shorter logic-第13章

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objective　being　of　things。　To　discover　the　truth　in　things；　mere　attention　is　not
enough；　we　must　call　in　the　action　of　our　own　faculties　to　transform　what　is
immediately　before　us。　Now；　at　first　sight；　this　seems　an　inversion　of　the　natural
order；　calculated　to　thwart　the　very　purpose　on　which　knowledge　is　bent。　But　the
method　is　not　so　irrational　as　it　seems。　It　has　been　the　conviction　of　every　age
that　the　only　way　of　reaching　the　permanent　substratum　was　to　transmute　the
given　phenomenon　by　means　of　reflection。　In　modern　times　a　doubt　has　for　the
first　time　been　raised　on　this　point　in　connection　with　the　difference　alleged　to
exist　between　the　products　of　our　thought　and　the　things　in　their　own　nature。　This
real　nature　of　things；　it　is　said；　is　very　different　from　what　we　make　out　of　them。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Kantian　Scepticism

The　divorce　between　thought　and　thing　is　mainly　the　work　of　the　Critical
Philosophy；　and　runs　counter　to　the　conviction　of　all　previous　ages；　that　their
agreement　was　a　matter　of　course。　The；　antithesis　between　them　is　the　hinge　on
which　modern　philosophy　turns。　Meanwhile　the　natural　belief　of　men　gives　the　lie
to　it。　In　common　life　we　reflect；　without　particularly　reminding　ourselves　that　this
is　the　process　of　arriving　at　the　truth；　and　we　think　without　hesitation；　and　in　the
firm　belief　that　thought　coincides　with　thing。　And　this　belief　is　of　the　greatest
importance。　It　marks　the　diseased　state　of　the　age　when　we　see　it　adopt　the
despairing　creed　that　our　knowledge　is　only　subjective；　and　that　beyond　this
subjective　we　cannot　go。　Whereas；　rightly　understood；　truth　is　objective；　and
ought　so　to　regulate　the　conviction　of　every　one；　that　the　conviction　of　the
individual　is　stamped　as　wrong　when　it　does　not　agree　with　this　rule。　Modem
views；　on　the　contrary；　put　great　value　on　the　mere　fact　of　conviction；　and　hold
that　to　be　convinced　is　good　for　its　own　sake；　whatever　be　the　burden　of　our
conviction　…　there　being　no　standard　by　which　we　can　measure　its　truth。

We　said　above　that；　according　to　the　old　belief；　it　was　the　characteristic　right　of
the　mind　to　know　the　truth。　If　this　be　so；　it　also　implies　that　everything　we　know
both　of　outward　and　inward　nature；　in　one　word；　the　objective　world；　is　in　its
own　self　the　same　as　it　is　in　thought；　and　that　to　think　is　to　bring　out　the　truth　of
our　object；　be　it　what　it　may。　The　business　of　philosophy　is　only　to　bring　into
explicit　consciousness　what　the　world　in　all　ages　has　believed　about　thought。
Philosophy　therefore　advances　nothing　new；　and　our　present　discussion　has　led　us
to　a　conclusion　which　agrees　with　the　natural　belief　of　mankind。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　〃Think　for　Yourself〃
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　23

（d）　The　real　nature　of　the　object　is　brought　to　light　in　reflection；　but　it　is　no　less
true　that　this　exertion　of　thought　is　my　act。　If　this　be　so；　the　real　nature　is　a
product　of　my　mind；　in　its　character　of　thinking　subject　…　generated　by　me　my
simple　universality；　self…collected　and　removed　from　extraneous　influences　…　in
one　word；　in　my　Freedom。

'Think　for　yourself'　is　a　phrase　which　people　often　use　as　if　it　had　some　special
significance。　The　fact　is；　no　man　can　think　for　another；　any　more　than　he　can　eat
or　drink　for　him　and　the　expression　is　a　pleonasm。　To　think　is　in　fact　ipso　facto　to
be　free；　for　thought　as　the　action　of　the　universal　is　an　abstract　relating　of　self　to
self；　where；　being　at　home　with　ourselves；　and　as　regards　our　subjectivity　utterly
blank；　our　consciousness　is；　in　the　matter　of　its　contents；　only　in　the　fact　and　its
characteristics。　If　this　be　admitted；　and　if　we　apply　the　term　humility　or　modesty
to　an　attitude　where　our　subjectivity　is　not　allowed　to　interfere　by　act　or　quality；　it
is　easy　to　appreciate　the　question　touching　the　humility　or　modesty　and　pride　of
philosophy。　For　in　point　of　contents；　thought　is　only　true　in　proportion　as　it　sinks
itself　in　the　facts；　and　in　point　of　form　it　is　no　private　or　particular　state　or　act　of
the　subject；　but　rather　that　attitude　of　consciousness　where　the　abstract　self；　freed
from　all　the　special　limitations　to　which　its　ordinary　states　or　qualities　are　liable；
restricts　itself　to　that　universal　action　in　which　it　is　identical　with　all　individuals。　In
these　circumstances　philosophy　may　be　acquitted　of　the　charge　of　pride。　And
when　Aristotle　summons　the　mind　to　rise　to　the　dignity　of　that　attitude；　the　dignity
he　seeks　is　won　by　letting　slip　all　our　individual　opinions　and　prejudices；　and
submitting　to　the　sway　of　the　fact。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　Objectivity　of　Thought
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　24

With　these　explanations　and　qualifications；　thoughts　may　be　termed　Objective
Thoughts　…　among　which　are　also　to　be　included　the　forms　which　are　more
especially　discussed　in　the　common　logic；　where　they　are　usually　treated　as　forms
of　conscious　thought　only。　Logic　therefore　coincides　with　Metaphysics；　the
science　of　things　set　and　held　in　thoughts　…　thoughts　accredited　able　to　express
the　essential　reality　of　things。

An　exposition　of　the　relation　in　which　such　forms　as　notion；　judgment；　and
syllogism　stand　to　others；　such　as　causality；　is　a　matter　for　the　science　itself。　But
this　much　is　evident　beforehand。　If　thought　tries　to　form　a　notion　of　things；　this
notion　（as　well　as　its　proximate　phases；　the　judgement　and　syllogism）　cannot　be
composed　of　articles　and　relations　which　are　alien　and　irrelevant　to　the　things。
Reflection；　it　was　said　above；　conducts　to　the　universal　of　things：　which　universal
is　itself　one　of　the　constituent　factors　of　a　notion。　To　say　that　Reason　or
Understanding　is　in　the　world；　is　equivalent　in　its　import　to　the　phrase　'Objective
Thought'。　The　latter　phrase　however　has　the　inconvenience　that　thought　is　usually
confined　to　express　what　belongs　to　the　mind　or　consciousness　only；　while
objective　is　a　term　applied；　at　least　primarily；　only　to　the　non…mental。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§24n

（1）　To　speak　of　thought　or　objective　thought　as　the　heart　and　soul　of　the　world；　may　seem　to　be
ascribing　consciousness　to　the　things　of　nature。　We　feel　a　certain　repugnance　against　making
thought　the　inward　function　of　things；　especially　as　we　speak　of　thought　as　marking　the　divergence
of　man　from　nature。　It　would　be　necessary；　therefore；　if　we　use　the　term　thought　at　all；　to　speak　of
nature　as　the　system　of　unconscious　thought；　or；　to　use　Schelling's　expression；　a　petrified
intelligence。　And　in　order　to　prevent　misconception；　'thought…form'　or　'thought…type'　should　be
substituted　for　the　ambiguous　term　thought。

From　what　has　been　said　the　principles　of　logic　are　to　be　sought　in　a　system　of　thought…types　or
fundamental　categories；　in　which　the　opposition　between　subjective　and　objective；　in　its　usual
sense　vanishes。　The　signification　thus　attached　to　thought　and　its　characteristic　forms　may　be
illustrated　by　the　ancient　saying　that　'nous　governs　the　world'；　or　by　our　own　phrase　that　'Reason
is　in　the　world'；　which　means　that　Reason　is　the　soul　of　the　world　it　inhabits；　its　immanent　principle；
its　most　proper　and　inward　nature；　its　universal。　Another　illustration　is　offered　by　the　circumstance
that　in　speaking　of　some　definite　animal　we　say　it　is　（an）　animal。　Now；　the　animal；　qua　animal；
cannot　be　shown；　nothing　can　be　pointed　out　excepting　some　special　animal。　Animal；　qua　animal；
does　not　exist：　it　is　merely　the　universal　nature　of　the　individual　animals；　while　each　existing　animal
is　a　more　concretely　defined　and　particularised　thing。　But　to　be　an　animal　…　the　law　of　kind　which　is
the　universal　in　this　case　…　is　the　property　of　the　particular　animal；　and　constitutes　its　definite
essence。　Take　away　from　the　dog　its　animality；　and　it　becomes　impossible　to　say　what　it　is。　All
things　have　a　permanent　inward　nature；　as　well　as　an　outward　existence。　They　live　and　die；　arise
and　pass　away；　but　their　essential　and　universal　part　is　the　kind；　and　this　means　much　more　than
something　common　to　them　all。

If　thought　is　the　constitutive　substance　of　external　things；　it　is　also　the　universal　substance　of　what　is