。　

Objective　and　subjective　are　convenient　expressions　in　current　use；　the
employment　of　which　may　easily　lead　to　confusion。　Up　to　this　point；　the
discussion　has　shown　three　meanings　of　objectivity。　First；　it　means　what　has
external　existence；　in　distinction　from　which　the　subjective　is　what　is　only
supposed；　dreamed；　&c。　Secondly；　it　has　the　meaning；　attached　to　it　by　Kant；　of
the　universal　and　necessary；　as　distinguished　from　the　particular；　subjective；　and
occasional　element　which　belongs　to　our　sensations。　Thirdly；　as　has　been　just
explained；　it　means　the　thought…apprehended　essence　of　the　existing　thing；　in
contradistinction　from　what　is　merely　our　thought；　and　what　consequently　is　still
separated　from　the　thing　itself；　as　it　exists　in　independent　essence。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　42

（a）　The　Theoretical　Faculty。　Cognition　qua　cognition。　The　specific　ground　of　the
categories　is　declared　by　the　Critical　system　to　lie　in　the　primary　identity　of　the　'I'
in　thought　what　Kant　calls　the　'transcendental　unity　of　self…consciousness'。　The
impressions　from　feeling　and　perception　are；　if　we　look　to　their　contents；　a
multiplicity　or　miscellany　of　elements：　and　the　multiplicity　is　equally　conspicuous
in　their　form。　For　sense　is　marked　by　a　mutual　exclusion　of　members；　and　that
under　two　aspects；　namely　space　and　time；　which；　being　the　forms；　that　is　to　say；
the　universal　type　of　perception；　are　themselves　a　priori。　This　congeries；
afforded　by　sensation　and　perception；　must　however　be　reduced　to　an　identity　or
primary　synthesis。　To　accomplish　this　the　'I'　brings　it　in　relation　to　itself　and
unites　it　there　in　one　consciousness　which　Kant　calls　'pure　apperception'。　The
specific　modes　in　which　the　Ego　refers　to　itself　the　multiplicity　of　sense　are　the
pure　concepts　of　the　understanding；　the　Categories。　

Kant；　it　is　well　known；　did　not　put　himself　to　much　trouble　in　discovering　the
categories。　'I'；　the　unity　of　selfconsciousness；　being　quite　abstract　and　completely
indeterminate；　the　question　arises；　how　are　we　to　get　at　the　specialised　forms　of
the　'I'；　the　categories？　Fortunately；　the　common　logic　offers　to　our　hand　an
empirical　classification　of　the　kinds　of　judgement。　Now；　to　judge　is　the　same　as
to　think　of　a　determinate　object。　Hence　the　various　modes　of　judgement；　as
enumerated　to　our　hand；　provide　us　with　the　several　categories　of　thought。　To　the
philosophy　of　Fichte　belongs　the　great　merit　of　having　called　attention　to　the　need
of　exhibiting　the　necessity　of　these　categories　and　giving　a　genuine　deduction　of
them。　Fichte　ought　to　have　produced　at　least　one　effect　on　the　method　of　logic。
One　might　have　expected　that　the　general　laws　of　thought；　the　usual
stock…in…trade　of　logicians；　or　the　classification　of　notions；　judgements；　and
syllogisms；　would　be　no　longer　taken　merely　from　observation　and　so　only
empirically　treated；　but　be　deduced　from　thought　itself。　If　thought　is　to　be　capable
of　proving　anything　at　all；　if　logic　must　insist　upon　the　necessity　of　proofs；　and　if
it　proposes　to　teach　the　theory　of　demonstration；　its　first　care　should　be　to　give　a
reason　for　its　own　subject。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§42n

（1）　Kant　therefore　holds　that　the　categories　have　their　source　in　the　'Ego'　and　that　the　'Ego'
consequently　supplies　the　characteristics　of　universality　and　necessity。　If　we　observe　what　we　have
before　us　primarily；　we　may　describe　it　as　a　congeries　or　diversity：　and　in　the　categories　we　find
the　simple　points　or　units；　to　which　this　congeries　is　made　to　converge。　The　world　of　sense　is　a
scene　of　mutual　exclusion：　its　being　is　outside　itself。　That　is　the　fundamental　feature　of　the　sensible。
'Now'　has　no　meaning　except　in　reference　to　a　before　and　a　hereafter。　Red；　in　the　same　way；　only
subsists　by　being　opposed　to　yellow　and　blue。　Now　this　other　thing　is　outside　the　sensible；　which
latter　is；　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　not　the　other；　and　only　in　so　far　as　that　other　is。　But　thought；　or　the
'Ego'；　occupies　a　position　the　very　reverse　of　the　sensible；　with　its　mutual　exclusions；　and　its　being
outside　itself。　The　'I'　is　the　primary　identity　…　at　one　with　itself　and　all　at　home　in　itself。　The　word　'　I'
expresses　the　mere　act　of　bringing…to…bear…upon…self：　and　whatever　is　placed　in　this　unit　or　focus
is　affected　by　it　and　transformed　into　it。　The　'I'　is　as　it　were　the　crucible　and　the　fire　which
consumes　the　loose　plurality　of　sense　and　reduces　it　to　unity。　This　is　the　process　which　Kant　calls
pure　apperception　in　distinction　from　the　common　apperception；　to　which　the　plurality　it　receives　is
a　plurality　still；　whereas　pure　apperception　is　rather　an　act　by　which　the　'I'　makes　the　materials
'mine'。　

This　view　has　at　least　the　merit　of　giving　a　correct　expression　to　the　nature　of　all　consciousness。
The　tendency　of　all　man's　endeavours　is　to　understand　the　world；　to　appropriate　and　subdue　it　to
himself：　and　to　this　end　the　positive　reality　of　the　world　must　be　as　it　were　crushed　and　pounded；　in
other　words；　idealised。　At　the　same　time　we　must　note　that　it　is　not　the　mere　act　of　our　personal
self…consciousness　which　introduces　an　absolute　unity　into　the　variety　of　sense。　Rather；　this　identity
is　itself　the　absolute。　The　absolute　is；　as　it　were；　so　kind　as　to　leave　individual　things　to　their　own
enjoyment；　and　it　again　drives　them　back　to　the　absolute　unity。　

（2）　Expressions　like　'transcendental　unity　of　self…consciousness'　have　an　ugly　look　about　them；
and　suggest　a　monster　in　the　background：　but　their　meaning　is　not　so　abstruse　as　it　looks。　Kant's
meaning　of　transcendental　may　be　gathered　by　the　way　he　distinguishes　it　from　transcendent。　The
transcendent　may　be　said　to　be　what　steps　out　beyond　the　categories　of　the　understanding：　a　sense
in　which　the　term　is　first　employed　in　mathematics。　Thus　in　geometry　you　are　told　to　conceive　the
circumference　of　a　circle　as　formed　of　an　infinite　number　of　infinitely　small　straight　lines。　In　other
words；　characteristics　which　the　understanding　holds　to　be　totally　different；　the　straight　line　and　the
curve；　are　expressly　invested　with　identity。　Another　transcendent　of　the　same　kind　is　the
self…consciousness　which　is　identical　with　itself　and　infinite　in　itself；　as　distinguished　from　the
ordinary　consciousness　which　derives　its　form　and　tone　from　finite　materials。　That　unity　of
self…consciousness；　however；　Kant　called　transcendental　only；　and　he　meant　thereby　that　the
unity　was　only　in　our　minds　and　did　not　attach　to　the　objects　apart　from　our　knowledge　of　them。　

（3）　To　regard　the　categories　as　subjective　only；　i。e。　as　a　part　of　ourselves；　must　seem　very　odd　to
the　natural　mind；　and　no　doubt　there　is　something　queer　about　it。　It　is　quite　true　however　that　the
categories　are　not　contained　in　the　sensation　as　it　is　given　us。　When；　for　instance；　we　look　at　a
piece　of　sugar；　we　find　it　is　hard；　white；　sweet；　etc。　All　these　properties　we　say　are　united　in　one
object。　Now　it　is　this　unity　that　is　not　found　in　the　sensation。　The　same　thing　happens　if　we
conceive　two　events　to　stand　in　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect。　The　senses　only　inform　us　of　the
two　several　occurrences　which　follow　each　other　in　time。　But　that　the　one　is　cause；　the　other　effect
…　in　other　words；　the　causal　nexus　between　the　two　…　is　not　perceived　by　sense；　it　is　only　evident
to　thought。　Still；　though　the　categories；　such　as　unity；　or　cause　and　effect；　are　strictly　the　property
of　thought；　it　by　no　means　follows　that　they　must　be　ours　merely　and　not　also　characteristics　of　the
objects。　Kant　however　confines　them　to　the　subject…mind；　and　his　philosophy　may　be　styled
subjective　idealism：　for　he　holds　that　both　the　form　and　the　matter　of　knowledge　are　supplied　by
the　Ego　…　or　knowing　subject　…　the　form　by　our　intellectual；　the　matter　by　our　sentient　ego。　

So　far　as　regards　the　content　of　this　subjective　idealism；　not　a　word　need　be　wasted。　It　might
perhaps　at　first　sight　be　imagined；