on the soul-第6章
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pt be made to start from this as the account of soul and explain from it the affections and actions of the soul； e。g。 reasoning； sensation； pleasure； pain； &c。 For； to repeat what we have said earlier； movement and number do not facilitate even conjecture about the derivative properties of soul。 Such are the three ways in which soul has traditionally been defined； one group of thinkers declared it to be that which is most originative of movement because it moves itself； another group to be the subtlest and most nearly incorporeal of all kinds of body。 We have now sufficiently set forth the difficulties and inconsistencies to which these theories are exposed。 It remains now to examine the doctrine that soul is composed of the elements。 The reason assigned for this doctrine is that thus the soul may perceive or come to know everything that is； but the theory necessarily involves itself in many impossibilities。 Its upholders assume that like is known only by like； and imagine that by declaring the soul to be composed of the elements they succeed in identifying the soul with all the things it is capable of apprehending。 But the elements are not the only things it knows； there are many others； or； more exactly； an infinite number of others； formed out of the elements。 Let us admit that the soul knows or perceives the elements out of which each of these composites is made up； but by what means will it know or perceive the composite whole； e。g。 what God； man； flesh； bone （or any other compound） is？ For each is； not merely the elements of which it is composed； but those elements combined in a determinate mode or ratio； as Empedocles himself says of bone；
The kindly Earth in its broad…bosomed moulds Won of clear Water two parts out of eight； And four of Fire； and so white bones were formed。
Nothing； therefore； will be gained by the presence of the elements in the soul； unless there be also present there the various formulae of proportion and the various compositions in accordance with them。 Each element will indeed know its fellow outside； but there will be no knowledge of bone or man； unless they too are present in the constitution of the soul。 The impossibility of this needs no pointing out； for who would suggest that stone or man could enter into the constitution of the soul？ The same applies to 'the good' and 'the not…good'； and so on。 Further； the word 'is' has many meanings： it may be used of a 'this' or substance； or of a quantum； or of a quale； or of any other of the kinds of predicates we have distinguished。 Does the soul consist of all of these or not？ It does not appear that all have common elements。 Is the soul formed out of those elements alone which enter into substances？ so how will it be able to know each of the other kinds of thing？ Will it be said that each kind of thing has elements or principles of its own； and that the soul is formed out of the whole of these？ In that case； the soul must be a quantum and a quale and a substance。 But all that can be made out of the elements of a quantum is a quantum； not a substance。 These （and others like them） are the consequences of the view that the soul is composed of all the elements。 It is absurd； also； to say both （a） that like is not capable of being affected by like； and （b） that like is perceived or known by like； for perceiving； and also both thinking and knowing； are； on their own assumption； ways of being affected or moved。 There are many puzzles and difficulties raised by saying； as Empedocles does； that each set of things is known by means of its corporeal elements and by reference to something in soul which is like them； and additional testimony is furnished by this new consideration； for all the parts of the animal body which consist wholly of earth such as bones； sinews； and hair seem to be wholly insensitive and consequently not perceptive even of objects earthy like themselves； as they ought to have been。 Further； each of the principles will have far more ignorance than knowledge； for though each of them will know one thing； there will be many of which it will be ignorant。 Empedocles at any rate must conclude that his God is the least intelligent of all beings； for of him alone is it true that there is one thing； Strife； which he does not know； while there is nothing which mortal beings do not know； for ere is nothing which does not enter into their composition。 In general； we may ask； Why has not everything a soul； since everything either is an element； or is formed out of one or several or all of the elements？ Each must certainly know one or several or all。 The problem might also be raised； What is that which unifies the elements into a soul？ The elements correspond； it would appear； to the matter； what unites them； whatever it is； is the supremely important factor。 But it is impossible that there should be something superior to； and dominant over； the soul （and a fortiori over the mind）； it is reasonable to hold that mind is by nature most primordial and dominant； while their statement that it is the elements which are first of all that is。 All； both those who assert that the soul； because of its knowledge or perception of what is compounded out of the elements； and is those who assert that it is of all things the most originative of movement； fail to take into consideration all kinds of soul。 In fact （1） not all beings that perceive can originate movement； there appear to be certain animals which stationary； and yet local movement is the only one； so it seems； which the soul originates in animals。 And （2） the same object…on holds against all those who construct mind and the perceptive faculty out of the elements； for it appears that plants live； and yet are not endowed with locomotion or perception； while a large number of animals are without discourse of reason。 Even if these points were waived and mind admitted to be a part of the soul （and so too the perceptive faculty）； still； even so； there would be kinds and parts of soul of which they had failed to give any account。 The same objection lies against the view expressed in the 'Orphic' poems： there it is said that the soul comes in from the whole when breathing takes place； being borne in upon the winds。 Now this cannot take place in the case of plants； nor indeed in the case of certain classes of animal； for not all classes of animal breathe。 This fact has escaped the notice of the holders of this view。 If we must construct the soul out of the elements； there is no necessity to suppose that all the elements enter into its construction； one element in each pair of contraries will suffice to enable it to know both that element itself and its contrary。 By means of the straight line we know both itself and the curved…the carpenter's rule enables us to test both…but what is curved does not enable us to distinguish either itself or the straight。 Certain thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe； and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of gods。 This presents some difficulties： Why does the soul when it resides in air or fire not form an animal； while it does so when it resides in mixtures of the elements； and that although it is held to be of higher quality when contained in the former？ （One might add the question； why the soul in air is maintained to be higher and more immortal than that in animals。） Both possible ways of replying to the former question lead to absurdity or paradox； for it is beyond paradox to say that fire or air is an animal； and it is absurd to refuse the name of animal to what has soul in it。 The opinion that the elements have soul in them seems to have arisen from the doctrine that a whole must be homogeneous with its parts。 If it is true that animals become animate by drawing into themselves a portion of what surrounds them； the partisans of this view are bound to say that the soul of the Whole too is homogeneous with all its parts。 If the air sucked in is homogeneous； but soul heterogeneous； clearly while some part of soul will exist in the inbreathed air； some other part will not。 The soul must either be homogeneous； or such that there are some parts of the Whole in which it is not
