on the soul-第7章
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e soul must either be homogeneous； or such that there are some parts of the Whole in which it is not to be found。 From what has been said it is now clear that knowing as an attribute of soul cannot be explained by soul's being composed of the elements； and that it is neither sound nor true to speak of soul as moved。 But since （a） knowing； perceiving； opining； and further （b） desiring； wishing； and generally all other modes of appetition； belong to soul； and （c） the local movements of animals； and （d） growth； maturity； and decay are produced by the soul； we must ask whether each of these is an attribute of the soul as a whole； i。e。 whether it is with the whole soul we think； perceive； move ourselves； act or are acted upon； or whether each of them requires a different part of the soul？ So too with regard to life。 Does it depend on one of the parts of soul？ Or is it dependent on more than one？ Or on all？ Or has it some quite other cause？ Some hold that the soul is divisible； and that one part thinks； another desires。 If； then； its nature admits of its being divided； what can it be that holds the parts together？ Surely not the body； on the contrary it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together； at any rate when the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays。 If； then； there is something else which makes the soul one； this unifying agency would have the best right to the name of soul； and we shall have to repeat for it the question： Is it one or multipartite？ If it is one； why not at once admit that 'the soul' is one？ If it has parts； once more the question must be put： What holds its parts together； and so ad infinitum？ The question might also be raised about the parts of the soul： What is the separate role of each in relation to the body？ For； if the whole soul holds together the whole body； we should expect each part of the soul to hold together a part of the body。 But this seems an impossibility； it is difficult even to imagine what sort of bodily part mind will hold together； or how it will do this。 It is a fact of observation that plants and certain insects go on living when divided into segments； this means that each of the segments has a soul in it identical in species； though not numerically identical in the different segments； for both of the segments for a time possess the power of sensation and local movement。 That this does not last is not surprising； for they no longer possess the organs necessary for self…maintenance。 But； all the same； in each of the bodily parts there are present all the parts of soul； and the souls so present are homogeneous with one another and with the whole； this means that the several parts of the soul are indisseverable from one another； although the whole soul is divisible。 It seems also that the principle found in plants is also a kind of soul； for this is the only principle which is common to both animals and plants； and this exists in isolation from the principle of sensation； though there nothing which has the latter without the former。
Book II 1
LET the foregoing suffice as our account of the views concerning the soul which have been handed on by our predecessors； let us now dismiss them and make as it were a completely fresh start； endeavouring to give a precise answer to the question； What is soul？ i。e。 to formulate the most general possible definition of it。 We are in the habit of recognizing； as one determinate kind of what is； substance； and that in several senses； （a） in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not 'a this'； and （b） in the sense of form or essence； which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this'； and thirdly （c） in the sense of that which is compounded of both （a） and （b）。 Now matter is potentiality； form actuality； of the latter there are two grades related to one another as e。g。 knowledge to the exercise of knowledge。 Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies； for they are the principles of all other bodies。 Of natural bodies some have life in them； others not； by life we mean self…nutrition and growth （with its correlative decay）。 It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite。 But since it is also a body of such and such a kind； viz。 having life； the body cannot be soul； the body is the subject or matter； not what is attributed to it。 Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it。 But substance is actuality； and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized。 Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge。 It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense； viz。 that of knowledge as possessed； for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul； and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing； sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed； and； in the history of the individual； knowledge comes before its employment or exercise。 That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it。 The body so described is a body which is organized。 The parts of plants in spite of their extreme simplicity are 'organs'； e。g。 the leaf serves to shelter the pericarp； the pericarp to shelter the fruit； while the roots of plants are analogous to the mouth of animals； both serving for the absorption of food。 If； then； we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul； we must describe it as the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body。 That is why we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one： it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one； or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter。 Unity has many senses （as many as 'is' has）； but the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality。 We have now given an answer to the question； What is soul？…an answer which applies to it in its full extent。 It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence。 That means that it is 'the essential whatness' of a body of the character just assigned。 Suppose that what is literally an 'organ'； like an axe； were a natural body； its 'essential whatness'； would have been its essence； and so its soul； if this disappeared from it； it would have ceased to be an axe； except in name。 As it is； it is just an axe； it wants the character which is required to make its whatness or formulable essence a soul； for that； it would have had to be a natural body of a particular kind； viz。 one having in itself the power of setting itself in movement and arresting itself。 Next； apply this doctrine in the case of the 'parts' of the living body。 Suppose that the eye were an animal…sight would have been its soul； for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula； the eye being merely the matter of seeing； when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye； except in name…it is no more a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure。 We must now extend our consideration from the 'parts' to the whole living body； for what the departmental sense is to the bodily part which is its organ； that the whole faculty of sense is to the whole sensitive body as such。 We must not understand by that which is 'potentially capable of living' what has lost the soul it had； but only what still retains it； but seeds and fruits are bodies which possess the qualification。 Consequently； while waking is actuality in a sense corresponding to the cutting and the seeing； the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool； the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality； as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye； so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal。 From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body； or at any rate t
