shorter logic-第11章
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Thought regarded as an activity
§20
If we take our prima facie impression of thought； we find on examination first （a）
that； in its usual subjective acceptation； thought is one out of many activities or
faculties of the mind； coordinate with such others as sensation； perception；
imagination； desire； volition； and the like。 The product of this activity； the form or
character peculiar to thought； is the UNIVERSAL； or； in general； the abstract。
Thought； regarded as an activity； may be accordingly described as the active
universal； and； since the deed； its product； is the universal once more； may be
called the self…actualising universal。 Thought conceived as a subject （agent） is a
thinker； and the subject existing as a thinker is simply denoted by the term 'I'。
The distinction between Sense； Conception； and Thought。
The propositions giving an account of thought in this and the following sections
are not offered as assertions or opinions of mine on the matter。 But in these
preliminary chapters any deduction or proof would be impossible； and the
statements may be taken as matters in evidence。 In other words； every man；
when he thinks and considers his thoughts； will discover by the experience of his
consciousness that they possess the character of universality as well as the other
aspects of thought to be afterwards enumerated。 We assume of course that his
powers of attention and abstraction have undergone 'a previous training； enabling
him to observe correctly the evidence of his consciousness and his conceptions。
This introductory exposition has already alluded to the distinction between Sense；
Conception； and Thought。 As the distinction is of capital importance for
understanding the nature and kinds of knowledge； it will help to explain matters if
we here call attention to it。 For the explanation of Sense； the readiest method
certainly is to refer to its external source … the organs of sense。 But to name the
organ does not help much to explain what is apprehended by it。 The real
distinction between sense and thought lies in this … that the essential feature of the
sensible is individuality； and as the individual （which； reduced to its simplest
terms； is the atom） is also a member of a group； sensible existence presents a
number of mutually exclusive units … of units； to speak in more definite and
abstract formulae； which exist side by side with； and after； one another。
Conception or picture…thinking works with materials from the same sensuous
source。 But these materials when conceived are expressly characterised as in me
and therefore mine； and secondly； as universal； or simple； because only referred
to self。 Nor is sense the only source of materialised conception。 There are
conceptions constituted by materials emanating from self…conscious thought； such
as those of law； morality； religion； and even of thought itself； and it requires some
effort to detect wherein lies the difference between such conceptions and
thoughts having the same import。 For it is a thought of which such conception is
the vehicle； and there is no want of the form of universality； without which no
content could be in me； or be a conception at all。 Yet here also the peculiarity of
conception is； generally speaking； to be sought in the individualism or isolation of
its contents。 True it is that； for example； law and legal provisions do not exist in a
sensible space； mutually excluding one another。 Nor as regards time； though they
appear to some extent in succession； are their contents themselves conceived as
affected by time； or as transient and changeable in it。 The fault in conception lies
deeper。 These ideas； though implicitly possessing the organic unity of mind； stand
isolated here and there on the broad ground of conception； with its inward and
abstract generality。 Thus cut adrift； each is simple； unrelated： Right； Duty； God。
Conception in these circumstances either rests satisfied with declaring that Right is
Right； God is God； or in a higher grade of culture it proceeds to enunciate the
attributes： as； for instance； God is the Creator of the world； omniscient； almighty；
etc。 In this way several isolated； simple predicates are strung together： but in spite
of the link supplied by their subject； the predicates never get beyond mere
contiguity。 In this point Conception coincides with Understanding： the only
distinction being that the latter introduces relations of universal and particular； of
cause and effect； etc。； and in this way supplies a necessary connection to the
isolated ideas of conception； which last has left them side by side in its vague
mental spaces； connected only by a bare 'and'。
The difference between conception and thought is of special individuality and
mutual exclusion of the members。 It is well to remember that these very attributes
of sense are thoughts and general terms。 It will be shown in the Logic that thought
（and the universal） is not a mere opposite of sense： it lets nothing escape it； but；
outflanking its other； is at once that other and itself。 Now language is the work of
thought： and hence all that is expressed in language must be universal。 What I
only mean or suppose is mine： it belongs to me … this particular individual。 But
language expresses nothing but universality； and so I cannot say what I merely
mean。 And the unutterable … feeling or sensation … far from being the highest truth；
is the most unimportant and untrue。 If I say 'the individual'； 'this individual'；
'here'； 'now'； all these are universal terms。 Everything and anything is an
individual； a 'this'； and if it be sensible； is here and now。 Similarly when I say 'I'； I
mean my single self to the exclusion of all others； but what I say； viz。 'I'； is just
every 'I'； which in like manner excludes all others from itself。 In an awkward
expression which Kant used； he said that I accompany all my conceptions …
sensations； too； desires； actions； etc。 'I' is in essence and act the universal： and
such partnership is a form； though an external form； of universality。 All other men
have it in common with me to be 'I'； just as it is common to all my sensations and
conceptions to be mine。 But 'I'； in the abstract； as such； is the mere act of
self…concentration or self…relation； in which we make abstraction from all
conception and feeling； from every state of mind and every peculiarity of nature；
talent； and experience。 To this extent； 'I' is the existence of a wholly abstract
universality； a principle of abstract freedom。
Hence thought； viewed as a subject； is what is expressed by the word 'I'； and
since I am at the same time in all my sensations； conceptions； and states of
consciousness； thought is everywhere present； and is a category that runs through
all these modifications。
Thought regarded as an activity
§20n
Our first impression when we use the term 'thought' is of a subjective activity … one among many
similar faculties； such as memory； imagination； and will。 Were thought merely an activity of the
subject…mind and treated under that aspect by Logic； Logic would resemble the other sciences in
possessing a well…marked object。 It might in that case seem arbitrary to devote a special science
to thought； while will； imagination； and the rest were denied the same privilege。 The selection of
one faculty however might even in this view be very well grounded on a certain authority
acknowledged to belong to thought； and on its claim to be regarded as the true nature of man； in
which consists his distinction from the brutes。 Nor is it unimportant to study thought even as a
subjective energy。 A detailed analysis of its nature would exhibit rules and laws； a knowledge of
which is derived from experience。 A treatment of the laws of thought； from this point of view； used
once to form the body of logical science。 Of that science Aristotle was the founder。 He succeeded
in assigning to thought what properly belongs to it。 Our thought is extremely concrete； but in its
composite contents we must distinguish the part that properly belongs to thought
