shorter logic-第21章
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be an abstraction。 When the notion of God is apprehended only as that of the abstract or most
real being； God is； as it were； relegated to another world beyond： and to speak of a knowledge of
him would be meaningless。 Where there is no definite quality； knowledge is impossible。 Mere light
is mere darkness。
The second problem of rational theology was to prove the existence of God。 Now； in this matter；
the main point to be noted is that demonstration； as the understanding employs it； means the
dependence of one truth on another。 In such proofs we have a presupposition…something firm and
fast； from which something else follows； we exhibit the dependence of some truth from an
assumed starting…point。 Hence； if this mode of demonstration is applied to the existence of God； it
can only mean that the being of God is to depend on other terms； which will then constitute the
ground of his being。 It is at once evident that this will lead to some mistake： for God must be
simply and solely the ground of everything； and in so far not dependent upon anything else。 And a
perception of this danger has in modern times led some to say that God's existence is not capable
of proof； but must be immediately or intuitively apprehended。 Reason； however； and even sound
common sense give demonstration a meaning quite different from that of the understanding。 The
demonstration of reason no doubt starts from something which is not God。 But； as it advances； it
does not leave the starting…point a mere unexplained fact； which is what it was。 On the contrary it
exhibits that point as derivative and called into being； and then God is seen to be primary； truly
immediate； and self…subsisting； with the means of derivation wrapped up and absorbed in himself。
Those who say： 'Consider Nature； and Nature will lead you to God； you will find an absolute final
cause' do not mean that God is something derivative： they mean that it is we who proceed to God
himself from another； and in this way God； though the consequence； is also the absolute ground of
the initial step。 The relation of the two things is reversed； and what came as a consequence being
shown to be an antecedent； the original antecedent is reduced to a consequence。 This is always
the way； moreover； whenever reason demonstrates。
If in the light of the present discussion we cast one glance more on the metaphysical method as a
whole； we find its main characteristic was to make abstract identity its principle and to try to
apprehend the objects of reason by the abstract and finite categories of the understanding。 But this
infinite of the understanding； this pure essence； is still finite： it has excluded all the variety of
particular things； which thus limit and deny it。 Instead of winning a concrete； this metaphysic stuck
fast on an abstract； identity。 Its good point was the perception that thought alone constitutes the
essence of all that is。 It derived its materials from earlier philosophers； particularly the Schoolmen。
In speculative philosophy the understanding undoubtedly forms a stage； but not a stage at which
we should keep for ever standing。 Plato is no metaphysician of this imperfect type； still less
Aristotle； although the contrary is generally believed。
III。 Second Attitude of Thought to Objectivity
ONE。 EMPIRICISM
§37
Under these circumstances a double want began to be felt。 Partly it was the need
of a concrete subject…matter； as a counterpoise to the abstract theories of the
understanding； which is unable to advance unaided from its generalities to
specialisation and determination。 Partly； too； it was the demand for something
fixed and secure； so as to exclude the possibility of proving anything and
everything in the sphere； and according to the method of the finite formulae of
thought。 Such was the genesis of Empirical philosophy； which abandons the
search for truth in thought itself； and goes to fetch it from Experience； the
outward and the inward present。
§37n
The rise of Empiricism is due to the need thus stated of concrete contents； and a firm footing …
needs which the abstract metaphysic of the understanding failed to satisfy。 Now by concreteness
of contents it is meant that we must know the objects of consciousness as intrinsically determinate
and as the unity of distinct characteristics。 But； as we have already seen； this is by no means the
case with the metaphysic of understanding； if it conform to its principle。 With the mere
understanding； thinking is limited to the form of an abstract universal； and can never advance to the
particularisation of this universal。 Thus we find the metaphysicians engaged in an attempt to elicit
by the instrumentality of thought what was the essence or fundamental attribute of the Soul。 The
Soul； they said； is simple。 The simplicity thus ascribed to the Soul meant a mere and utter
simplicity； from which difference is excluded： difference； or in other words composition； being
made the fundamental attribute of body； or of matter in general。 Clearly； in simplicity of this narrow
type we have a very shallow category； quite incapable of embracing the wealth of the soul or of
the mind。 When it thus appeared that abstract metaphysical thinking was inadequate； it was felt
that resource must be had to empirical psychology。 The same happened in the case of Rational
Physics。 The current phrases there were； for instance； that space is infinite； that Nature makes no
leap； etc。 Evidently this phraseology was wholly unsatisfactory in presence of the plenitude and life
of nature。
§ 38
To some extent this source from which Empiricism draws is common to it with
metaphysic。 It is in our materialised conceptions； i。e。 in facts which emanate； in
the first instance； from experience； that metaphysic also finds the guarantee for
the correctness of its definitions （including both its initial assumptions and its
more detailed body of doctrine）。 But； on the other hand； it must be noted that the
single sensation is not the same thing as experience； and that the Empirical School
elevates the facts included under sensation； feeling； and perception into the form
of general ideas propositions； or laws。 This； however； it does with the reservation
that these general principles （such as force） are to have no further import or
validity of their own beyond that taken from the sense impression； and that no
connection shall be deemed legitimate except what can be shown to exist in
phenomena。 And on the subjective side Empirical cognition has its stable footing
in the fact that in a sensation consciousness is directly present and certain of
itself。
In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must be in the actual
world and present to sensation。 This principle contradicts that 'ought to be' on the
strength of which 'reflection' is vain enough to treat the actual present with scorn
and to point to a scene beyond a scene which is assumed to have place and being
only in the understanding of those who talk of it。 No less than Empiricism；
philosophy （§ 7） recognises only what is； and has nothing to do with what merely
ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist。 On the subjective side； too； it
is right to notice the valuable principle of freedom involved in Empiricism。 For the
main lesson of Empiricism is that man must see for himself and feel that he is
present in every fact of knowledge which he has to accept。
When it is carried out to its legitimate consequences； Empiricism being in its facts
limited to the finite sphere denies the supersensible in general； or at least any
knowledge of it which would define its nature； it leaves thought no powers except
abstraction and formal universality and identity。 But there is a fundamental
delusion in all scientific empiricism。 It employs the metaphysical categories of
matter； force； those of one； many； generality； infinity； etc。； following the clue
given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions； and in so doing
presupposes and applies the syllogistic form。 And all the w
