shorter logic-第17章
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very expression cannot fail to suggest an opposition； to characterise and
appreciate which is the main motive of the philosophical attitude of the present
time； and which forms the real problem of the question about truth and our
means of ascertaining it。 If the thought…forms are vitiated by a fixed antithesis； i。e。
if they are only of a finite character； they are unsuitable for the self…centred
universe of truth； and truth can find no adequate receptacle in thought。 Such
thought； which can produce only limited and partial categories and proceed by
their means； is what in the stricter sense of the word is termed Understanding。
The finitude； further； of these categories lies in two points。 Firstly； they are only
subjective； and the antithesis of an objective permanently clings to them。
Secondly； they are always of restricted content； and so persist in antithesis to one
another and still more to the Absolute。 In order more fully to explain the position
and import here attributed to logic； the attitudes in which thought is supposed to
stand to objectivity will next be examined by way of further introduction。
In my Phenomenology of the Spirit； which on that account was at its publication
described as the first part of the System of Philosophy； the method adopted was
to begin with the first and simplest phase of mind； immediate consciousness； and
to show how that stage gradually of necessity worked onward to the philosophical
point of view； the necessity of that view being proved by the process。 But in
these circumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to the mere form of
consciousness。 For the stage of philosophical knowledge is the richest in material
and organisation； and therefore； as it came before us in the shape of a result； it
presupposed the existence of the concrete formations of consciousness； such as
individual and social morality； art and religion。 In the development of
consciousness； which at first sight appears limited to the point of form merely；
there is thus at the same time included the development of the matter or of the
objects discussed in the special branches of philosophy。 But the latter process
must； so to speak； go on behind consciousness； since those facts are the essential
nucleus which is raised into consciousness。 The exposition accordingly is rendered
more intricate； because so much that properly belongs to the concrete branches is
prematurely dragged into the introduction。 The survey which follows in the
present work has even more the inconvenience of being only historical and
inferential in its method。 But it tries especially to show how the questions men
have proposed； outside the school； on the nature of Knowledge； Faith； and the
like…questions which they imagine to have no connection with abstract thoughts …
are really reducible to the simple categories； which first get cleared up in Logic。
III。 First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity
§26
The first of these attitudes of thought is seen in the method which has no doubts
and no sense of the contradiction in thought； or of the hostility of thought against
itself。 It entertains an unquestioning belief that reflection is the means of
ascertaining the truth； and of bringing the objects before the mind as they really
are。 And in this belief it advances straight upon its objects； takes the materials
furnished by sense and perception； and reproduces them from itself as facts of
thought； and then； believing this result to be the truth； the method is content。
Philosophy in its earliest stages； all the sciences； and even the daily action and
movement of consciousness； live in this faith。
§27
This method of thought has never become aware of the antithesis of subjective
and objective： and to that extent there is nothing to prevent its statements from
possessing a genuinely philosophical and speculative character； though it is just as
possible that they may never get beyond finite categories； or the stage where the
antithesis is still unresolved。 In the present introduction the main question for us is
to observe this attitude of thought in its extreme form； and we shall accordingly
first of all examine its second and inferior aspect as a philosophic system。 One of
the clearest instances of it； and one lying nearest to ourselves； may be found in
the Metaphysic of the Past as it subsisted among us previous to the philosophy of
Kant。 It is however only in reference to the history of philosophy that this
Metaphysic can be said to belong to the past： the thing is always and at all places
to be found； as the view which the abstract understanding takes of the objects of
reason。 And it is in this point that the real and immediate good lies in a closer
examination of its main scope and its modis operandi。
§28
This metaphysical system took the laws and forms of thought to be the
fundamental laws and forms of things。 It assumed that to think a thing was the
means of finding its very self and nature： and to that extent it occupied higher
ground than the Critical Philosophy which succeeded it。 But in the first instance
（1） these terms of thought were cut off from their connection； their solidarity；
each was believed valid by itself and capable of serving as a predicate of the
truth。 It was the general assumption of this metaphysic that a knowledge of the
Absolute was gained by assigning predicates to it。 It neither inquired what the
terms of the understanding specially meant or what they were worth； no…r did it
test the method which characterises the Absolute by the assignment of predicates。
As an example of such predicates may be taken： Existence； in the proposition；
'God has existence'； Finitude or Infinity； as in the question； 'Is the world finite or
infinite？'； Simple and Complex； in the proposition； 'The Soul is simple' or again；
'The thing is a unity； a whole'； etc。 Nobody asked whether such predicates had
any intrinsic and independent truth； or if the propositional form could be a form
of truth。
§28n
The Metaphysic of the past assumed； as unsophisticated belief always does； that thought
apprehends the very self of things； and that things； to become what they truly are； require to be
thought。 For Nature and the human soul are a very Proteus in their perpetual transformations； and
it soon occurs to the observer that the first crude impression of things is not their essential being。
This is a point of view the very reverse of the result arrived at by the Critical Philosophy； a result；
of which it may be said； that it bade man go and feed on mere husks and chaff。
We must look more closely into the procedure of that old metaphysic。 In the first place it never
went beyond the province of the analytic understanding。 Without preliminary inquiry it adopted the
abstract categories of thought and let them rank as predicates of truth。 But in using the term
thought we must not forget the difference between finite or discursive thinking and the thinking
which is infinite and rational。 The categories； as they meet us prima facie and in isolation； are finite
forms。 But truth is always infinite； and cannot be expressed or presented to consciousness in finite
terms。 The phrase infinite thought may excite surprise； if we adhere to the modern conception
that thought is always limited。 But it is； speaking rightly； the very essence of thought to be infinite。
The nominal explanation of calling a thing finite is that it has an end； that it exists up to a certain
point only； where it comes into contact with； and is limited by； its other。 The finite therefore
subsists in reference to its other； which is its negation and presents itself as its limit。 Now thought is
always in its own sphere its relations are with itself； and it is its own object。 In having a thought for
object； I am at home with myself。 The thinking power； the 'I'； is therefore infinite； because； when it
thinks； it is in relation to an object which is itself。 Generally speaking； an object means a something
else； a negative confronting me。
