shorter logic-第23章
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it turned against the deliverances of sense first of all。 （On modern scepticism as
compared with ancient； see Schelling and Hegel's Critical Journal of Philosophy）
III。 Second Attitude of Thought to Objectivity
TWO。 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
§40
In common with Empiricism the Critical Philosophy assumes that experience
affords the one sole foundation for cognitions； which however it does not allow to
rank as truths； but only as knowledge of phenomena。
The Critical theory starts originally from the distinction of elements presented in
the analysis of experience； viz。 the matter of sense； and its universal relations。
Taking into account Hume's criticism on this distinction as given in the preceding
section； viz。 that sensation does not explicitly apprehend more than an individual
or more than a mere event； it insists at the same time on the fact that universality
and necessity are seen to perform a function equally essential in constituting what
is called experience。 This element； not being derived from the empirical facts as
such； must belong to the spontaneity of thought； in other words； it is a priori。
The Categories or Notions of the Understanding constitute the objectivity of
experiential cognitions。 In every case they involve a connective reference； and
hence through their means are formed synthetic judgements a priori； that is；
primary and underivative connections of opposites。
Even Hume's scepticism does not deny that the characteristics of universality and
necessity are found in cognition。 And even in Kant this fact remains a
presupposition after all； it may be said； to use the ordinary phraseology of the
sciences； that Kant did no more than offer another explanation of the fact。
§ 41
The Critical Philosophy proceeds to test the value of the categories employed in
metaphysic； as well as in other sciences and in ordinary conception。 This scrutiny
however is not directed to the content of these categories； nor does it inquire into
the exact relation they bear to one another： but simply considers them as affected
by the contrast between subjective and objective。 The contrast； as we are to
understand it here； bears upon the distinction （see preceding §） of the two
elements in experience。 The name of objectivity is here given to the element of
universality and necessity； i。e。 to the categories themselves； or what is called the a
priori constituent。 The Critical Philosophy however widened the contrast in such
a way； that the subjectivity comes to embrace the ensemble of experience；
including both of the aforesaid elements； and nothing remains on the other side
but the 'thing…in…itself'。
The special forms of the a priori element； in other words； of thought； which in
spite of its objectivity is looked upon as a purely subjective act； present
themselves as follows in a systematic order which； it may be remarked； is solely
based upon psychological and historical grounds。
§41n
（1） A very important step was undoubtedly made； when the terms of the old
metaphysic were subjected to scrutiny。 The plain thinker pursued his
unsuspecting way in those categories which had offered themselves naturally。 It
never occurred to him to ask to what extent these categories had a value and
authority of their own。 If； as has been said； it is characteristic of free thought to
allow no assumptions to pass unquestioned； the old metaphysicians were not free
thinkers。 They accepted their categories as they were； without further trouble； as
an a priori datum； not yet tested by reflection。 The Critical philosophy reversed
this。 Kant undertook to examine how far the forms of thought were capable of
leading to the knowledge of truth。 In particular he demanded a criticism of the
faculty of cognition as preliminary to its exercise。 That is a fair demand； if it mean
that even the forms of thought must be made an object of investigation。
Unfortunately there soon creeps in the misconception of already knowing before
you know … the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to swim。
True； indeed； the forms of thought should be subjected to a scrutiny before they
are used： yet what is this scrutiny but ipso facto a cognition？
So that what we want is to combine in our process of inquiry the action of the
forms of thought with a criticism of them。 The forms of thought must be studied
in their essential nature and complete development： they are at once the object of
research and the action of that object。 Hence they examine themselves： in their
own action they must determine their limits； and point out their defects。 This is
that action of thought； which will hereafter be specially considered under the
name of Dialectic； and regarding which we need only at the outset observe that；
instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without； it is Immanent
in their own action。
We may therefore state the first point in Kant's philosophy as follows： Thought
must itself investigate its own capacity of knowledge。 People in the present day
have got over Kant and his philosophy： everybody wants to get further。 But there
are two ways of going further … a backward and a forward。 The light of criticism
soon shows that many of our modern essays in philosophy are mere repetitions of
the old metaphysical method； an endless and uncritical thinking in a groove
determined by the natural bent of each man's mind。
（2） Kant's examination of the categories suffers from the grave defect of viewing
them； not absolutely and for their own sake； but in order to see whether they are
subjective or objective。 In the language of common life we mean by objective
what exists outside of us and reaches us from without by means of sensation。
What Kant did was to deny that the categories； such as cause and effect； were； in
this sense of the word； objective； or given in sensation； and to maintain on the
contrary that they belonged to our own thought itself； to the spontaneity of
thought。 To that extent therefore they were subjective。 And yet in spite of this；
Kant gives the name objective to what is thought； to the universal and necessary；
while he describes as subjective whatever is merely felt。 This arrangement
apparently reverses the first…mentioned use of the word； and has caused Kant to
be charged with confusing language。 But the charge is unfair if we more narrowly
consider the facts of the case。 The vulgar believe that the objects of perception
which confront them； such as an individual animal； or a single star； are
independent and permanent existences； compared with which thoughts are
unsubstantial and dependent on something else。 In fact however the perceptions
of sense are the properly dependent and secondary feature； while the thoughts are
really independent and primary。 This being so； Kant gave the title objective to the
intellectual factor； to the universal and necessary： and he was quite justified in so
doing。 Our sensations on the other hand are subjective； for sensations lack
stability in their own nature； and are no less fleeting and evanescent than thought
is permanent and self…subsisting。 At the present day； the special line of distinction
established by Kant between the subjective and objective is adopted by the
phraseology of the educated world。 Thus the criticism of a work of art ought； it is
said； to be not subjective； but objective … in other words； instead of springing
from the particular and accidental feeling or temper of the moment； it should keep
its eye on those general points of view which the laws of art establish。 In the
same acceptation we can distinguish in any scientific pursuit the objective and the
subjective interest of the investigation。
But after all； objectivity of thought； in Kant's sense； is again to a certain extent
subjective。 Thoughts； according to Kant； although universal and necessary
categories； are only our thoughts … separated by an impassable gulf from the
thing； as it exists apart from our knowledge。 But the true objectivity of thinking
means that the thoughts； far fro
