shorter logic-第22章

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presupposes　and　applies　the　syllogistic　form。　And　all　the　while　it　is　unaware　that　it
contains　metaphysics　in　wielding　which；　it　makes　use　of　those　categories　and　their
combinations　in　a　style　utterly　thoughtless　and　uncritical。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§38n

From　Empiricism　came　the　cry：　'Stop　roaming　in　empty　abstractions　keep　your　eyes　open；　lay
hold　on　man　and　nature　as　they　are　here　before　you；　enjoy　the　present　moment。'　Nobody　can
deny　that　there　is　a　good　deal　of　truth　in　these　words。　The　everyday　world；　what　is　here　and　now
was　a　good　exchange　for　the　futile　other…world　…　for　the　mirages　and　the　chimeras　of　the　abstract
understanding。　And　thus　was　acquired　an　infinite　principle　…　that　solid　footing　so　much　missed　in
the　old　metaphysic。　Finite　principles　are　the　most　that　the　understanding　can　pick　out　…　and　these
being　essentially　unstable　and　tottering；　the　structure　they　supported　must　collapse　with　a　crash。
Always　the　instinct　of　reason　was　to　find　an　infinite　principle。　As　yet；　the　time　had　not　come　for
finding　it　in　thought。　Hence；　this　instinct　seized　upon　the　present；　the　Here；　the　This　…　where
doubtless　there　is　implicit　infinite　form；　but　not　in　the　genuine　existence　of　that　form。　The　external
world　is　the　truth；　it　if　could　but　know　it：　for　the　truth　is　actual　and　must　exist。　The　infinite　principle；
the　self…centred　truth；　therefore；　is　in　the　world　for　reason　to　discover：　though　it　exists　in　an
individual　and　sensible　shape；　and　not　in　its　truth。　

Besides；　this　school　makes　sense…perception　the　form　in　which　fact　is　to　be　apprehended；　and　in
this　consists　the　defect　of　Empiricism。　Sense　perception　as　such　is　always　individual；　always
transient：　not　indeed　that　the　process　of　knowledge　stops　short　at　sensation：　on　the　contrary；　it
proceeds　to　find　out　the　universal　and　permanent　element　in　the　individual　apprehended　by　sense。
This　is　the　process　leading　from　simple　perception　to　experience。　

In　order　to　form　experiences；　Empiricism　makes　especial　use　of　the　form　of　Analysis。　In　the
impression　of　sense　we　have　a　concrete　of　many　elements；　the　several　attributes　of　which　we　are
expected　to　peel　off　one　by　one；　like　the　coats　of　an　onion。　In　thus　dismembering　the　thing；　it　is
understood　that　we　disintegrate　and　take　to　pieces　these　attributes　which　have　coalesced；　and　add
nothing　but　our　own　act　of　disintegration。　Yet　analysis　is　the　process　from　the　immediacy　of
sensation　to　thought：　those　attributes；　which　the　object　analysed　contains　in　union；　acquire　the　form
of　universality　by　being　separated。　Empiricism　therefore　labours　under　a　delusion；　if　it　supposes
that；　while　analysing　the　objects；　it　leaves　them　as　they　were：　it　really　transforms　the　concrete　into
an　abstract。　And　as　a　consequence　of　this　change　the　living　thing　is　killed：　life　can　exist　only　in　the
concrete　and　one。　Not　that　we　can　do　without　this　division；　if　it　be　our　intention　to　comprehend。
Mind　itself　is　an　inherent　division。　The　error　lies　in　forgetting　that　this　is　only　one　half　of　the
process；　and　that　the　main　point　is　the　reunion　of　what　has　been　parted。　And　it　is　where　analysis
never　gets　beyond　the　stage　of　partition　that　the　words　of　the　poet　are　true：　

　　　　　Encheiresin　Naturae　nennt's　die　Chemie；　
　　　　　Spottet　ihrer　selbat；　und　weiss　nicht；　wie：　
　　　　　hat　die　Theile　in　ihrer　Hand；　
　　　　　Fehlt　leider　nur　das　geistige　Band。　

Analysis　starts　from　the　concrete；　and　the　possession　of　this　material　gives　it　a　considerable
advantage　over　the　abstract　thinking　of　the　old　metaphysics。　It　establishes　the　differences　in　things；
and　this　is　very　important；　but　these　very　differences　are　nothing　after　all　but　abstract　attributes；　i。e。
thoughts。　These　thoughts；　it　is　assumed；　contain　the　real　essence　of　the　objects；　and　thus　once
more　we　see　the　axiom　of　bygone　metaphysics　reappear；　that　the　truth　of　things　lies　in　thought。　

Let　us　next　compare　the　empirical　theory　with　that　of　metaphysics　in　the　matter　of　their　respective
contents　。　We　find　the　latter；　as　already　stated；　taking　for　its　theme　the　universal　objects　of　the
reason；　viz。　God；　the　Soul；　and　the　World：　and　these　themes；　accepted　from　popular　conception；
it　was　the　problem　of　philosophy　to　reduce　into　the　form　of　thoughts。　Another　specimen　of　the
same　method　was　the　Scholastic　philosophy；　the　theme　presupposed　by　which　was　formed　by　the
dogmas　of　the　Christian　Church；　and　it　aimed　at　fixing　their　meaning　and　giving　them　a　systematic
arrangement　through　thought。　The　facts　on　which　Empiricism　is　based　are　of　entirely　different　kind。
They　are　the　sensible　facts　of　nature　and　the　facts　of　the　finite　mind。　In　other　words；　Empiricism
deals　with　a　finite　material；　and　the　old　metaphysicians　had　an　infinite　…　though；　let　us　add；　they
made　this　infinite　content　finite　by　the　finite　form　of　the　understanding。　The　same　finitude　of　form
reappears　in　Empiricism　…　but　here　the　facts　are　finite　also。　To　this　extent；　then；　both　modes　of
philosophising　have　the　same　method；　both　proceed　from　data　or　assumptions；　which　they　accept
as　ultimate。　

Generally　speaking；　Empiricism　finds　the　truth　in　the　outward　world；　and　even　if　it　allow　a
supersensible　world；　it　holds　knowledge　of　that　world　to　be　impossible；　and　would　restrict　us　to
the　province　of　sense…perception。　This　doctrine　when　systematically　carried　out　produces　what
has　been　latterly　termed　Materialism。　Materialism　of　this　stamp　looks　upon　matter；　qua　matter；　as
the　genuine　objective　world。　But　with　matter　we　are　at　once　introduced　to　an　abstraction；　which　as
such　cannot　be　perceived；　and　it　may　be　maintained　that　there　is　no　matter；　because；　as　it　exists；　it
is　always　something　definite　and　concrete。　Yet　the　abstraction　we　term　matter　is　supposed　to　lie　at
the　basis　of　the　whole　world　of　sense；　and　expresses　the　sense…world　in　its　simplest　terms　as
out…and…out　individualisation；　and　hence　a　congeries　of　points　in　mutual　exclusion。　So　long　then　as
this　sensible　sphere　is　and　continues　to　be　for　Empiricism　a　mere　datum；　we　have　a　doctrine　of
bondage：　for　we　become　free；　when　we　are　confronted　by　no　absolutely　alien　world；　but　depend
upon　a　fact　which　we　ourselves　are。　Consistently　with　the　empirical　point　of　view；　besides；　reason
and　unreason　can　only　be　subjective：　in　other　words；　we　must　take　what　is　given　just　as　it　is；　and
we　have　no　right　to　ask　whether　and　to　what　extent　it　is　rational　in　its　own　nature。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§39

Touching　this　principle　it　has　been　justly　observed　that　in　what　we　call
Experience；　as　distinct　from　mere　single　perception　of　single　facts；　there　are　two
elements。　The　one　is　the　matter；　infinite　in　its　multiplicity；　and　as　it　stands　a　mere
set　of　singulars：　the　other　is　the　form；　the　characteristics　of　universality　and
necessity。　Mere　experience　no　doubt　offers　many；　perhaps　innumerable；　cases　of
similar　perceptions：　but；　after　all；　no…multitude；　however　great；　can　be　the　same
thing　as　universality。　Similarly；　mere　experience　affords　perceptions　of　changes
succeeding　each　other　and　of　objects　in　juxtaposition；　but　it　presents　no　necessary
connection。　If　perception；　therefore；　is　to　maintain　its　claim　to　be　the　sole　basis　of
what　men　hold　for　truth；　universality　and　necessity　appear　something　illegitimate：
they　become　an　accident　of　our　minds；　a　mere　custom；　the　content　of　which
might　be　otherwise　constituted　than　it　is。　

It　is　an　important　corollary　of　this　theory；　that　on　this　empirical　mode　of　treatment
legal　and　ethical　principles　and　laws；　as　well　as　the　truths　of　religion；　are　exhibited
as　the　work　of　chance；　and　stripped　of　their　objective　character　and　inner　truth。　

The　scepticism　of　Hume；　to　which　this　conclusion　was　chiefly　due；　should　be
clearly　marked　off　from　Greek　scepticism。　Hume　assumes　the　truth　of　the
empirical　element；　feeling　and　sensation；　and　proceeds　to　challenge　universal
principles　and　laws；　because　they　have　no　warranty　from　sense…perception。　So　far
was　ancient　scepticism　from　making　feeling　and　sensation　the　canon　of　truth；　that
it　turned　against　the　deliverances　of　sense　first　of　all。　（On　modern　scepticism　as
compared　with　ancient；　see　Schelling　and　Heg